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Abstract	
There are 14 designated “toxic hotspots,” or “Areas of Concern” (AOCs), around 
Michigan’s coasts where legacy contamination impairs water quality. The State’s Office 
of the Great Lakes manages the Remedial Action Planning (RAP) process and engages 
stakeholders through local Public Advisory Councils (PACs). Michigan began Remedial 
Action Planning in 1985, but to date, only two AOCs have completed cleanup. The 
overarching objective of this study is to determine: why does RAP implementation 
progress differ among AOCs? This study asks the research question: what factors enable 
and constrain a PAC’s ability to influence RAP implementation progress? The existing 
literature solicits responses from state and federal agency participants, and the dominant 
explanatory narrative is that maximum public representation on PACs facilitates RAP 
implementation progress. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 29 past and 
current PAC participants in a representative set of five Michigan AOCs (Kalamazoo 
River, Lower Menominee River, Saginaw River and Bay, St. Clair River, and White 
Lake). Among the factors that enable progress, PACs benefit from: motivated, engaged 
individuals from the community; consistent and flexible funding; strong leadership; and 
perceptions of independence and influence. Constraints to a PAC’s influence on RAP 
implementation progress include: poorly managed meetings; inconsistent commitment 
from community members and organizations; and inconsistent state and federal 
commitment and engagement. Factors that help explain why AOCs differ in their 
progress include: clearly delineated state agency roles; a balanced membership with 
network connections to resources and support; state and federal agency commitment and 
engagement; and effective PAC leadership. Recommendations for agencies to cultivate 
the process of community-based collaborative ecosystem management include 
collaborating with PACs on agendas, criteria, and roles, and supporting the PAC’s 
membership transitions and strategic outreach.
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Chapter	1	
Introduction	
In 1987, the United States and Canada renegotiated the 1978 Great Lakes Water 
Quality Agreement (the Agreement). The amended Agreement focused its objectives on 
an “ecosystem approach” and directed states to cooperate with responsible federal 
agencies and create Remedial Action Plans (RAPs) for the 421 most polluted waterways 
of the Great Lakes (Canada and The United States of America 1987). The Agreement 
defines these toxic hotspots of water contamination as Areas of Concern (AOCs). Federal 
authorities charged state government agencies with consulting the public in the RAP 
process, including the planning, implementation, and monitoring of each AOC’s cleanup 
(Canada and The United States of America 1987, 25; Botts and Muldoon 2005, 130). 
Figure 1.1 illustrates the location and status of every AOC site as of October 2014.  
There are fourteen designated AOCs around Michigan’s coasts (Figure 1.2) 
where legacy contamination impairs water quality. At the time of this study, the State’s 
Office of the Great Lakes (OGL) manages the RAP process and engages the public in 
each AOC’s RAP process through local Public Advisory Councils (PACs). 
This study investigates the influence of PACs on the RAP implementation process 
and its progress in Michigan’s AOCs. In other words, this study explores these public 
groups’ influence on advancing the cleanup of pollution in their local waterways. 
 
                                                
1 In 1991 one site was added, thus there are now 43 total AOCs. 
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Figure 1.1: Canadian and US Areas of Concern in the Great Lakes Basin As of October 2014. (United States 
Environmental Protection Agency and Environment and Climate Change Canada 2019) 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Michigan's Areas of Concern (Michigan Department of Natural Resources 2018, 4) 
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 The International Joint 
Commission (IJC)2 designated 
Beneficial Use Impairments (BUIs) for 
each AOC where many, or all, of the 
fourteen BUIs, were known or 
suspected. Table 1.1 lists the 
impairments. The 1987 Agreement 
required each AOC’s RAP follow three 
stages: the Stage 1 RAP defines the 
BUIs and identifies their causes; the 
Stage 2 RAP identifies the selected 
remedial and regulatory actions for 
implementation; and the Stage 3 RAP 
documents the monitoring indicators that 
demonstrate the use restoration (Canada 
and The United States of America 1987, 
26). Today, instead of one final Stage 3 report, individual reports document the 
‘removal,’ or repair, of each beneficial use. Once every designated BUI in an AOC is 
‘removed,’ the state and federal governments submit a final report to the IJC 
demonstrating BUI restoration. Once approved, an AOC is considered ‘delisted.’ 
The implementation progress of the RAPs for each Michigan AOC widely varies. 
Notably, to date only two AOCs in Michigan have removed all their BUIs and are 
delisted (Deer Lake, White Lake); another AOC (Menominee) is currently in the final 
documentation stage, and its delisting is imminent. Two AOCs have not removed any of 
their BUIs (Rouge River, Clinton River). Government agencies’ common metric for 
measuring RAP progress is counting the number of BUIs removed. Figure 1.3 illustrates 
the status of each BUI designated for Michigan’s fourteen AOCs to date. 
                                                
2 The Great Lakes Water Quality Board is the primary advisor to the International Joint Commission under the 
Agreement. The Water Quality Board’s reports on Great Lakes toxic hotspots informed the definition and identification 
of BUIs and AOCs in the Agreement. 
BUI: “a change in the chemical, physical, or 
biological integrity of the Great Lakes 
System sufficient to cause any of the 
following: 
(i) restrictions on fish and wildlife consumption; 
(ii) tainting of fish and wildlife flavour; 
(iii) degradation of fish wildlife populations; 
(iv) fish tumors or other deformities; 
(v) bird or animal deformities or reproduction 
problems; 
(vi) degradation of benthos; 
(vii) restrictions on dredging activities; 
(viii) eutrophication or undesirable algae; 
(ix) restrictions on drinking water consumption, or 
taste and odour problems; 
(x) beach closings; 
(xi) degradation of aesthetics; 
(xii) added costs to agriculture or industry; 
(xiii) degradation of phytoplankton and zooplankton 
populations; and 
(xiv) loss of fish and wildlife habitat.” 
Table 1.1: Definition of Beneficial Use Impairments (BUIs) 
(Canada and The United States of America 1987, 24) 
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Each AOC is unique in the cause and extent of its pollution; two Michigan AOCs 
have three BUIs, another has a dozen. AOCs also vary in the environmental complexity 
of their BUIs. As Figure 1.4 illustrates, each ‘Area’ also differs in its geographic scope. 
Due to this variability, it is not reasonable to compare RAP implementation progress 
among AOCs based on removing BUIs, because one AOC’s BUI might have eight miles 
of shoreline to remediate while another AOC has eighty miles. Distinguishing AOCs by 
their BUIs is not an apples-to-apples comparison. 
Figure 1.3: Michigan Areas of Concern Beneficial Use Impairment Progress Tracking Matrix As of February 2019. 
(Michigan Office of the Great Lakes 2019, 1) 
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Figure 1.4: The Varied Boundaries and Geographic Scope of Michigan AOCs AOC Boundaries are dark gray; 
black circles (original to image source) do not define any boundary and serve to highlight the relative location and size 
of each AOC. Some AOC boundaries are exclusive to the surface water of the river, lake, or bay; two AOCs (Rouge 
and Clinton) have official boundaries that include the entire watershed of the river. (Michigan Department of Natural 
Resources, 2018, 1) 
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This study does not ‘measure’ RAP implementation progress by the number of 
BUI removals nor does it compare AOCs to each other by BUIs removed. Similarly, 
‘management action’3 completion is not a suitable metric to compare progress between 
AOCs because these interventions occur at different ecological scales. The fact that there 
is no fitting standard metric to compare between AOC’s RAP implementation progress 
exemplifies the compelling need for this study to provide a nuanced understanding of the 
concept of RAP implementation progress. On the other hand, due to the lack of a 
standard definition for RAP implementation progress, a limitation of this study is that it 
relies upon PAC participants’ intuitive perception of progress. Broadly defined, progress 
is the perception that the RAP implementation process is moving forward. This study 
aims to understand what enables progress while it is happening, where it is happening, 
and to explain the differences in rates of progress among AOCs, not to compare between 
them. 
Purpose	
The purpose of this study is to understand the reasons why AOCs differ in their 
RAP implementation progress. When it comes to identifying the factors that shape a 
PAC’s influence on RAP implementation progress, past and present studies mainly 
examine technical or governance dimensions. A preponderance of this AOC literature 
solicits responses from state and federal agency participants. The dominant explanatory 
narrative is that maximum public representation on PACs facilitates RAP implementation 
progress. These studies focus on form, analyzing what is happening in an AOC, or how a 
PAC came to operate in a certain way. There are limits to analyzing progress when the 
government agency is the unit of analysis because it is missing the perspectives and 
evaluations of the PAC members. Therefore, the unit of analysis of this study is the 
individual members of the PAC group, rather than the representatives from state or 
federal government agencies. Furthermore, the objective of this study is for PAC 
participants to identify the factors enabling and constraining their group’s ability to 
influence RAP implementation progress.  
                                                
3 A ‘management action’ is a project that implements part of a BUI restoration. 
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Research	Questions	
The overarching objective of this study is to determine: why does RAP 
implementation progress differ among AOCs? Each AOC’s story is unique in part 
because the 1987 mandate for public involvement made the state agencies responsible for 
engagement without prescribing a specific participation process (Canada and The United 
States of America 1987, 25). However, an AOC’s chronological story of who-did-what-
when fails to explain why AOCs differ in their progress. Therefore, another purpose of 
this study is to construct each case study AOC’s narrative to describe, from the members’ 
perspectives, both how and why their PAC influences RAP implementation progress. 
This study asks the research question: what factors enable and constrain a Public 
Advisory Council’s ability to influence Remedial Action Plan implementation progress? 
To answer the research question, this study identifies external factors by probing the 
following sub-questions: 
1. In what ways does community context enable or constrain a PAC’s 
influence on progress? 
2. In what ways does community capacity enable or constrain a PAC’s 
influence on progress? 
3. In what ways do state and federal actors and actions enable or constrain a 
PAC’s influence on progress? 
The study also investigates the following sub-questions to identify internal factors: 
1. In what ways does the PAC origins, structure, and function enable or 
constrain a PAC’s influence on progress? 
2. In what ways does the PAC process and management enable or constrain a 
PAC’s influence on progress? 
3. In what ways do PAC participant perceptions and attitudes enable or 
constrain a PAC’s influence on progress? 
Figure 1.5 situates these research sub-questions within the framework for research 
inquiry. 
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Figure 1.5: Framework for Research Inquiry 
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Significance	
The need for this study is compelling because it not only includes analyses of 
governance form, or the “tangible, replicable” (Wondolleck and Yaffee 2017, 9) process 
infrastructure of the PACs, it also systematically probes “intangible” (9) process attributes 
and asks PAC participants to elaborate on the function of the PAC groups as they work to 
influence RAP implementation progress. The available literature on public engagement in 
the RAP process predominantly applies theories of participatory governance deductively 
to AOC cases to generalize themes that explain public participation. Whether in peer-
reviewed journals (Krantzberg and Houghton 1996; Lino Grima 1997; Sproule-Jones 
2002; Krantzberg 2003, 2006), books (Sproule-Jones 2003; Grover and Krantzberg 2012), 
documents from government entities (United States General Accounting Office 2003), or 
academic theses (Becker 1996; Van Alstyne 2013), the field of AOC research focuses 
dominantly on form, analyzing what is happening in an AOC, or how a PAC came to 
operate in a certain way. 
Other research that investigates factors that influence RAP implementation 
progress inductively analyzes why values, motivations, and perceptions are relevant to 
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progress in delisting AOCs. However, most of this research has relied on the perspectives 
and evaluations of government officials. These functional research investigations that do 
ask why factors such as values, motivations, and perceptions are relevant to AOC 
progress, are written by, or are surveys of, managers and agencies, and do not include 
primary information from PAC-level participants in their evaluations (Landre and Knuth 
1993; Hartig and Law 1994; Gurtner-Zimmermann 1995; Krantzberg and Houghton 
1996; Hartig et al. 1998; Beierle and Konisky 2001; Krantzberg 2003, 2006; Hall et al. 
2006). Research that has tapped PAC participants for their perspectives is limited; those 
that have are studies of psychological or sociological dimensions (Lertzman 2012; Van 
Alstyne 2013; Williams 2015), position statements from PAC participants (Boyer 1997; 
Dworsky 1997), and a survey limited to PAC members from the “delisted” AOCs 
(Mandelia 2016). 
Finally, there is a paucity of analytical literature, besides technical assessments, on 
Michigan’s fourteen AOCs, including a lack of analysis of PAC-level factors. One 
advantage to limiting the scope of this study to Michigan’s AOCs is the ability to 
‘control’ for federal and state-level factors, as they are more alike across AOCs in 
Michigan than they would be comparing AOCs across a state or national boundary. All 
Michigan AOCs and their PACs are subject to the state’s delisting guidelines (Michigan 
Department of Natural Resources 2018) and held to the same standards to qualify for 
state funding support. With the longest Great Lakes coastline of any state or province in 
the basin, Michigan’s AOCs also constitute one-third of the total AOCs, and so there is 
pressure on Michigan to push for progress as it represents a significant proportion of the 
sites in the entire AOC program. 
One under-unexamined dimension of AOC progress is the influence of the PAC 
on RAP implementation progress. Existing research into AOCs insufficiently addresses 
factors at the PAC level and their impact on RAP implementation progress. There is an 
emerging body of literature filling the research gap by analyzing the perspectives of PAC 
participants (Holifield and Williams 2018). This study seeks to contribute novel insights 
from semi-structured interviews with the PAC members of five case study AOCs in 
Michigan. Therefore, it is helpful to advance the understanding of the PAC’s influence on 
RAP implementation progress by systematically analyzing and comparing observations 
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from PAC members. Through a systematic, rather than anecdotal, analysis of the factors 
impacting a PAC’s ability to influence RAP implementation progress, lessons from 
Michigan’s AOC program can inform PACs and state agencies working on RAP 
implementation in AOCs throughout the Great Lakes. 
 
Methodology	
Case	Study	Selection	
A representative set of five Michigan Areas of Concern are the case study sites: 
Kalamazoo River, Lower Menominee River, Saginaw River and Bay, St. Clair River, and 
White Lake. To ensure the comparison among case study sites can be meaningful and 
generalizable, this set of five cases endeavors to represent the variety of traits among all 
fourteen Michigan AOCs. The first group of selection criteria focuses on the community 
and geographic variety of the AOCs: whether the AOC is in Michigan’s Upper or Lower 
Peninsula; whether the AOC region is (overall) urban, rural, or mixed; the geography of 
the AOC; and whether the PAC is domestic (Michigan-only) or transboundary (joint with 
another state or province). The second group of selection criteria focuses on the differing 
evidence of RAP implementation progress vis-à-vis BUI removal: whether the AOC had 
greater or fewer BUIs designated initially, and whether they removed fewer than half, 
more than half, or all of the BUIs. These criteria were selected based on the status of each 
AOC’s BUIs as of April 2018. Table 1.2 illustrates that the collection of five case study 
sites selected represent every dimension of these case study selection criteria.  
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Table 1.2: Selection Criteria for Case Study Sites 
 
White Lake Kalamazoo River 
Saginaw 
Bay 
Menominee 
River 
St. Clair 
River 
Community and geographic 
variety 		 		 		 		 		
Upper Peninsula 		 		 		 		 		
Lower Peninsula 		 		 		 		 		
Urban 		 		 		 		 		
Rural 		 		 		 		 		
Urban/rural mix 		 		 		 		 		
AOC is river (lower) 		 		 		 		 		
AOC is river (middle and lower) 		 		 		 		 		
AOC is lake 		 		 		 		 		
AOC is mixed 		 		 		 		 		
Transboundary PAC 		 		 		 		 		
Domestic PAC 		 		 		 		 		
Differing evidence of progress 		 		 		 		 		
6 or fewer BUIs initially designated 		 		 		 		 		
7 or greater BUIS initially designated 		 		 		 		 		
Half or more BUIs removed 		 		 		 		 		
Fewer than half BUIs removed 		 		 		 		 		
Delisted - all BUIs removed 		 		 		 		 		
 
Interview	Protocol	
Interviews are the most suitable method for collecting data on PAC participants’ 
perceptions due to the absence of systematic program evaluation reporting at the PAC, 
state, federal, or international level. Semi-structured, open-ended interview methods 
solicit open-ended responses from individuals in a private setting. The framework in 
Figure 1.5 (page 8) guides the interview protocol design. In addition to open-ended 
interview questions, the protocol includes a modified conceptual content cognitive 
mapping (3CM) method, selected for its accessibility for the public to characterize their 
knowledge (Kearney and Kaplan 1997). The maps are a facilitative mechanism to help 
PAC members convey concepts and factors through the open-ended interview protocol, 
and are not substantively analyzed. 
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Under the auspices of a related, community-based research assignment conducted 
for graduate coursework, interviews with five PAC participants piloted the first draft of 
the interview protocol and suitability of the modified 3CM technique. The interview 
questions did not undergo further refinement after use in the pilot case study interviews, 
but the instructional portion of the protocol for administering the 3CM activity became 
less scripted. The mapping activity was optional if interview subjects opted out. The 
refined interview protocol and an amended 3CM process are exempt from review by the 
University of Michigan Institutional Review Board (HUM 00143811). 
Over the course of four months in 2018, 29 PAC participants across five case 
study sites contributed interviews ranging from 60 to 160 minutes long. In all but one 
case (video conference administered), interviews were conducted face-to-face in a 
discreet setting, often selected by the participant, in a place they expressly acknowledged 
that they were able to speak freely. Subsequently, the audio recordings of the interviews 
were transcribed into text files. Metadata generated includes field notes from interviews 
and transcribed post-interview audio memos. Other metadata includes field notes taken 
during observations of six separate meetings of the PAC groups. There are also data 
captured for background research but not for analysis, including field notes from a 
version of the protocol administered during unrecorded conversations with ten 
government officials. Table 1.3 enumerates interview participants by case study site. The 
interview questions are provided in Table 1.4. 
 
Table 1.3: Interview Participation by Case Study Site 
Case study Kalamazoo Menominee Saginaw St. Clair White Lake Total 
# Interviews 4 5 7 6 7 29 
 
  
1. Introduction – Methodology 
 13 
Table 1.4: Interview Questions 
1. Please introduce yourself with your name, where in the region you live, and your 
occupation. 
2. Tell me about [AOC location], what is important about this community?  
3. What is your connection to water quality in [AOC location]? Please describe why you 
got involved in the Area of Concern work here. 
4. From your perspective, what is the goal of the PAC? 
5. You said you joined [date as mentioned above]. Tell me about the how the PAC was 
working toward completing management actions back then. 
6. You mentioned the PAC was working with [examples of other organizations and 
people mentioned by the respondent], please list them on the paper in front of you.  
7. How does the PAC currently work toward completing management actions? Please 
add to the list for new partners and indicate with an X the partners from before no 
longer involved. 
8. Where does the local, state, and federal government fit into the PAC’s work toward 
completing management actions? Please add each agency or office to your list. 
9. How does the capacity of the community influence the PAC’s work? Please add 
groups or individuals to your list.  
10. To help me better understand how the PAC helps to make progress toward completing 
management actions, on the paper in front of you please illustrate a model, such as a 
flow chart, Venn diagram, or whatever way you see fit, to describe the interactions 
between people and organizations you have listed. Let’s start by putting the PAC on 
the paper, and please talk me through the process of completing a management action.  
11. What parts of this organization do you feel work well and enable the PAC’s ability to 
make progress completing management actions? Why do you feel this enables the 
PAC? 
12. What parts constrain the PAC’s ability to make progress? Why do you feel this 
constrains the PAC? 
13. From your perspective, who or what else should be involved to make this system work 
more effectively? 
14. What would you change about this illustration in order to improve the PAC’s ability to 
make progress toward completing the management actions in [AOC location]? 
15. [If applicable] I will be attending your PAC’s next meeting. Sometimes in the 
presence of an observer, participants are on their best behavior, or on the other 
extreme, sometimes they try to stir the pot more than usual. From your experience 
what should I be looking for when I observe your meeting that will help me 
understand the factors that influence your PAC’s ability to make progress? 
16. Finally, is there anything else about your experience we haven’t yet discussed that you 
would like to share? 
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Analytical	Approach	
This study applies a “grounded theory” (Timmermans and Tavory 2012) 
analytical approach to discern factors through the iterative review of interview 
transcripts, 3CM diagrams, primary documents, and literature from the collaborative 
watershed management and AOC research domain. The steps of this analytical process 
include: writing post-interview memos, commenting on transcriptions, initially reviewing 
transcripts and notes, writing memos about each case study, systematically coding 
transcripts with Nvivo software, and writing case study profiles, findings, and synthesis 
chapter drafts. During each iteration of analysis, existing frameworks and theories 
dovetail with salient and analytical reviews of data and metadata, building an 
amalgamated set of “novel theoretical insights” (176). Therefore, many terms and 
concepts from interviews overlap with factors noted in the literature; for example, PAC 
members identified the enabling factor of having a common goal, which the literature 
also emphasizes (Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000, 2017; Sproule-Jones 2003).  
Thesis	Outline	
This first chapter introduces the issue, the significance of the study, and its 
research methods. Chapter 2 provides an analytic narrative profile of each of the five case 
study sites, highlighting the context, PAC genesis, function, and current status of each 
AOC. Next, Chapter 3 describes the analysis of factors across cases per the framework 
for research inquiry outlined in Figure 1.5. Chapter 4 provides a synthesis of the factors 
that distinguish PACs’ ability to influence RAP implementation progress. The synthesis 
provides the foundation for the recommendations and conclusions in Chapter 5. 
Throughout the rest of this study, italicized text is used to distinguish where PAC 
participants are directly, anonymously, quoted from their interviews.
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Chapter	2	
Case	Study	Profiles	
What is a typical PAC? The variety across the five case studies suggests the 
Menominee and White Lake PACs are more typical PACs insofar as they exclusively 
serve as a voluntary advisory committee to the agency-led RAP process, compared to the 
Kalamazoo, Saginaw, and St. Clair PACs that have evolved, in part or in whole, into 
independent 501(c)3 nonprofit organizations. However, this organizational distinction is 
not enough to explain differences in RAP implementation progress. Each case study 
profile that follows details other important and unique characteristics of each AOC and 
the story of its PAC group. 
The profiles begin with more ‘typical’ PACs: the ‘delisted’ AOC of White Lake 
and its PAC, followed by the shared Michigan-Wisconsin AOC of the Lower Menominee 
River Citizens Advisory Committee. Next are the profiles of less ‘typical,’ incorporated, 
PACs: the Partnership for the Saginaw Bay Watershed which serves as PAC for the 
Saginaw River and Bay AOC, the Kalamazoo River Public Advisory Council, which is 
‘doing business as’ the Kalamazoo River Watershed Council, and the binational 
Michigan-Ontario St. Clair River Binational Public Advisory Council, which inspired and 
shares membership and mission with two Friends of the St. Clair River non-governmental 
organizations, one in each country. The narrative of each PAC could fill volumes; the 
following profiles serve as a synopsis of the much longer, richer stories of each group’s 
30- or 40-year evolution.	
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White	Lake	
Context	
The summer sun warms the sandy beaches where the White River channel 
outflows to eastern Lake Michigan’s windy dune shores. The channel enables navigation 
to and from Lake Michigan and White Lake, the drowned river mouth lake of the White 
River. Flowing 70 miles from its headwaters in Manistee National Forest through 
Oceana, Newaygo, and Muskegon Counties in central western Michigan, the White River 
is a protected Natural River (Michigan Department of Natural Resources 1975). The 
White River divides the towns of Whitehall from Montague around the White River 
Marsh at the head of White Lake, and three more townships abut the lake. White Lake is 
home to year-round families, local businesses, agriculture, and multiple industries. 
Several past industrial activities have severely degraded the water quality of 
White Lake. From 1840-1940, logging and leather tanning dumped debris into the lake, 
followed by chlorinated chemical manufacturing (Michigan Department of 
Environmental Quality 2014, 12). In the 1940s, unmitigated chemicals and other 
industrial wastes flowed into White Lake at up to 150,000 gallons per day (Ruck 2003). 
Chemicals manufactured at three facilities around White Lake discharged directly into 
surface water, and toxic waste piles on land swiftly leached through the region’s sandy 
soils into the groundwater (Michigan Department of Natural Resources 1987b). 
PAC	Genesis	
In 1960s, residents penned a report that identified municipal effluent pollution 
sources (The Murder of a Lake, 1967). A decade later, a whistle-blowing saga exploded 
when a local chemical worker revealed their employer’s egregious pollution (United 
States Department of Health Education and Welfare Office of Environmental Education 
1978). The response was dramatic and litigious, and one offending manufacturing plant 
shuttered that same year (Michigan Department of Environmental Quality 2014, 12). This 
history of activism was important when it came to White Lake’s designation as an AOC 
in 1985 (Restoring White Lake 2018a). After two public meetings to develop the Stage 1 
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RAP published 1987, it became clear by 1989 that the Michigan Department of Natural 
Resources (MDNR) had no plans to continue citizen input to guide Stage 2 RAP 
development (Michigan Department of Environmental Quality 1995, 1). In 1991 
residents self-organized the White Lake Public Advisory Council (PAC) with the help of 
the local office of a non-profit group, the Lake Michigan Federation (1). The PAC’s self-
organizing genesis is key because “the community was the first to figure out the direction 
to go... to have that community connection, that grassroots part is the important part.” 
Overall in the White Lake region “people are more aware” and have “greater 
knowledge of environmental issues.” The White Lake community is full of 
knowledgeable residents: “we had a lot of resources educationally... people with 
historical knowledge.”  
Function	
The PAC works to provide “information, services, and project which will improve 
the environmental quality of White Lake and its affiliated watersheds” and “advise 
agencies, express views and voice the concerns of the local community” (Restoring 
White Lake 2018a). The PAC “helped ensure there was good publicity” which enabled 
communication through “support of the local paper:” “there was a mechanism there to 
ensure the public could be aware... and knew how to provide that input.”  
However, the challenge for PAC leadership was to focus the “broad spectrum of 
expectations” of PAC participants. One PAC leader noted: “I was kind of addressing the 
topic of the day... like popcorn.” PAC participants’ expectations varied, and members 
resisted accepting “a certain level” of pollution, so there was disagreement over defined, 
attainable BUI removal criteria. Before governments set BUI removal criteria, the White 
Lake PAC “kind of struggled to find focus;” they wrestled with “setting how clean is 
clean?” The internal agreement suffered, discussion in meetings “wasn’t always very 
friendly,” but despite the occasional tensions, it was “a good dialogue” that was 
consistently open to the community since the beginning of the PAC in 1992. Internal 
agreement shifted when the PAC relationship shifted away from blame-and-complain to 
separating the people from the problem and focusing on solutions: “people got to realize 
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that [the industry representative was] a good person too.” It took a long time to build 
this trust and focus because “it takes a lot of talking, it takes a lot of reflection.” 
For many BUIs, the PAC accepted the state criteria as an objective standard. For 
the other BUIs, the PAC negotiated with the state to approve unique local indicators and 
removal thresholds. However, this level of PAC autonomy possessed a transaction cost: 
“there was a scenario where, if you didn’t accept the state’s criteria then you’d have to 
come up with funding on your own” to do the research and set a scientifically- and 
locally- justifiable BUI removal criteria. The PAC relied on state PAC Support Grant 
funds and community resources to fund their local partnership projects that enabled 
progress in the AOC. The Muskegon County Conservation District is a “quasi-
governmental entity” (Michigan Department of Agriculture & Rural Development 2018) 
with staff who served as PAC participants, and frequently as PAC leaders. The PAC 
members also had a good relationship with researchers at the nearby Annis Water 
Research Institute of Grand Valley State University: “we could always go down there, 
make an appointment, and say what do you think about this... they would take the time to 
do that.” The White Lake PAC also had the in-kind support of community institutions: 
“I’m talking the Chamber of Commerce, at least three city or township governments, and 
support of the local paper, the editorials, those were all key factors.” The White Lake 
PAC benefitted from the generosity of their neighbors: capacity came from “community 
resources, it’s surprising. Given the opportunity, people come forward.” 
Current	Status	
The White Lake PAC successfully delisted the AOC in 2014 (Michigan 
Department of Environmental Quality 2014, 4). The delisting was not without 
controversy. The AOC program definition of BUI criteria exclude aspects of 
groundwater. The White Lake Drinking Water BUI was removed over stakeholders’ 
objections that their drinking water sourced from groundwater remained contaminated 
from the same source of pollution (62). The issue of groundwater contamination remains 
a major hot-button issue today because the White Lake AOC delisted without the cleanup 
of all its groundwater contamination sites. 
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In hindsight, PAC participants recognized the constraining factor of “personality 
conflict” because “interpersonal conflict and differences can impede progress.” To deal 
with the “tough debates from time to time,” the White Lake PAC group chose majority 
rule, rather than consensus, to enable the group to move forward and not dwell on 
fundamental disagreements. This did not satisfice all White Lake interests: “they just 
persisted in that it’s a majority.” The “organizational dynamics” of majority rule are 
destructive to organizations: “if you allow the minority group to prevail consistently, it 
ultimately results in the disbanding of the group because people are going to say, why am 
I here?” But, in the end, majority rule enabled progress in the White Lake AOC. In 
hindsight, PAC leadership thought an outside mediator for arbitration “would have been 
effective,” because “there’s underlying things that are going on here that we need to 
address, because we’re spending too much energy addressing it the wrong way.” 
Furthermore, “the PAC doesn’t exist today.” While the PAC group established the White 
Lake Environmental Network after delisting the AOC (Restoring White Lake 2018b), 
participants shared meek, measured optimism that the initiative might re-activate after 
years of dormancy.  
  20 
Lower	Menominee	River	
Context	
Part of the boundary that demarcates the northeast corner of Wisconsin from 
Michigan’s Upper Peninsula is the 116-mile long Menominee River that feeds into Green 
Bay on northwestern Lake Michigan. Its densely forested rural upstream was prime 
spawning habitat supporting a productive Green Bay fishery before industry and dams 
interfered with proliferation. While the forests have rebounded from historical, intensive 
logging, the fishery has not fully recovered from similar impairments. The development 
of Menominee, Wisconsin, and Marinette, Michigan destroyed the marshes that once 
grew abundant wild rice at the river’s slow-flowing mouth. Sediments containing arsenic 
and coal tar restricted dredging in the lower river’s federal navigation channel, while 
flotsam and jetsam like paint sludge or fibers from many different manufacturing 
discharges floated in its waters and littered its shores (Wisconsin Department of Natural 
Resources and Michigan Department of Natural Resources 1990). The culture of the 
Marinette-Menominee region centers around individual liberty: “the people, they love 
their woods, they love their rivers... but they don’t want anybody else telling them what to 
do.” There are “not any environmental groups in Marinette-Menominee.” The industrial 
base of the economy is important for residents’ jobs and livelihoods. 
PAC	Genesis	
The local Chambers of Commerce discovered in the late 1980s that the Michigan 
and Wisconsin Departments of Natural Resources (MDNR and WDNR, together referred 
to as the DNRs) did not intend to incorporate ongoing public input into the RAP. Industry 
interests were 
really concerned when [the DNRs] thought they didn’t need a community 
committee... [there was a] strong feeling that the local community needed to be 
involved and the DNRs were not just going to come in and start dictating. 
The state DNRs honored the Chambers’ request for a citizen’s committee on one 
condition: “if you want local involvement then you’re going to have to do the work to 
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make that happen.” The Lower Menominee River Citizens Advisory Committee (CAC) 
began in 1988 (Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources and Michigan Department of 
Natural Resources 1990, 7), and initially operated under the leadership of a representative 
of the Chambers. However, the context of the communities meant the PAC “has always 
been real light on the environmental end of it because there aren’t a lot of people up here 
that are involved in that sort of thing.” At this time the DNRs also organized a separate 
Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) of experts that prompted inter-agency 
communication for technical review of the RAP and subsequent documents. The CAC 
thus focuses more on ensuring the RAP met local priorities than technical, environmental 
research review or advice. 
Function	
The CAC’s most recent bylaws state the group’s primary objective is to “seek to 
determine the status of the [BUIs] identified for the Lower Menominee River, with the 
ultimate goals of removing those impairments and delisting the [AOC]” (Lower 
Menominee River Citizens Advisory Committee 2016). The Stage 1 RAP process united 
competing interests under a broad common goal and participants were motivated because 
“there was an end in sight. That was the carrot; you’re not going to be an Area of 
Concern.” One of the CAC’s earliest tasks was to jointly articulate a “Desired Future 
State” for the 1990 Stage 1 RAP (Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources and 
Michigan Department of Natural Resources 1990, 181). Economic concerns are a 
preponderance of the CAC’s shared interests, “a healthy economy” (182) is the priority of 
the desired future state. The Chambers, representing the industry and business interests, 
“wanted to make sure that their interests were being protected during this whole [AOC] 
process.” Demonizing industry was not in the group’s shared interest: “the value of those 
jobs were important, and [the CAC was not] there to shut people down or run them out.” 
The CAC needed industry at the table to make progress: “having the people who could 
fix the problems at the table, and treating them as co-concerned people, [we were] able 
to accomplish more.” 
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The CAC participants “pretty much argued point by point until we could all say, 
yes, we can support that... [over] many, many, many, very long meetings, we stayed at the 
table… until we reached consensus.” Ultimately, the consensus was to: 
encourage the companies and encourage the agencies to work through the RCRA 
[federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act] process and the other 
[regulatory] processes to come to solutions. 
The CAC stopped meeting and temporarily disbanded in the late 1990s, partly 
because of “the loss of funding for Remedial Action Planning” (Uvaas et al. 2013, 395), 
and partly because the next steps of the RAP were held up waiting for the legal process of 
negotiations through these other federal regulatory programs. The CAC was hamstrung 
waiting on the other regulatory program’s opaque negotiation process: “nobody can say a 
lot. EPA [Environmental Protection Agency] couldn’t say a lot, [industry] couldn’t say a 
lot. So we were... left hanging while a lot of that was going on.” 
Thus, when the CAC reconvened in 2008 (Uvaas et al. 2013, 395), participants 
were in a position to begin working on a Stage 2 RAP to formulate implementation plans 
that would achieve their agreed-upon goals for delisting the AOC (Wisconsin Department 
of Natural Resources and Michigan Department of Environmental Quality 2011). The 
challenge of the Stage 2 RAP was that not all participants were interested in the whole 
package of implementation goals. “The makeup of the group and who would be attending 
[meetings] changed dramatically depending on what particular issue we were focused 
on.” As problems were solved many of those CAC participants, “mainly industry 
members, were dropping off [the CAC] because they had taken care of their issues.” 
There were also changes in the AOC program as the IJC-initiated three-stage process was 
phased out and the Great Lakes Restoration Initiative (GLRI) introduced federal funding 
dollars available to the AOC program. Some CAC participants perceived these changes 
as moving the goalposts on the end points the CAC previously agreed upon, “and it 
began to look like there was never going to be an end.”  
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Current	Status	
The common motivation of today’s core group of CAC participants is an “interest 
in the community and the other issues around the whole RAP. The folks that have really 
hung on have more than that very specific issue.” However, this has also contributed to 
the CAC dwindling to a core group as single-interest participants get their problems 
resolved and drop out of the CAC. While the CAC may not have ever had representation 
from many organized “environmentalists,” it has always had environmentally-minded 
participants from many sectors who have a strong sense of place: they have “many ties to 
the river, so that’s the glue that’s held this group together, a real genuine interest in this 
river and the land around it.” The common goal of the CAC has shifted away from an 
exclusive focus on delisting: “delisting has come to mean something much more 
significant to all of us. So we don’t want to just delist and walk away.” 
Additionally, the Menominee CAC group lost a key leader in 2017 with the 
unexpected death of their Michigan co-chair, who was “involved since the 1980s” and a 
key CAC cheerleader (Eggleston 2016). The PAC is now operating with Wisconsin-
based chair and vice-chair, instead of one co-chair from each state, as there is not a 
suitable Michigan replacement for the co-chair position. During the course of this study, 
the “Loss of Fish and Wildlife Populations” and “Degradation of Fish and Wildlife 
Habitat” BUIs were removed for the Lower Menominee River AOC (United States 
Environmental Protection Agency 2019). One remaining BUI, “Restrictions on Wildlife 
Consumption,” is currently being assessed. While the CAC has the impression they will 
delist in 2020, members are getting impatient that the state and federal agencies seem to 
postpone their delisting date indefinitely. The CAC agenda also occasionally includes 
discussion of what the PAC will transition into once delisting occurs.
  24 
Saginaw	River	and	Bay	
Context	
Michigan’s iconic ‘hand’ shape owes its ubiquity largely to the Saginaw Bay of 
Lake Huron; the land around the shoreline of the bay forms the inside of Michigan’s 
‘thumb.’ The Saginaw Bay’s largest tributary is the Saginaw River that receives its water 
flows from an extensive network of rivers that drain water off most of the land of mid-
Michigan, including agricultural, urban and industrial land uses. In the mid-20th Century, 
the Saginaw River experienced degradation from nutrient and sewage inputs similar to 
most waterways of the Great Lakes. However, the concentration of industrial chemical 
manufacturing and use along the rivers feeding into the Saginaw meant that unmitigated 
industrial effluent polluted the sediments and water column for decades with an alphabet 
soup of contaminants (Michigan Department of Natural Resources 1988). The 
Tittabawassee and Saginaw rivers are also under Superfund jurisdiction (United States 
Environmental Protection Agency 2018a). Flooding is also an important environmental 
management concern. The residents of the Bay region live at the “bottom of the bathtub” 
of a traditionally swampy area. While not optimal for human development, the natural 
features of the region are ideal coastal habitat: Saginaw Bay’s tens of thousands of acres 
of coastal wetlands are unofficially national treasures (Bredin and Goudy 1995). 
PAC	Genesis	
In 1986, MDNR contracted the East Central Michigan Planning and Development 
Region to prepare the first draft RAP and coordinate the Saginaw Basin Natural 
Resources Steering Committee (Michigan Department of Natural Resources 1988, 
xxxiv). That year, a destructive flood drew further local and federal government 
attention, and Congressional support materialized as the EPA’s National Watershed 
Initiative (NWI) pilot in the Saginaw River basin which combined the efforts of the 
Saginaw Bay Soil Erosion and Sedimentation Control Program and the Saginaw 
River/Bay RAP. The Initiative granted federal funds to MDNR “to develop a 
comprehensive program for addressing problems in the watershed” (Bredin and Goudy 
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1995, 314) through coordinating the state agency’s efforts with two local river basin 
organizations. According to one PAC member:  
The Saginaw Basin Watershed Council [Watershed Council] was one of the 
predecessor organizations... [and] the Saginaw Basin Alliance was a citizen-
based group, and were actually the designated Public Advisory Council, although 
they didn’t quite have that name hammered out yet. 
Current PAC members recall these early years (1991-1995) as the “golden age of 
the public advisory group.” Congress funded the Initiative for four years, and during that 
time, the program focused resources and “facilitated tons of communication” between 
the two local organizations, Saginaw Valley State University, the MDNR, and the EPA. 
Through the NWI, the groups consulted the MDNR on the Stage 1 RAP when it 
underwent a comprehensive update culminating in the 1995 Biennial Report (Michigan 
Department of Natural Resources 1994). When Congressional support for the Initiative 
ended in 1995, the groups merged into the Partnership for the Saginaw Bay Watershed 
(PSBW) as a 501(c)3 organization (Public Sector Consultants 2015, 1). As one charter 
member explained, the move was financially motivated: when “both of those 
organizations were about to dry up, we merged those organizations into what the PSBW 
is today.” 
Function	
The PSBW’s stated goal is “to coordinate efforts and monitor progress toward 
restoration goals with an ultimate goal of removing the Saginaw River and Bay from the 
list of AOCs” (Partnership for the Saginaw Bay Watershed 2019). However, becoming a 
multi-purpose local involvement group changed the organizational structure of two 
existing groups, and that negatively affected the PSBW’s ability to sustain itself. The loss 
of government funds went “on a pretty steep downward track; we lost staff fairly quickly 
after that.” During the decade of wide-scale government austerity (1996-2006), with no 
staff and a modest grant, PSBW hired a contractor to fill the organization’s technical 
capacity gap. The consultant developed indicator criteria for the Saginaw River/Bay 
RAP. In this way, PSBW members were “a leader early on in the program in developing 
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the 2000 Measures of Success report that informed, I think, the AOC program in 
Michigan specifically in setting criteria” (see also: Public Sector Consultants 2000). 
Six years afterward, the state established its criteria (Michigan Department of 
Environmental Quality 2005; Final guidance for delisting Michigan’s Great Lakes Areas 
of Concern 2006), but PSBW members found that state and federal criteria diverged from 
their Measures of Success criteria, and “new issues emerged by trying to impose the 
statewide delisting criteria in the Saginaw AOC.” The PSBW members then began to 
wrestle with whether or not the state standards were clean enough to satisfy local 
interests. Members were faced with the choice of going the “easy” route to accept state 
standards, or “find ways to modify [local] criteria so we could try to accomplish 
something, to be more suited with what makes sense.” However, in the pursuit of 
promulgating local criteria, PSBW struggled to agree on another objective standard, 
Disagreements are because “everybody seems to want it to be perfect instead of saying 
this is a conceptual thing.” Members lamented that this lends itself to “talking about this 
[BUI] forever” and that “when all is said and done, there is a lot more said than done.” 
Sometime in the early 2000s, the PSBW stopped meeting regularly; 
communications and visibility to the public had atrophied: “there were no meetings, no 
membership, even though you couldn’t be a member unless you paid, but there was no 
website, no nothing.” After a few years, the PSBW came under external criticism for 
becoming inaccessible: “external stakeholders were saying [the PSBW] does not have 
enough people at the table, they are not going through a good public engagement 
process.” It took several more contentious years for the PSBW to re-establish consistent, 
open meetings, eliminate membership dues, and resume regular communications.  
Current	Status	
The PSBW has reconciled these issues, but their relationship with the state 
through OGL has become one of distrust, and members “feel like they’re not being taken 
seriously” by the state. There is “some built-in friction” regarding the division of 
authority balanced between the state and the PSBW. Members “are clearly frustrated 
with the state AOC Coordinator saying that the state will be the arbiters of what is going 
to be the final answer here on whether this is able to get delisted or not.” The nature of 
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the relationship between members and state representatives is “a push-me-pull-you kind 
of thing.” PSBW members describe their influence as weak, and with “very little role in 
the food chain, that results in a bit of a disconnect between our wishes for things and how 
much we actually get or find out from the agencies that are out there doing work.” 
Thus, funding priorities are drivers of the PSBW’s priorities; “as long as it makes 
the state happy and the Office of the Great Lakes and the EPA ultimately, that’s what we 
care about.” One PSBW member quipped about “the old golden rule: they got the gold, 
so they make the rule; so whatever we want to do here, we still have to get their 
permission.” The perceptions of PSBW members of the RAP process is that “it’s pretty 
set as a take-it-or-leave-it thing, which is frustrating, I would like to feel that we’re more 
of a full partner.” It becomes a challenge for the state to walk the fine line between being 
a wanted facilitator, and a capricious arbiter because of “the state’s role in having to say 
no sometimes upsets [members].” The most recent BUI removed in Saginaw is the 2014 
removal of “Loss of Fish and Wildlife Habitat” (United States Environmental Protection 
Agency 2014). Today, Saginaw has nine remaining BUIs to remove (Michigan Office of 
the Great Lakes 2019).  
  28 
Kalamazoo	River	
Context	
The immense length of the 131-mile-long Kalamazoo River in Southwest 
Michigan matches the immense extent of its PCB contamination, a legacy from the de-
inking process of the paper mills that operated, and operate, on the riverbanks. Paddlers 
can float down the Kalamazoo through vast stretches of undeveloped riparian land; the 
Kalamazoo is a “Natural River” under Michigan law (Hartig and Zarull 1992, 251). 
Dams and cities impinge on the watercourse as it flows from its headwaters east of Battle 
Creek, through Marshall, Kalamazoo, Allegan, to the dune shores of Saugatuck on Lake 
Michigan. Because of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) in the sediment, the lower 80 
miles of the system is a designated AOC (Michigan Department of Natural Resources 
1987a, 1) and also a Superfund site on the National Priority List (United States 
Environmental Protection Agency 2018b). 
There is a “very active environmental and recreational river user community” in 
the Kalamazoo region. Early on, residents made “a lot of noise in public meetings,” 
sounding the alarm on PCBs in the river and its fish. As the issues of legacy 
contamination progressed, so did the concerns of civil society. Residents self-organized, 
including more recent groups opposing the siting of contaminated dredge spoils in a local 
riverfront waste dump. Groups in the community have formed around other single-issue 
water quality problems, including the 2010 pipeline leak of heavy crude oil into the 
watercourse. There are township water resource councils, sub-watershed associations, 
universities, and land conservancies all operating with jurisdiction and interests 
overlapping in the Kalamazoo River watershed. 
PAC	Genesis	
Many policy mechanisms work to clean up the river, including the Area of 
Concern program, the Superfund program, and Michigan’s Act 307; all three policies 
mandate public participation in some way (Hartig and Zarull 1992, 260), but there was no 
formal public engagement institution created after the 1989 disbandment of the 
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government-convened Kalamazoo River Basin Strategy Committee (15). Vocal citizens 
and local leaders concerned about PCB contamination organized enthusiastic residents 
into the Kalamazoo River Watershed Public Advisory Council (PAC) that the state then 
recognized formally under their AOC program in 1993 (Kalamazoo River Watershed 
Public Advisory Council 1998, 5). The original goal of the PAC was the “wise balance 
and management” (5) of competing interests affecting the river’s improvement and 
protection. In 1998 the PAC incorporated as a 501(c)3 nonprofit (Kalamazoo River 
Watershed Council 2018). 
The early group of staunch advocates worked in the 1990s on updating and 
producing their own RAP in 1998, including conducting interviews with community 
leaders to gather input on visions for the future of the river (Kalamazoo River Watershed 
Public Advisory Council 1998, 21). This early strategic planning diversified the scope of 
the PAC’s work beyond PCBs because “a lot of people thought we [the PAC] were too 
specialized in PCBs and Superfund... it’s dealing with stormwater and nutrient effluent 
pollution, so it’s broader.” The strategic changes to expand the PAC’s scope beyond the 
AOC and Superfund programs came at a time when leadership and membership 
transitioned to more of “the science people that came in and the engineering 
professionals that came in.” An amalgamation of the existing regional watershed and 
environmental groups strategically convened in 2005 to designate an umbrella 
organization to coordinate sub-basin and sub-watershed group efforts. From that point on, 
the PAC decided to begin “doing business as” the Kalamazoo River Watershed Council 
(KRWC) (Kalamazoo River Watershed Council 2018). 
Function	
The mission of the KRWC is to “work collaboratively with the community, 
government agencies, local officials, and businesses to improve and protect the health of 
the Kalamazoo River, its tributaries, and its watershed” (Kalamazoo River Watershed 
Council 2018). KRWC “engage[s in] a broader array of activities, and does some of the 
whole-system coordination” which has the group “functioning better” than its’ early 
PCB-focused days. However, the KRWC role as an AOC PAC now occupies a smaller 
portion of their overall agenda because their umbrella approach necessitates that toxic 
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substance priorities balance with other regional human and ecosystem priorities. While 
the KRWC has a part-time paid Watershed Coordinator and volunteer Board of Directors, 
the Watershed Coordinator and less than half the members are engaged in AOC program 
priorities and RAP implementation. 
When conducting PAC business, the KRWC is a neutral broker of technical 
information and the liaison between the regulatory agencies and the public:  
When you think of [KRWC] in that conceptual model, we’re kind of in the center, 
and you’ve got regulatory agencies at the state and federal levels, they’ve got 
industry or a [water pollution discharge] permittee, and then you’ve got the 
public and the other environmental groups, and we’re trying to walk that balance 
between all these different stakeholders. 
KRWC members said they are involved because they “care about seeing the 
agencies do right.” There is also a consensus among KRWC members to represent the 
group as a science-based advisory body, as “not just an angry citizenry but an informed 
spokespeople.” When it comes to advocacy for singular, adversarial, or positional 
bargaining, “this organization is not taking those roles… this group is oriented around 
what we can do. And because of that, it is trusted.” The group’s balanced approach to 
AOC PAC business and other priorities bolsters the local credibility of the KRWC as the 
liaison: “the PAC is sort of a hub.”	
Current	Status	
Because the KRWC’s PAC role is as a liaison, participants must interface with 
many stakeholders and deliver messages two ways between the public and governments. 
The full-time staff, along with the “consistent presence of the PAC” enables the KRWC 
as an organization to act as an effective liaison, not only for the AOC PAC program but 
also for other regulatory and non-regulatory government programs: “it’s that you can call 
our office, and someone will call you back.” The KRWC is unique to how it has 
“cobbled together” sufficient funds for dedicated and independent staff from multiple 
regulatory government programs and regional philanthropic organizations. For example, 
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after the 2010 oil spill, the KRWC was the community liaison group for the cleanup 
process and received funds to support its work in this capacity. 
Membership continuity is an asset because longtime participants “have some of 
that institutional memory;” the benefit is remembering past lessons learned. Continuous 
member participation means the group’s PAC liaison services have been consistently 
available to their watershed communities since 1993. However, many KRWC longtime 
members have dropped out of the group; the attrition of institutional knowledge from 
those “who have been around through all of [the PAC’s iterations]” means that the 
KRWC organization relies on just a few key individuals to anchor the group members’ 
focus on its long-term watershed-scale priorities. Moreover, with a paid Executive 
Director, a lot of the time-consuming relationship building and networking is now 
centralized. The full-time staff possesses many of the KRWC’s relationships and 
institutional knowledge; however, over the course of this study, the KRWC Watershed 
Coordinator position turned over to a new staff person. 
The last BUI removed from the Kalamazoo River AOC was the “Degradation of 
Aesthetics” in 2012, and to date, six beneficial uses remain impaired (United States 
Environmental Protection Agency 2012). Most recently, the KRWC assisted EPA with 
public input and outreach for an emergency dam removal coordinated with contaminated 
sediment removal and habitat restoration in Otsego. The KRWC holds annual paddling 
events, green infrastructure education, disseminates fish consumption advisory 
information, serves in an unofficial capacity as the Superfund Community Advisory 
Group (CAG), works on the Lake Allegan Total Maximum Daily Load, and multiple 
other projects; RAP implementation is one of the KRWC’s many agenda items. 
  32 
St.	Clair	River	
Context	
Lake Huron outflows into the St. Clair River forming a 40-mile strait that creates 
the largest freshwater delta in North America at the St. Clair Flats on the northern shores 
of Lake St. Clair (Friends of the St. Clair River (US) 2018, 2). The border between the 
United States and Canada bisects the length of the river stem, and six of ten islands in the 
Flats are among two First Nations’ riparian jurisdiction. At the northern mouth of the 
river, the cities of Port Huron, Michigan and Sarnia, Ontario connect at the Blue Water 
Bridge. The region embraces the river and the community is “proud of, and known for,” 
their Blue Water brand. As early logging and extractive industry boomed along the strait 
in the early 20th Century, families earning more wealth began developing residential 
neighborhoods along the shoreline. However, these homes were built “with their backs to 
the filthy water” where freighters and barges cruise by, belching soot into their backyard 
air. As technology and the economy modernized in the mid-1900s, the availability of 
salts and fossil fuels in Ontario with access to shipping led to an intense cluster of 
petrochemical and refinery operations in Sarnia called ‘Chemical Valley’ (Ford 2015). 
Drinking water, human health, and industrial spills are the top hot-button issues in 
the Blue Water region. In the years leading up to the formation of the Binational Public 
Advisory Council for the AOC, several public drinking water emergencies recurred. 
Toxic chemical “blob” spills captured local headlines. In Wallaceburg, Ontario, two 
citizen activist groups started organizing. Public passions about chemical spills and 
drinking water were strong, but “there were personal perceptions about the impairments 
[to the water quality] that were different on the two sides of the river.”	
PAC	Genesis	
The St. Clair River is a binational Area of Concern because the AOC boundaries 
include both the US and Canadian sides of the river. In 1985 the Ontario and Michigan 
governments agreed to a “joint RAP process and providing for Ontario to take the lead 
role” for the AOC (St. Clair River AOC RAP Team 1991, 6). Governments organized a 
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“RAP Team comprised of federal, state and provincial representatives” (6) assembled in 
1987 to write the draft Stage 1 RAP. The Ontario Regional Conservation District is the 
regional quasi-governmental office that provides a full-time employee to implement 
secretarial and administrative programs for the RAP. The Ontario Ministry of 
Environment (OMOE) “oversees” (37) this process for Canada’s AOC program.  
When multiple, opposing local interests accepted the OMOE’s invitation to attend 
the first St. Clair AOC Binational Public Advisory Council (BPAC) organizing meeting 
in 1988, it started “like a revolution.” The drama played out in front of local news 
cameras when, at the first BPAC meeting, the Canadian public, labor unions, citizen 
watchdogs, and industry clashed. The early contention led to nasty fighting about control 
over BPAC chairmanship and membership because “you don’t want to sit with your 
enemy... it was like the battle lines were drawn.” In response to a walkout citizen 
watchdog members had staged in the early BPAC days, OMOE committed funding for a 
RAP Coordinator. However, Michigan’s agency support was “totally insincere in the 
beginning.” 
The tense situation required professional facilitation, and OMOE “hired a 
consultant to assist in the development of a public participation program plan” (St. Clair 
River AOC RAP Team 1991, 37). The benefits of this facilitated strategic planning were 
critical for the BPAC helping moving progress forward because the facilitators: 
taught this large, diverse, and mostly inexperienced group how to focus, and how 
to make decisions, and how to set goals. We needed that third party to be able to 
say to these people, that’s fine, that’s important, but it’s not in the AOC.  
Function	
The BPAC abides by its original 1988 charge to: 
advise the RAP Team on key aspects of the Remedial Action Plan 
Preparation and Adoption... the goal of all concerned should be to arrive at 
planned recommendations upon which the RAP Team and the Advisory 
Council agree, and for which there is broad public support (Friends of the 
St. Clair River (Canada) 2010). 
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After initial facilitation, the RAP Team spent three years consulting with the BPAC and 
published the St. Clair AOC Stage 1 RAP in 1991. Without US funding, BUI removal 
came first “on the Canadian side of the river, way ahead of things that were done on the 
American side of the river.” Rather than binationalism and operating with one set of 
criteria, bilateralism is how the BPAC’s members from each country work 
“simultaneously towards the same goal, but we do it in our own way.” Each side of the 
border had its own list of BUIs with criteria conforming to guidance from Michigan and 
EPA or Ontario and Environment and Climate Change Canada.  
Drinking water protection and chemical spill accidents draw residents’ attention 
to the BPAC’s work: “the occasional spill and crisis actually provide a motivation, a 
focal point.” The drinking water BUI and issue of spill monitoring reporting and 
response is a key motivation that gets reactions from the community and local media:  
it became immediately became obvious that some of the impairments were going 
to have to be listed, not because there was any science backing them up, but 
because there was such a strong public perception. 
There is a keen interest from the Canadian side to ensure citizen watchdog groups 
have a seat at the BPAC table because Canadians do not have the same toxic accident 
citizen right-to-know privileges that Americans have under the Superfund Amendments 
and Reauthorization Act Title III (Michigan Department of Environmental Quality 2018).   
One unique challenge for the BPAC is the financial barrier of being a binational 
council as the non-entity organizational status, because “all the industrial reps said we 
have funds for this type of thing but we cannot support a binational group.” The solution 
was “two totally independent ‘Friends of’ groups. So there’s a Friends of the St. Clair 
(FOSCR) Ontario [Canada] and there’s a Friends of the St. Clair, Michigan.” In 2008, a 
couple of US BPAC participants identified the BPAC’s need to receive grant funds, and 
“started FOSCR US to serve in the capacity of a watershed council, as an environmental 
entity for any organization in the county that needed a fiduciary.” They modeled FOSCR 
US after the FOSCR Canada organization that had been around for a few years prior. 
However, the BPAC is a distinct entity from the Friends’ groups, as the Organization 
Flow Chart from FOSCR US depicts in Figure 2.1.  
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Figure 2.1: Friends of the St. Clair River (US) Organization Flow Chart (Friends of the St. Clair River (US) 2018) 
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Current	Status	
The BPAC relationship with the OGL improved once GLRI increased State of 
Michigan AOC program budget, and thus capacity, in the mid-2000s. The attention, 
engagement, and “active involvement” by OGL were “key” for the BPAC. With PAC 
support grant money, FOSCR US as a fiduciary can attract the time and support from 
local governmental staff at the County Health Department or the Wastewater Treatment 
Plant, through sub-contracting. The BPAC coordinates with the Canadian agencies 
through the Canadian RAP Implementation Committee (CRIC) and the BPAC advises 
agency representatives from the Four Agency Managers Work Group. 
FOSCR US conducts many project-based activities to achieve RAP objectives for 
enhancing public education about the river’s water quality. The group’s Sturgeon Festival 
is a popular and well-attended annual event (see http://www.sturgeonfestival.com). 
However, the need for the BPAC to retain its watchdog role has undermined some 
areas of its work: “having that public perception perhaps of being an activist group 
makes it a little more difficult for us to get information.” Similarly, the BPAC has 
dwindled to a core group now that it has delisting within sight. As crises came and went, 
industry participation dwindled because some contentious issues around transparency 
reduced cooperation. Now as drinking water and toxic spill plan criteria are developed 
and tested, success is becoming the enemy of vigilance: “the worst thing that we could do 
would be to succeed, because that might produce a feeling of it’s all fixed, and we don’t 
have to worry about it anymore.” The issues of spill emergencies on the St. Clair River 
AOC is challenging for the BPAC because crises can be distracting and aren’t a reliable 
source of new long-term membership to support the group. 
Most recently, the EPA removed the “Loss of Fish and Wildlife Habitat” and 
“Bird or Animal Deformities or Reproduction Problems” BUIs from the US side of the 
AOC in 2017 (United States Environmental Protection Agency 2017a, 2017b). To date, 
two BUIs remain impaired on the US side. 
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Chapter	3	
Research	Findings	
Whereas the previous case study profiles embedded influential factors into the 
narrative context of each case study site, the goal of this analysis is to articulate the 
factors PAC members identified as enabling or constraining their group’s ability to 
influence the RAP progress. The purpose of this analysis is to derive generalizable 
lessons and understand the implications of these factors as they relate to public 
engagement and remedial implementation in Michigan’s AOC program. The objective of 
this analysis is to make sense of the various enabling and constraining factors identified 
by PAC members across these five cases. The study design framework guided the 
systematic identification and classification of factors as they emerged from the interview 
data. Figure 3.1 outlines the framework once again: 
Figure 3.1: Framework for Research Inquiry (same as Figure 1.5) 
Why does RAP implementation progress differ among AOCs? 
     
What factors ENABLE a PAC’s ability to 
influence progress? 
 What factors CONSTRAIN a PAC’s 
ability to influence progress? 
External Factors Internal Factors  External Factors Internal Factors 
Community context PAC origins, structure, 
and function 
 Community context PAC origins, structure, 
and function 
Community capacity PAC process and 
management 
 Community capacity PAC process and 
management 
State and Federal 
actors and actions 
Participant perceptions 
and attitudes 
 State and Federal 
actors and actions 
Participant perceptions 
and attitudes 
 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 summarize each factor in the framework, followed by detailed 
descriptions of the salient and unique internal and external factors PAC members 
described.
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Table 3.1: Summary of All Enabling Factors 
  What factors ENABLE a PAC’s ability to influence progress? 
External Factors Internal Factors 
Community context 
• Strong community identification with 
the water resource 
• Active water user community 
• Parallel actions through other local, 
state, or federal programs 
• Cohesive community networks and 
relationships 
PAC origins, structure, and function 
• Bottom-up origins 
• Engaged and committed Board of 
Directors 
• Dedicated, paid point of contact for 
PAC 
• PAC open membership 
• PAC meeting accessibility 
Community capacity 
• Motivated, engaged, and connected 
individuals 
• Accessible, credible community experts 
• Strong local media presence and 
coverage 
• Private sector engagement 
• Local government investment 
PAC process and management 
• Strong leadership 
• Membership continuity 
• Detailed, attainable Remedial Action 
Plan 
• Consensus-building strategy 
• Common goal 
• Future planning 
• Facilitation 
• Clear endpoint 
State and Federal actors and actions 
• Consistent, flexible funding 
• Clear criteria 
• Forums for cross-PAC learning 
• Dedicated and involved state agency 
coordinator 
• Committed, supportive agency sponsor 
• Coordination between state and federal 
agencies 
• Defined roles and responsibilities 
Participant perceptions and attitudes 
• Empowered by autonomy 
• Dedicated individuals 
• Motivated by holistic vision 
• Camaraderie within the PAC 
• Effective public education 
• Recognition of accomplishments 
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Table 3.2: Summary of All Constraining Factors 
What factors CONSTRAIN a PAC’s ability to influence progress? 
External Factors Internal Factors 
Community context 
• Differing levels of environmental 
understanding and awareness 
• Large watershed geography 
• Lack of control over or connection to 
parallel outside actions 
• Short-term problems or crises 
PAC origins, structure, and function 
• Inconsistent Board of Directors 
engagement and communication 
• Ambiguous membership definition 
• Inaccessible PAC meetings 
• Unclear organizational structure 
Community capacity 
• Local government lack of commitment 
• Local government resource constraints 
• Lack of private sector engagement 
• Unreliable local media presence and 
coverage 
• Lack of interested individuals 
• Communities disconnected from 
experts 
PAC process and management 
• Poorly managed meetings 
• Participant attrition 
• Demanding workload 
• Unclear Remedial Action Planning 
process 
• Lack of clear endpoint 
• Majority rules 
 
State and Federal actors and actions 
• Lulls in funding 
• Consternating caveats and strings 
attached to funding 
• Silos 
• Bottlenecks in communication between 
PACs and agencies 
• Lack of clear criteria 
• Lack of clear roles and responsibilities 
Participant perceptions and attitudes 
• Limited by state control 
• Public apathy 
• Tiresome, lifelong process 
• Philosophical division within the PAC 
• Strained interpersonal relationships 
• Diminishing interest 
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External	Factors	
Community	Context	
No AOC community is alike; each PAC is the product of a combination of factors 
influenced by the situational context of the community. PAC members noted that the 
geography and social fabric of the watershed influence the community’s understanding 
of, and care for, their local water quality. The constellation of water users and other 
ecosystem management activities influences whether and how the community mobilizes 
to protect their interests and prioritize remediation. Table 3.3 summarizes the community 
context factors PAC members identified in their interviews; detailed descriptions of each 
follow. 
Table 3.3: Summary of Community Context Factors 
 Enabling Factors Constraining Factors 
Community 
context 
• Strong community 
identification with the water 
resource 
• Active water user community 
• Parallel actions through other 
local, state, or federal programs 
• Cohesive community networks 
and relationships 
 
• Differing levels of 
environmental understanding and 
awareness 
• Large watershed geography 
• Lack of control over or 
connection to parallel outside 
actions 
• Short-term problems or crises 
 
 
Enabling	Factors	
Strong	community	identification	with	the	water	resource	
In all cases, the AOC communities’ identity has strong ties to the water resource. 
PAC members attested that their community’s “identity is tied up in the fact that we have 
access to the water,” “it’s something we’re proud of, and we’re known for.” The waters 
are not simply in the background of the community but are “a part of the social fabric 
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in” their region, and the whole “community culture is very tied to the [waters].” Most 
PAC members shared the sentiment that their waterway is the defining attribute of the 
community: “most of what attracts people to live here, [and] most of what enhances the 
quality of life here has to do with the [waters] and is directly tied to water quality.” PAC 
members identified that water quality improvements reinforce their communities’ 
connection to the resource: “water quality is what defines our quality of life around here, 
so having clean water allows people to enjoy what they have.” 
When people in an AOC community have a strong connection to the water 
resource, it enables “a little more buy-in in those natural resources” and their 
improvement. PACs benefit by getting buy-in from local institutions that are “very 
supportive in terms of [recognizing] the value of cleaning up.” Some PACs focus their 
goals on strengthening the community connection to the resource because “getting that 
community responsibility, that community ownership for ongoing stewardship is going to 
be a real[ly] important part of how we move forward.” One PAC member describes 
community buy-in to the RAP process as “the desire to make the communities whole, to 
restore the community, to do something positive.” 
Active	water	user	community	
Many PAC members mentioned that an “active [water] user community” enables 
the PAC’s ability to influence RAP implementation progress. When “you have people 
interested in the outdoors… [that] makes a big difference” because visible water quality 
improvements have a positive effect when there is an active community observing the 
changes in the waters they frequently use and enjoy. For example, in St. Clair, “kayaking 
has really changed focus in a lot of ways” because the active user community helps the 
PAC spread the message about RAP implementation achievements: “we have this great 
new paddling, and conditions have improved on the St. Clair River, it’s a great place to 
paddle, the water quality is great.” Participants noted that visible water quality 
improvements influence community buy-in for ensuring post-delisting support. Visible 
remedial projects that emphasize public access, and benefit the active water users, have 
“gotten a lot of folks in the town excited about the possibilities of what can be done if 
3. Findings – External Factors: Community Context 
 42 
folks work together on it. And so I think it’s the one that’s most likely to sustain an effort 
to continue to clean up.” 
Parallel	actions	through	other	local,	state,	or	federal	programs	
In all of the cases studied, there were, or are, parallel remedial actions occurring 
in the AOC through other local, state, or federal water quality programs. Many PAC 
members explained that RAP progress has happened in their AOC through these parallel 
programs—Superfund, RCRA, Clean Water Act (CWA) or otherwise. For example, with 
the CWA, local public sector compliance enabled RAP implementation progress because 
“cities were changing their stormwater, and they were putting in retention basins, and 
they were building new waste treatment plants.” The cities’ attention on compliance “ties 
into the city’s focus on the river.” 
Other regulatory programs also influenced RAP progress by facilitating industrial 
cleanup actions and changes to industrial management: 
We would not be that far ahead if [the industries] had not made that initial push 
to reduce discharge and spills, et cetera. And we’re not talking just spills, we’re 
talking about their normal discharge that was going in… it was [because of a] 
regulatory [change]. 
In other cases, part of the PAC’s RAP implementation strategy was to stay out of 
these different regulatory processes. For example, in White Lake “one big initial decision 
that the PAC made was to… accept, if that’s the right word, [a chemical company’s] 
plans for dealing with the persistent pollution.” Regulatory-based management actions 
enable PAC groups because “things happened externally, and they piggybacked” off the 
progress made through the regulatory channels. Other PAC members noted that these 
regulatory programs are the only processes that communities “have any faith [in] that the 
cleanup is going to be always moving forward.” 
Some other regulatory programs have enabled the PAC’s organizational capacity 
by providing an alternative source of funding. For example, in Kalamazoo: 
It’s fair to say that almost all the operating expenses of the KRWC since 2000, 
most base operating expenses have been 319 grants, or related watershed 
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implementation grants, for pollution runoff correction, stream bank revitalization, 
[and] project grants. 
Several PACs augment their organizational resources through strategic 
participation in these other, regulatory, water quality programs by “making use of the 
various processes in their area and being very successful about it.” 
Cohesive	community	networks	and	relationships	
In several of the cases, PAC members highlighted that their community networks 
are established and cohesive where “everybody knows everybody else.” Notably, “there 
was a lot of communication” between individuals and institutions in these well-connected 
networks. Often related to small communities, participants noted the benefits of “a very 
close, tight-knit community, I mean, people stay here for life.” Even AOC communities 
where the state or national line is “running right down the middle of it, which is also the 
river... it functions as a single community.” PAC members noted the benefit of 
“work[ing] back and forth” across community lines. The PAC becomes a valuable table 
to convene around because “it [is] an opportunity to maintain some of those 
relationships… to continue those [professional] associations” in the community 
network. These “personal relationship[s] and the, kind of friendly neighbor” factor 
enables PACs to “have some credibility that we can bring to the table… because of our 
roles and working with all these people.” 
 
Constraining	Factors	
Differing	levels	of	environmental	understanding	and	awareness	
There can be friction when users lack ecosystem understanding: “People that live 
here don’t necessarily have a good connection to ecological issues and their problems,” 
and “there’s not a lot of awareness.” In some cases, while community members may 
have an awareness of the water resources, they have “just that gut feeling of things are 
worse than they are.” When community awareness was driven by “emotional thinking,” 
then “there were some real urban legends about the contamination.” The challenge of 
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different levels of understanding and awareness about the environmental problems is that 
the waterways do not “have much of a positive image in a lot of people’s minds,” and 
PAC members acknowledged that “bucking that mindset is frustrating.” PAC members 
noted that differing levels of environmental understanding and awareness meant their 
PAC needed to spend more time and resources on public education. For example, at one 
AOC habitat restoration site, project managers: 
often hear complaints about the height of the vegetation… ‘I can’t get to the 
water,’ or ‘I can’t see the water because there’s vegetation in the way…’ So the 
challenge is explaining first of all why we need habitat in the first place, and then 
why are native plants important in a habitat project, and why do they need to be 
so tall. 
In several AOC cases, there is a need for raising watershed consciousness. However, not 
all PACs have the capacity, or funding, or interest to implement ecosystem-based 
watershed education and awareness projects. 
In other cases, a different understanding of environmental problems created 
additional work to address misplaced concerns. Public insistence on including unverified 
BUIs during the Stage 1 RAP created this issue: “It became immediately obvious that 
some of the impairments were going to have to be listed, not because there was any 
science backing them up, but because there was such a strong public perception.” Part of 
the extra work involved included gathering information and, despite the 
misunderstanding, address public concerns “by making sure that the information is 
included. You don’t just say, well, they didn’t understand, and cross it off the list—you 
don’t want to do that. You want the public to be confident in the process.” Therefore, 
raising awareness through education instills public confidence in the RAP process. 
Large	watershed	geography	
Many PAC members mentioned that the large size of the AOC boundary or the 
watershed, often referred to as the “geography” of the place, is a constraining factor 
itself. However, PAC members’ rationale connected the factor of geography to 
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underlying challenges of the logistics, disparate community interconnections that instill 
inherent distrust among a plurality of interests, and a lack of urgency. 
The primary constraining influence of a watershed’s geography is that its large 
physical scale impedes the PAC’s logistics and “full ability to interact with, provide 
services for, and take advantage of the full watershed.” Specifically, members noted that 
“geographically [it] is hard to convene people.” It is a hassle to travel; it takes 
considerable time to travel across a large area to a less-than-central location where the 
PAC conducts its business meetings. One member noted that “it’s not that [another 
organization in the watershed is] not willing to work with [us, but] they’re far enough 
away it would be hard for them to actually be members.” PAC members also noted the 
“distance thing” influences the PAC’s ability to coordinate with state agency officials 
because the travel time constrains “getting bodies… here to run things from the [M]DNR 
side of it.” For some, the barriers to travel disproportionately discourages public 
participants from attending the PAC’s meetings: 
If you’re working for [a] government, if you’re representing an industry, you just 
shrug, and you put up with that kind of crud. But if you’re a citizen-at-large and 
you’re taking time out of your personal life to contribute or participate, you don’t 
need that [travel hassle]. 
PAC members also cited the challenge of managing the RAP implementation 
process with a large plurality of interests. One member attested: “It’s too big, how do you 
get all these people on the same page? How do you get participation from everybody?” 
Another PAC member alleged that such an endeavor would “be a major conference, and 
almost impossible to get anybody to agree.” Members pointed to the large geographic 
scope of the watershed as the cause of a “less highly developed… interconnectivity, a 
sense of common purpose” throughout the watershed. Large geography constrains the 
PAC’s ability to facilitate progress because members assert that upstream and 
downstream users “don’t want to interact with [the PAC] tree-huggers” because “a lot 
of them don’t trust hanging out with those upper-class white people. That’s a problem… 
both ways.” One challenge is that stakeholders from different communities with differing 
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interests do not find it easy to identify with one another cohesively, and this is 
exacerbated when the geography of an AOC site is large. 
Finally, large geographic areas with complex environmental challenges are 
difficult issues to organize people around because the problem is not urgent:  
as soon as that issue gets really big and broad and takes on multiple components 
like all the elements of watershed management, you no longer have sort of, the 
urgency of the issue of the day. 
Lack	of	control	over	or	connection	to	parallel	outside	actions	
When an AOC’s RAP implementation progress relies upon piggybacking on other 
regulatory programs, PAC members “feel like they don’t have as much ownership or 
power over what to do” about advancing remedial progress. Most of these parallel 
regulatory processes do not have a role for the PAC (i.e., no ‘official’ Superfund CAG in 
Kalamazoo), so PAC interests are disconnected from these actions and are “not part of 
that [regulatory] discussion.” There would not be funding to implement remediation 
until the conclusion of regulatory litigation or negotiations. As a consequence, “until that 
funding source was there to do the cleanup, there wasn’t a lot that could happen.” 
Therefore, some PACs pressed pause on the AOC process entirely while they waited for 
other regulatory processes to “churn” along. PAC members noted that remaining RAP 
implementation was contingent upon these regulatory cleanups: “we were kind of 
hamstrung trying to resolve those other issues.” Implementation aside, the PAC did not 
need to convene in the meantime because “there wasn’t really a whole lot for this 
committee to do until that process got through the whole negotiation.” The overall effect 
constrained the PAC’s ability to influence RAP implementation due to exclusion from 
these regulatory programs. 
Further, the legal rigidity of the regulatory process produces “uncertainty in the 
actual plans” for remedial regulatory actions which makes it a challenge for the PAC “to 
see where you’re going, [so] it’s really hard to organize and be prepared for those sorts 
of things and talk about them” with PAC constituents. The lack of a formal connection to 
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other regulatory processes constrains a PACs' ability to influence RAP implementation 
through parallel outside actions. 
Short-term	problems	or	crises	
Water quality degradation in an AOC is not the only water-related problem facing 
these communities, and these other issues can create distractions or confusion about the 
PAC’s focus. One-off environmental problems or crises create distractions for the PAC 
when community members are “showing up at our meetings and wondering why we 
weren’t addressing that [specific concern]. And you’d have to explain to them, it’s not 
what we’re about.” To minimize distractions, PACs demarcate “a boundary around our 
activities… [because] we can’t expand out in every direction.” Maintaining boundaries is 
key to keep their RAP implementation progress focused: “we’re not saying we’re not 
interested, do we think it’s not important, but we’ve got to stay focused, or we’ll never get 
this thing done.” 
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Community	Capacity 
Each AOC community has a similar set of stakeholders: individuals and interest 
groups, experts, the media, the private sector, and local government. However, players 
vary in the degree of personal and organizational motivation, interest, and commitment 
that constitute the community’s unique capacity to engage in the AOC program. Table 
3.4 summarizes the community capacity factors PAC members identified in their 
interviews; detailed descriptions of each follow. 
Table 3.4: Summary of Community Capacity Factors 
 Enabling Factors Constraining Factors 
Community 
capacity 
• Motivated, engaged, and 
connected individuals 
• Accessible, credible 
community experts 
• Strong local media presence 
and coverage 
• Private sector engagement 
• Local government investment 
 
• Local government lack of 
commitment 
• Local government resource 
constraints 
• Lack of private sector 
engagement 
• Unreliable local media presence 
and coverage 
• Lack of interested individuals 
• Communities disconnected from 
experts 
 
 
Enabling	Factors	
Motivated,	engaged,	and	connected	individuals	
PAC members from every case noted that motivated and engaged individuals in 
the community are a vital factor enabling progress. Particularly, interested individuals 
who are “professionally engaged” and “actively employed” at regional organizations. As 
one member noted: 
3. Findings – External Factors: Community Capacity 
 49 
I think it comes down to, somebody from an organization or municipality… if they 
have an interest, then they get on board and they bring some participation. But if 
there’s no interest… from anybody in that group, they ain’t coming. 
The professional relationships shared between AOC community institutions can 
promote “regional cooperation” that benefits RAP implementation. PAC members 
described the engaged individuals in their community as having well-developed 
professional relationships with each other. PAC members emphasized that “a lot of the 
same faces [show] up in different iterations of a lot of organizations,” and that “there’s 
lots of groups [in the community and] everybody knows each other.” The professional 
relationships among interested individuals in the community help to bridge these 
institutions: “some of the other entities had those personal connections already… and 
they start talking because they already know each other… so there was a lot of that 
connection.” 
PAC members emphasized the communication benefits of PAC members building 
relationships with representatives of community institutions: “what works well is that 
right now, we have regular communication between all of these partners.” Institutions in 
an AOC that “all work really well together” have an advantage because they have 
experience cooperating. 
Motivated and engaged individuals can also bring their institution’s resources to 
bear on solving water quality problems of mutual interest. Institutional support is 
essential to PACs because “we need those key [community] resource people… [to] 
support these projects to get to the end outcome.” Support and resources are particularly 
enabling when they come from local government institutions. It always helps a PAC 
when individuals who are “really stalwart advocates for improvements to” local water 
quality occupy the regional units of government. 
It was helpful because the individual had the passion to bring it back [to their 
office] and to see what that organization could do for [the] common goal. Versus, 
I’m here [on the PAC], representing the City, so I want to see how this is going to 
impact the City. It was kind of the opposite way, of the individual then trying to go 
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back to these entities and saying, OK, Here’s what’s going on, how can we help? 
How can we impact? So it was less, you know, ‘just’ a board member. 
Accessible,	credible	community	experts	
PAC members noted that their work towards RAP progress benefitted from access 
to credible experts from within the community. In several cases, local academic 
institutions supplied accessible water quality experts: “our sophistication comes from 
people we know, like the [local university]. So if you want to consider them a part of 
local capacity, then, they’re a big deal.” For example, in White Lake, without expert 
contacts at the local college: 
We wouldn’t have had that, walk in the door, sit down for a half an hour and talk 
something through with a knowledgeable expert… these folks are easy to talk to… 
helpful and sympathetic to local concerns. I thought that was all real important. 
The community’s local experts are a source of “information we [PAC members] 
could trust… We were absolutely sure that we were going to get whatever the data 
shows; it wasn’t being massaged.” Participants expressed trust in the credibility of their 
local technical partners: “they do a great job… those folks believe in what they do.” 
Some PAC members noted the “local technical expertise” of individuals from the 
community is also “instrumental” to the PAC’s efforts to make RAP implementation 
progress. Their strategy was to recruit these professionals by “getting people from the 
committee reaching out and saying, you have this expertise… how can you help us, or 
how can we help you?” Some PACs have successfully recruited these locals with 
“reliable expertise” without necessarily contracting them for services. These local 
experts serve on the PAC as at-large participants: “we never have a problem getting 
technical people on our board, they are mostly… representatives of the community.” 
Strong	local	media	presence	and	coverage	
The community press is a vital communication link between the AOC program 
and the communities affected by BUIs. Local media helps to reduce the deficit of 
knowledge in communities where, allegedly, 90% of members have “never heard” of the 
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AOC program. When regional media partners are engaged and covering AOC program 
progress, the PACs experience a community awareness breakthrough: “now people know 
what the PAC is!” PAC members, therefore, attest that “support of the local paper, the 
editorials… were factors in the success.” 
PAC members also attested that a good relationship with the press enables 
progress toward RAP implementation because it makes the process visible: “I think there 
was good visibility of this process in the press [and] in the local community.” The 
“continued coverage” of water quality issues in the local media is essential to keep the 
AOC, the PAC, and the RAP process all in the public eye because it facilitates public 
awareness. 
It’s media coverage… People read about it, and they become more aware, so as 
much as you can get in the media with some good news, that people are aware 
that things are improving, and you’re doing good things, and so then they have 
support for it. 
Media coverage also can facilitate public input into the process: 
So they helped ensure there was good publicity with respect to what was going on 
and what the next steps were and if we needed public involvement on a particular 
matter. The press coverage was there to help ensure that that happened… there 
was a mechanism there to ensure that the public could be aware of it and knew 
how to provide that input. 
Finally, media coverage is said to enable a PAC because it adds to the “perceived 
momentum” of RAP implementation progress. 
The more that there is a perceived momentum from the press, from local 
organizations, from [the] government, the more it’s easier to get that support and 
to move forward. You don’t have to fight a battle every day with some naysayer 
who is [saying]: ‘Why are we doing this and why is it taking so long?’ It just 
reduces the barriers and the friction of the process, and I think that’s important 
any time you’re trying to do big things like we were with [our AOC]. 
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Private	sector	engagement	
The private sector’s initiative and institutional investment in the AOC program 
influences the PAC’s ability to help RAP implementation progress because their effort 
materialized as in-kind benefits for the PAC:  
Some of the paper companies gave us some in-kind support, helped us with some 
publications. They helped us with some technical information. They would go out 
of their way to host meetings. For a while, we were struggling to find locations 
and venues, and they would always step up. 
The voluntary character of the AOC program emphasizes the benefits of private 
sector engagement: “Fortunately we had industrial actors who were willing to take that 
step and be innovative as they’re going along and found that… we can see a way to 
actually finish this up.” In a couple of cases, the local industry was central to the 
community because “the value of those jobs was important” to the economy. This 
community context shaped the PAC approach to the RAP process: 
We weren’t there to shut [companies] down or run them out, and so we found 
ways to be encouraging for agencies and companies to work together towards a 
solution, and so I really feel that was an important part in why we were able to 
keep moving forward. 
When industry participated in other regulatory programs, the resulting 
“investment by the polluting industries” facilitated funding for remedial actions. Some 
private sector engagement funded AOC RAP implementation, and as a result of the 
regulatory processes playing out: “the companies stepped up, probably because they 
didn’t have any other choice, but they did step up.” 
Local	government	investment	
In some AOCs, local government and quasi-governmental organizations (i.e., 
Conservation Districts, Councils of Government, County Community Foundations) 
possess the resources to make water quality remediation a priority. Government capacity 
translates into dedicated local resources for supporting RAP implementation. For 
example, in St. Clair, the County Community Foundation not only committed land and 
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sought funds to develop riparian habitat, but also their connections to the Binational PAC 
facilitated cooperation: 
[St. Clair County] asked us, what do they need environment-wise, how does that 
work into our [RAP] plan? And we told them, we need habitat, we need in-water, 
shallow-water habitat. And they made that part of their plan. 
RAP implementation progresses when local government capacity includes 
investments dedicated to water quality priorities, such as through funding, land, human 
resources, and capital resources. For example, one PAC member noted the benefit of 
having “the support of the Health Department where I can use all of this [“electronic 
infrastructure”] and get [PAC] work done really quickly and easily and efficiently.” 
	
Constraining	Factors	
Local	government	lack	of	commitment	
Many PAC members felt the individuals in local government positions were not 
committed to water quality issues and as a result, “they weren’t attending the meetings 
regularly.” The constraining effect this had on the PAC was that “they didn’t prevent 
things from happening, [but] they turned a blind eye to what was going on.” Without 
passionate individuals occupying official seats in the local government, “participation 
was fairly haphazard.” At one extreme, local government units actively ignore PAC 
requests for collaboration: 
[The County agency reps] don’t have to answer our phone calls. There is nothing 
that we bring to the process except a bunch of blah-blah that they probably think 
gets in their way, and we don’t always agree with their view about how things are 
working, or what would be most important. 
Local government officials not committed and engaged in water quality remedial 
activities do not fully understand or see the value in supporting AOC program efforts and 
are thus not supportive of the PAC’s work toward RAP implementation progress. 
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Institutional relationships and investment were sporadic when individual interest did not 
align with the AOC program: “there’s not anybody that’s doing any writing any checks 
anywhere.” In most cases, this lack of commitment became a point of frustration that 
discouraged PAC members: “They just weren’t interested. None of us could understand 
that if the pollution is on your property, why aren’t you here talking about resolution?” 
On the other hand, local units of government that had once participated have exited the 
PAC process as soon as ‘their’ issue was resolved: “they don’t come to meetings. They 
weren’t part of the board, but they’re not called upon because everybody just assumes 
that issue’s fixed. So they were there, but [now] they’re gone.” PAC members expressed 
that the lack of commitment and support from local government was a missed 
opportunity to advance RAP implementation progress: “having some support like that 
from the local municipalities probably would have helped and expedited some things.” 
Local	government	resource	constraints	
Some PAC members noted that the small scale of their local government units 
constrained investment in remedial activities, because “there was no deep pocket.” 
Furthermore, local government units did not necessarily have the budget or bandwidth to 
commit funds or full-time equivalents to contribute to remedial actions: 
The availability of funds of the local government has definitely become more 
limiting, especially since the economic downturn… [the] staff has been cut, [and] 
funding is more lean for environmental programs. 
Not all constraints of local government resources are financial. For example: “we 
couldn’t get those communities to provide people or participation, in some cases, 
information, and that is very frustrating.” Therefore, local government austerity limits 
the resources available to support RAP implementation progress in many AOCs. 
Lack	of	private	sector	engagement	
In several cases, key private sector corporations responsible for the legacy 
pollution are not engaged with the community: “generally they haven’t been very 
enthusiastic about engaging the community, they’d rather just fly low under the radar as 
much as possible.” In these constraining cases, certain companies “were trying to avoid 
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everything” and engaged only through regulatory means. As a result, there is limited 
support and resources for remediation: “industries do not want to invest in this; they 
fought for so long that it will go away somehow.” 
Unreliable	local	media	presence	and	coverage	
Local media presence is a crucial mechanism for the PAC’s information-sharing 
ability, so when local press is unreliable, the PACs’ dissemination capacity diminishes. 
With media conglomeration and corporate austerity came “the demise of environmental 
journalism.” Consequently, PAC relationships with the press suffered: 
[At] the local newspaper where you know somebody on staff who covered the 
river for years and years and years… and was deeply knowledgeable about the 
history, and been to all the meetings... And we didn’t always agree with their 
assessment, but they were no doubt very knowledgeable. They retired and then we 
ended up getting like a different person every three months. 
Without a local media mechanism, “it’s almost hamstrung us as far as information 
sharing.” Unreliable media coverage reduces RAP process visibility and constrains the 
public’s awareness of the AOC program. 
Many communities’ local media capacity has greatly diminished in the social 
media era. However, the reliance on social media and personal networks is not an 
effective substitute for a strong local media presence. PAC members noted struggling to 
communicate with the public through social media because it’s “done in narrow silos.” 
Communication between the PAC and the community is constrained when it relies on 
personal relationships: “It’s all, ‘I missed that email’ or ‘I didn’t get that email.’” 
PAC members also expressed concerns that local press coverage is not always 
honest or fair in its characterizations of the problems, players, and progress in their AOC. 
In some cases in the past, “the press had also been extremely unhelpful by unfairly 
characterizing some of the existing industries.” For example, when CSO discharges get 
reported in Saginaw, the reports do not inform the public that discharges are adequately 
treated to protect public health: “and to this day you read in the newspapers… people 
believe that the Saginaw River is full of sewage.” The problems have been “grossly 
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overstated” by the press, particularly in times of crisis, to the point that PAC members 
have been discouraged from seeking publication: “You’re reluctant to discuss it with 
them, because you’d read the article and you didn’t even recognize the description [you 
gave].” Finally, PAC members expressed concerns that local media decline to report on 
PAC successes: “it is really difficult to get them to report on positive activities.” 
Lack	of	interested	individuals	
When interested individuals in a community are no longer active in the 
institutions they represent, the bridges between organizations built by personal 
relationships do not rebuild automatically. Often, “people retired and continued their 
involvement on the PAC, so it stayed with the individual rather than the entity,” because 
the individual’s replacement may not be interested in participating in the same 
professional networks of their predecessor. One frequent refrain of PAC members was 
that some critical contacts to larger organizations retired, and their organizations never 
sent a replacement. A retiring community network weakens the institutional bonds PAC 
members have forged with community partners, both present and prospective. 
When it came to interested individuals in government organizations, part of the 
lack of interest was attributed to the challenge of elected official turnover: 
People aren’t around in state offices long enough to develop these associations, 
or develop these interests, or develop these commitments. They’re either getting 
re-elected, or they’re gone. 
Turnover adds to the PAC’s workload because now “you’re educating new people 
instead of maintaining relationships.” 
Communities	disconnected	from	experts	
AOC sites in some cases are well-studied, but by research institutions without 
local ties. One PAC member listed universities from three states outside of Michigan 
“that came up and did investigations” on aspects of water quality in the AOC. PAC 
members noted that the research by external experts lacks a strategy or systematic thread 
to tie many efforts back to RAP implementation. There is not always good 
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communication and notification between researchers and PAC members whose decisions 
can be influenced and benefitted by reading a copy of published studies. Researchers 
collecting data in the AOC “don’t have a constant presence here, but they have done a 
few key studies, kind of swoop in, take some measurements, and swoop back out.” 
Outcomes of external research are not disseminated systematically to players in the AOC 
program at the community level.  
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State	and	Federal	Actors	and	Actions	
The state and federal government agencies directing the AOC program have 
shaped each PAC group’s ability to influence progress. State and federal agencies control 
funding, define criteria and process endpoints, delineate responsibilities, and delegate 
inter-governmental cooperation in different ways across AOCs. Table 3.5 summarizes 
the state and federal actor and action factors PAC members identified in their interviews; 
detailed descriptions of each follow. 
Table 3.5: Summary of State and Federal Actor and Action Factors 
 Enabling Factors Constraining Factors 
State and 
federal 
actors and 
actions 
• Consistent, flexible funding 
• Clear criteria 
• Forums for cross-PAC learning 
• Dedicated and involved state 
agency coordinator 
• Committed, supportive agency 
sponsor 
• Coordination between state and 
federal agencies 
• Defined roles and responsibilities 
 
• Lulls in funding 
• Consternating caveats and 
strings attached to funding 
• Silos 
• Bottlenecks in communication 
between PACs and agencies 
• Lack of clear criteria 
• Lack of clear roles and 
responsibilities 
 
 
Enabling	Factors	
Consistent,	flexible	funding	
Every PAC member interviewed for this study mentioned, at least once, the 
federal GLRI funding for AOC programs and the state’s administration of those funds 
through their PAC support grants. Before GLRI funding came online, the AOC program 
was an unfunded mandate. The introduction of the GLRI funds “sure helped to kind of 
grease the skids, get things moving.” While PACs often undertook planning during the 
decades before federal funding, there did come the point when plans were collecting dust, 
and PAC meeting agendas were sparse. After the inception of GLRI, the subsequent 
3. Findings – External Factors: State and Federal Actors and Actions 
 59 
consistency in the funding enabled PAC groups to implement the remedial plans they had 
ready to go. The GLRI prioritized RAP implementation for PACs that had plans and 
partners but no funds: these are the “bucket-ready, shovel-ready” plans for management 
actions. PAC members noted that progress on RAP implementation required such GLRI 
funding: “I don’t think [OGL] would have accepted our [Stage 2] plans without having 
some [GLRI] money there… if they didn’t have the money to do those they weren’t going 
to put themselves in that kind of box… until they knew that it was do-able.” These 
proposals were no surprise to the agencies when it came time for bureaucratic approval to 
release the GLRI funds. Due to cooperation and connections, PACs are enabled to make 
progress because “there was some backing before it was sent off for final review.” 
While consistent GLRI funds accelerated implementation of fully developed, 
agency-backed plans, it is crucial that GLRI funding for remedial actions not be overly 
rigid concerning implementing funded plans. PACs “could get the money you would need 
to finish it, and it allowed modification of plans and improvement of plans as the process 
went on.” The consistency of GLRI funding has enabled PAC groups to gather steam as 
they move through RAP implementation: 
It wasn’t until we knew that GLRI funding was going to come along that we could 
see how much progress you can truly make… We’ve been getting these PAC 
grants for a very long time, which has helped… keep [up] momentum. 
The PAC support grants are valuable to the group because the consistency and 
flexibility of the funds enable continuity in the PAC’s organizational capacity. Consistent 
PAC support grants have been a source of “sustainable funding” invested in supporting 
PACs’ organizational capacity include “small packets of money… [that] have gotten 
them through some lean periods.” The money from PAC support grants enables PACs to 
fulfill their needs for technical capacity, outreach, and continuity in assets like staff and 
contractors. PACs can direct the funds to “hire consultants if we needed to specialize in 
doing certain tasks” that enhances the technical capacity of their work. Grant monies 
may flow to partner or umbrella organizations to provide community outreach capacity to 
the PAC’s work: “so we’re able to build a website, we’re able to put out brochures, 
we’re able to put out swag items. That’s part of keeping the community engaged.” 
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Clear	criteria	
For many years early in the AOC program, PACs and states lacked a specific, 
uniform standard or threshold for attaining restoration of an impaired beneficial use. The 
agency-set standards were enabling to PAC groups:  
[If you] never really quantify or clarify and just… be present and come to lots of 
meetings and say we need money to fix all of our problems, we need money to fix 
all our problems… you’ll never get any clarity or end point on anything… 
[Defining the criteria] was a really big step, and good. 
At the behest of GLNPO, the OGL defined criteria for BUI removal in the published 
delisting guidance, which are currently in a revised format. PAC members highlighted the 
“top-down move” “driven by the agencies,” where the state “actually put criteria 
together” for how to remove a BUI, and published its guidance. The criteria were 
enabling because “the agencies, state and federal, worked together enough to force the 
local citizen groups to write down, finally, what exactly the impairments are or are not.” 
In many cases, PAC members noted that many great benefits accrued when PACs 
accepted state criteria or at least used them as reference points for developing their 
tailored local criteria. Either way, this move helped to keep PAC groups “focused on the 
AOC.” 
Clear criteria also helped orient the PAC towards defined goals, and shifted the 
mindset of the members to:  
look at this from the standpoint from trying to define the endgame. How do we 
win this game? As opposed to, what the heck are we trying to do here? And that 
really did change the mentality of what this whole effort felt like. And that’s why I 
think it bought into fairly quickly, and so you see that process having been 
followed. 
The unambiguous criteria for the endpoint of the process were important for engaging 
private sector stakeholders who wanted certainty: “But the idea of the industry is ‘OK, 
we’ll clean it, we’ll do that. We’ll take responsibility. But you’ve got to tell us exactly 
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[what to do].’” Clear criteria helped define the endpoint and incentivize industry to buy 
into the RAP process.	
Forums	for	cross-PAC	learning	
The cooperative federal and state support convening the Statewide Public 
Advisory Council, or SPAC, is “a worthwhile investment” because the SPAC is 
instrumental in providing PACs with opportunities to learn from one another and interact 
with their elected officials. During times of slow progress, SPAC provided solace to PAC 
members: “It was somewhat helpful to go to the SPAC meetings because… all of a 
sudden you weren’t alone. Everybody was suffering at the same level you were.” 
Learning from one another’s experiences scraping resources together was “valuable,” as 
was the opportunity to educate “our elected officials about a local issue that they could 
easily ignore, and we’re actually selling it.” SPAC also became a venue that 
strengthened federal and state communications with PAC members. 
Dedicated	and	involved	state	agency	coordinator	
Numerous PAC members recognized their OGL AOC Coordinators are markedly 
“dedicated and excited,” “more responsive,” giving “excellent participation” and 
finding “a lot of synergy,” contributing “a positive influence” as a “key player,” and are 
a “steady person” who is “very involved” “without being overbearing” and who is “an 
affable individual… want[ing] a good working relationship.” Many participants 
characterized this as a trusting, appreciative relationship. In several cases, PAC members 
attested that the OGL and their AOC Coordinator are equally committed to RAP 
implementation progress, and part of that equanimity in the relationship stems from the 
two-way communications between the PAC and the AOC Coordinator: “the feedback 
between [the] state agency and [the] PAC… goes back and forth; that’s really 
important.” 
While it’s not a comfortable position because it occasionally entails telling the 
PAC no when they want to hear yes, PAC members noted that AOC Coordinator 
leadership is beneficial: “the OGL have shown up and provided oversight and feedback 
and maybe a reality check.” A strong relationship between the AOC Coordinator from 
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the OGL and the PAC enables the group to focus on making progress: “You have to have 
somebody that brings the sides in on to identify the problem, or it just kind of goes 
everywhere.” 
Committed,	supportive	state	agency	sponsor	
Over the course of the AOC program, the Michigan state agency sponsoring the 
AOC program varied in its commitment and support for RAP implementation and PAC 
engagement. PAC members identified that the OGL is now a supportive state agency 
sponsor with interests the PAC shares: “we’ve had that support to work cooperatively 
towards our mutual goals of cleaning up the river.” PAC members across most cases 
commented positively about the OGL’s commitment and support as the AOC program 
guardians: “It was like a curtain opened. The Director of the OGL and the Assistant 
Director attended our SPAC meeting and said: ‘What are you doing? How can we help?’ 
And we’re like… Oh?!... We’re not the voice in the wilderness anymore.” 
The value of the PAC’s relationship with both federal (GLNPO) and state (OGL) 
agencies is apparent in PAC members’ statements about concerns for life after delisting: 
“we just don’t want all of the attention and money just to completely disappear and walk 
away.” The benefit of a committed and supportive agency is that PAC members 
remarked the agencies are responsive to the needs of the group:  
[When] the state said we want to support this [AOC], we want to move it forward, 
not only could they provide some technical support, but they worked through 
some of the minutiae of getting grants, and here is what the state’s looking for, 
and here’s the direction we’re heading. 
Coordination	between	state	and	federal	agencies	
PACs benefit when state and federal representatives coordinate across program 
and agency boundaries on AOC programming. PAC members noted that it was helpful 
when their AOC Coordinators were active liaisons, bringing the resources of other state 
and federal agencies to the PAC as a joint search for answers or to implement solutions: 
“they would be a liaison to ensure that we had access to the state experts.” A few PAC 
members described being “lucky” to have connections of their own to other state and 
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federal agencies. For the rest, AOC Coordinators are in a position of a natural fit to be the 
“conduit” between the PAC and the constellation of government bureaucracy: “they 
have the ability to gain information that’s been extremely helpful in the delisting 
process.” AOC Coordinators have valuable insight, relationships, and contacts that 
contribute to coordination between government units. 
RAP progress is enhanced with intergovernmental cooperation because 
“communication has improved greatly” among all the players. In one example, 
communication between the PAC and EPA facilitated improved environmental outcomes 
of a management action:  
the habitat’s better than when we came in, that has been some pressure we’ve put 
on EPA saying, thinking about what the habitat looks like… And to EPA it was a 
really good engineering solution… so there has been some back and forth. 
In many instances, PAC members would reflect jointly on OGL and GLNPO in 
consideration of their partnership or teamwork. PAC members primarily evaluated their 
relationship with GLNPO in the same breath as relationships with the state: “that close 
relationship we have with [OGL] and EPA is helpful. They’re really involved,” asking: 
“How can I help? What do you need? What can we do? What are you looking to do? I 
think that helped out a ton and expedited the process.” PAC members characterized the 
federal/state teamwork as “cheerleading” for the PAC’s progress. PAC members noted 
that physical attendance at meetings demonstrated both agencies’ commitment to being 
an equally committed partner around the table. 
Defined	roles	and	responsibilities	
The extent to which the State’s roles and responsibilities are unambiguously 
defined and delineated from the PAC’s roles and responsibilities influences PAC 
members’ sense of progress. PAC members benefit from the clear division of labor: 
“we’re not supposed to be doing the work. We’re just supposed to be advising,” where 
the PAC approves “OGL-written documents” when their group is satisfied with the 
documentation. 
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Constraining	Factors	
Lulls	in	funding	
PAC members explained that “lulls of funding” caused inertia and set PACs up 
for contrarian bickering. Without funding, PACs claimed they would “still just be kind of 
sitting here; we’d basically be just holding a meeting as a debating society because that’s 
about what it was for a while.” To have plans with no way to move forward “made 
getting anything done almost impossible. All you could do is complain… it just fostered 
people sitting around and complaining.” 
Lulls in funding also may disrupt continuity in hiring part- or full-time staff 
because PACs are “grants-based, we live hand to mouth.” Inconsistent funding 
constrains the PAC’s organizational capacity, for example: 
We’ve gone through at least one lean period where we had to drop down to a 
part-time volunteer, one of the board members manning the office… they did a 
good job, but we couldn’t do nearly as much. We almost became semi-dormant 
for a year until we got grant money again, so that’s always a limiting factor. 
Consternating	caveats	and	strings	attached	to	funding	
PAC members noted that PAC support grants have some consternating caveats 
and strings attached: “The state is in the driver’s seat, and stuck with the responsibility of 
doing this, and limited to being able to work within the constraints of the federal funding 
that drives all of that.” 
Some bitterness remains about the decades when “Michigan’s commitment was 
totally insincere” because they did not put their money where their mouth was. In the 
absence of state support, an all-volunteer committee had to rely on the resources of 
member organizations. However, not all partners were so generous or endowed to support 
the PAC with needed resources: “There was a time that some of us involved in the 
process were getting in trouble for using resources from our own facilities to keep the 
process running because you couldn’t even buy [some] paper.” PAC members noted that 
luck was the only difference between PACs with and without organizational capacity 
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during the unfunded era: “the only reason a few of us had any funding was because we 
were either talented or lucky at getting grants, or someone got lucky and got a big donor 
for a few years.” 
There is also frustration with the OGL’s rationale behind PAC support grant 
deadlines and priorities, which reflects an asymmetric relationship between OGL and the 
PAC: “[OGL is] pretty much set on [PAC support grants] as take-it or leave-it thing, 
which is frustrating for a group that… would like to feel that we’re more of a full 
partner.” Some PAC members asserted that the OGL is making “seemingly arbitrary 
decisions” about funding and priorities. OGL rejecting PAC funding requests 
discourages PAC members and undermines their relationship with the OGL: 
There’s the whole frustration and the old golden rule, well they got the gold, so 
they make the rule, so whatever we want to do here, we still [have] got to get their 
permission… [so] there’s some built-in friction. 
Silos	
PAC members in several cases mentioned there are “silos that are always hard to 
overcome” in pursuit of inter-agency coordination. PAC members recognize that state 
and federal AOC program agents do not automatically get attention from other agency 
programs, recognizing the “turf block” there. In one case, PAC members were highly 
aware that other agencies “don’t pay attention to another program called the Area of 
Concern program.” Their experience was that federal representatives from another 
regulatory agency department “didn’t even really connect that” their waterway was also 
an AOC. PAC members noted that other agency programs do not “really understand” the 
AOC program.	
Bottlenecks	in	communication	between	PACs	and	agencies	
Several PAC members expressed the sense that their AOC Coordinator as their 
point of contact to the world of government bureaucracy was somewhat of a bottleneck: 
“because everything has to go through them, that one person, so that was a challenge.” 
PAC members are primarily looking to access technical assistance through interagency 
coordination. On the one hand, some want the AOC Coordinators to “act on [the PAC’s] 
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behalf” to bring in government experts for assistance. On the other hand, others feel that 
going exclusively through AOC Coordinators for intergovernmental communication bogs 
down progress. Members claimed the formal channels are slow: “it was OGL or DEQ 
saying to DNR we need you to do this and they’d say, oh, get on our five-year monitoring 
cycle, and we’ll do it,” which PAC members expressed would be too long to wait for new 
monitoring results. 
In many cases, the PAC members do not regularly communicate directly with 
other agencies, and the bottleneck of working only through OGL translates into missed 
opportunities: 
They don’t use us as well as they could, I think if they recognized us as a positive 
communication force more than they do, or recognize how they could use us, I 
think they could benefit, advancing all of our goals of restoring the [AOC]. So, we 
felt a bit underutilized over the years… it can be hard to get regulatory agencies 
to take the time and trouble to use us as a resource. 
Lack	of	clear	criteria	
PACs were “struggling with figuring out a target” when there were no criteria 
enumerated by GLNPO or OGL. Once the governments ironed out their standards, in 
several cases, community members were not always satisfied with the criteria as going 
“far enough.” However, despite aspirations for cleaner criteria: 
if you didn’t accept the state’s criteria, then, you’d have to come with funding on 
your own. So they kind of said, here’s our state criteria. You can accept them, or 
if you don’t, you’re kind of on your own to get funding to fix the problem.	
Lack	of	clear	roles	and	responsibilities	
PAC members had different perspectives on whether the state agency is obligated 
to seek PAC advice on RAP implementation. One PAC member observed the obligation 
of consulting the PAC is a “push-me-pull-you kind of thing. It’s a requirement of the 
AOC program, so to some extent, the [M]DNR, or OGL, needs to have us there because 
they have to work with Advisory Councils.” While there may be a requirement for 
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agencies to work with PACs, members have observed agencies lacked interest in 
managing public input: “everybody involved would agree that, sure, that’s a legitimate 
thing… doesn’t make it any more pleasant.” Some PAC members are dissatisfied with 
the involvement of, and their relationship with, their AOC Coordinator. 
Questions arise not only about who is responsible for completing management 
actions but also about who is responsible for tracking progress, for driving the RAP 
implementation agenda, for running the PAC? “There seems to be some tension with this 
PAC… [about] the State’s roles and responsibilities and who is ultimately responsible 
for the cleanup?” Some PAC members feel “the [M]DEQ [and] OGL, could be and 
should be doing much, much more,” while another posited: “the [State OGL] reps, at 
that time, had personal agendas.” 
In two cases, PAC members identified “some dysfunctionality between the PAC 
and the State” AOC Coordinators: “there isn’t always agreement on priorities and 
projects” past or present. From the perspective of one PAC member: “I started to see 
where [other PAC members and the Coordinator] were just at odds… I guess I see a 
little bit of distrust…” Distrust relates to the challenge the OGL faces because “their role 
in having to say no sometimes maybe upset [PAC members].” PAC members’ 
dysfunctional relationship with their OGL AOC Coordinator may have deeper roots for 
some participants, depending on their view of government: when “you have somebody in 
the room who knows better you ought to listen to them, but you don’t trust them either.” 
The relationship that PACs have with the GLNPO/OGL through the AOC 
program is based on the AOC designation. PAC members have fears about the future 
when delisting means the agencies are no longer obligated to fulfill their roles and 
responsibilities to focus on and communicate with the PAC, “so you almost lose a little 
bit of like, your safety net there.”  
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Internal	Factors	
PAC	Origins,	Structure,	and	Function	
Across the AOC program, PACs originated in unique ways, created by, or 
responding to, state initiatives to begin the RAP process. Subsequently, the PACs have 
evolved their organizational structure, and functionality over time as their group leaders, 
members, and visions change. A PAC’s origins, structure, and functions all uniquely 
shape the group's ability to influence RAP implementation progress. Table 3.6 
summarizes the factors about the internal organization of the PAC that members 
identified in their interviews; detailed descriptions of each follow. 
Table 3.6: Summary of PAC Origins, Structure, and Function Factors 
 Enabling Factors Constraining Factors 
PAC 
origins, 
structure, 
and 
function 
• Bottom-up origins 
• Engaged and committed Board 
of Directors 
• Dedicated, paid point of contact 
for PAC 
• PAC open membership 
• PAC meeting accessibility 
 
• Inconsistent Board of Directors 
engagement and communication 
• Ambiguous membership 
definition 
• Inaccessible PAC meetings 
• Unclear organizational structure 
 
 
Enabling	Factors	
Bottom-up	origins	
When members of the AOC communities lead a PAC’s formation, or subsequent 
operation, PAC members identified their group’s structure as bottom-up: 
I think the PAC also became a trusted partner to the public, or a trusted entity 
because it was made up of community members, people that were interested, 
people that were here. It wasn’t top-down. It was classic grassroots. I think that 
had a huge influence on the quick progress and having positive progress in the 
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community. Rather than waiting for Superfund or whatever, like, it’s our 
community. Let’s take care of it. 
Members from PACs that identify as bottom-up groups mentioned that it was 
important for the process to be community-oriented. In several cases, the community’s 
bottom-up structure originated in response to the state’s AOC program, and part of what 
unites the group is the pursuit of accountability: “having the citizenry, the PAC people, 
the watershed council people, shepherd the whole thing, and watch-dog it, I think, is 
probably the glue that holds it together.” 
PAC members expressed that fulfilling the watch-dog role is essential as a 
bottom-up group to “be vigilant and paying attention and playing by what we know to be 
right and wrong;” “some [PAC members] care about seeing the agencies do right… [to] 
hold peoples’ feet to the fire.” 
In other cases of bottom-up PAC groups, the “community piece has to be strong” 
because the trust of the community enabled the PAC to represent them as liaisons. One 
PAC member noted that “serving as a liaison between the regulatory agencies and the 
public” is the PAC group’s “most important role.” These PACs are a conduit to agencies 
involved in the AOC process: “people count on [the PAC] to play the role that we play… 
keeping this in the public eye locally” as the “voice of the community.” 
We tell people what’s going on. We’re sort of the conduit to the public because I 
don’t think the public would know much about what’s going on, on a regular 
basis, if it weren’t for the PAC. 
Bottom-up PACs were able to secure community buy-in for the RAP 
implementation process: “I think that because the [PAC] members are mostly from the 
communities, that made it pretty smooth.” It was important that PAC members were 
relatable to their community audience: 
It was great to see someone who was able to explain why [the cost of a remedial 
action is] worth 176 million dollars in ten years and ripping up all the streets… it 
was good to have someone like [member name] there who is like: ‘I have to live 
here, too. Yeah, I have to drive around all these detours. Yeah, I want to be able 
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to drink this water. Yes, I want to be able to fish here. I want my grandchildren to 
have that same option.’ 
The messenger matters as much as the message when it comes to soliciting community 
buy-in for remedial plans and their management actions; communities regard bottom-up 
PACs as credible messengers. 
Engaged	and	committed	Board	of	Directors	
In every case study, the PAC composition is an “all-volunteer Board of 
Directors” that makes decisions. PAC members noted the benefits of an “active and 
engaged” Board. A “good group of regulars” serves as a stable foundation for the 
PAC’s Board of Directors: “the leadership itself was fairly the same group of individuals 
in that regard, so I think that helped.” The benefit of a tight-knit circle of engaged, 
committed Directors is that it enables understanding of the perspectives of all the 
members: “we all know who or where each other is coming from… some things don’t 
need to be said, at least among the core group.” For groups with larger boards, 
subcommittee formats enable communication: “and we just meet regularly and 
communicate regularly and work together.” 
Dedicated,	paid	point	of	contact	for	PAC	
Members noted that a dedicated, paid point of contact was a key factor for 
enabling RAP implementation progress. One PAC, incorporated as a 501(c)3 non-profit 
organization, directly employs a full-time staff. Another 501(c)3 incorporated PAC has 
fiduciary capabilities to pay their own part-time staff and hire contractors. These 
dedicated paid personnel endow the PAC with the human resources capacity to make 
progress on RAP implementation. PAC members emphasized that these paid, dedicated 
individuals make a big difference to organizational capacity because they undertake PAC 
business and keep the group’s work on RAP implementation organized and visible. Paid 
staff or contractors enables “organizational stability” because they can facilitate PAC 
planning, including “lots of strategic plans, communication plans, outreach… all these 
different things to help us… function.” PAC support grants enable the groups to 
compensate staff for their time. 
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A dedicated point of contact is vital for the PAC to fulfill its role as the voice of 
the public. For example, in Kalamazoo, their staff is a more reliable contact for the public 
than a volunteer board member filling that role: 
It’s really staff. It’s that you can call our office. We have an office number, and 
you can call, and someone will call you back. Whether I hand that off to a board 
member, but they aren’t engaged the same ways as... a full-time employee. 
Not all formally incorporated PACs directly hire full-time staff for their 
organizational capacity, communication, and technical needs. Other PACs contract 
consultancy firms to do heavy lifts for specialized tasks, which is enabling because 
consultancies are time- and money-efficient: “far more effective than a bunch of 
volunteers meeting once a month if they happen to all show up at the same time.” 
For the other cases where PACs are intangible, the PAC has established a 
fiduciary partnership with a local incorporated nonprofit group. A fiduciary enables the 
PAC to outsource some of its administrative burden to staff at these partner 
organizations. For example, another local water quality group would act as an “arm” of 
the PAC and fund a paid coordinator or part-time secretary to work on a subset of RAP 
implementation and PAC meeting tasks. PAC members noted the benefits of a fiduciary. 
The PAC “needed an agency to receive grant funds” and began utilizing the human and 
capital resources of another group to function as an ‘arm’ of the PAC. For example, in the 
St. Clair River BPAC: “we realized that as funding was decreasing, we were going to 
look outside for funding so that we needed a fiduciary arm… that’s why [US non-profit 
arm of BPAC] Friends of the St. Clair River was formed.” These fiduciary arrangements 
enable the PAC to rely on and contract out certain administrative, technical, and 
community engagement work to these special partners linked to the PAC. In several 
PACs, an ‘arm’ group “manages all the grants and staff” and “most of the technical 
resources” for the PAC. Examples of PAC fiduciaries in the case studies here include 
Conservation Districts and ‘Friends of’ non-profits. 
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PAC	open	membership	
Many PAC members noted that community participation enables RAP 
implementation. Some explained that their PAC promotes public participation by 
codifying membership openness: 
They suspended the membership requirements, that was discretionary within the 
bylaws. There were also the geographic-based classes [of representatives on the 
PAC], I think they just got rid of that altogether. Now anyone can go. 
The elimination of membership barriers is important to public accessibility and 
facilitates participation. One PAC leader explained, “I really wanted to make sure that 
we did it so that when people were done, they felt like they were a part of it.” Their 
members confirmed, “Anybody could come to a meeting at any time… I felt very 
welcome when I joined.” 
PAC	meeting	accessibility	
Of the four cases with BUIs still listed, three hold their PAC meetings on 
weekdays after bank hours. Public access to PAC business is a crucial mechanism for 
ensuring viable public input. Accessibility is vital to the PAC “because then you have 
people participate… And you’re in the room, and you’re finally talking about this stuff.” 
Open membership enables the public input mechanism for the RAP process. 
 
Constraining	Factors	
Inconsistent	Board	of	Directors	engagement	and	communication	
When the Board of Directors convene and communicate inconsistently, the 
function of the group suffers and progress stalls. Early in the process, several of the PACs 
had a large Board of Directors that constituted a “robust organization.” Over time, 
however, these PACs “dwindled” to a “core group” of committed and engaged 
Directors. In one case, “things died down [to] where the executive committee effectively 
became the board. They stopped doing external communication,” and when meetings 
3. Findings – Internal Factors: PAC Origins, Structure, and Function 
 73 
“kind of dropped off, things had stopped working.” The Board’s communication with 
itself, as well as to the public, is critical to fulfilling the obligation of public input in RAP 
implementation. Several PACs stopped conducting meetings over long stretches of time. 
Directors sometimes disengage from their positions because their contributions 
are voluntary and unpaid. Progress and decision-making are slower, but the Board 
volunteers cannot be coerced into decisions: “when it’s a volunteer, it’s a volunteer. 
You’re appreciative if they give you a little bit of time, but you can’t make them do 
anything.” Participation from the volunteer Board of Directors is enabling, but it is not a 
top priority for every volunteer: “as an organization… [we] have a lot of people who 
bring specific and useful skills and talents to the table, but we don’t get paid to work 
together.” The transaction cost of participating on the Board can outweigh the incentives 
to participate because “one of the tricky parts…when you’re trying to participate at the 
[PAC is that] sometimes you’ve got your own work to do.” 
A disengaged volunteer Board constrains a PAC group's ability to act nimbly and 
decide swiftly. For individuals working on RAP implementation, the PAC Board 
decisions delay progress: “if [the Board] doesn’t decide this week it doesn’t matter. But I 
have a grant that I need to show progress on, so sometimes I would like it to work a little 
quicker than the rest [of the Board].” Therefore, when Directors are not engaged and 
communicative, it constrains the consultants, staff, and agency Coordinators working 
with the PAC, in their ability to plan ahead for RAP implementation. 
Ambiguous	membership	definition	
PAC structures and membership definitions vary across cases and over time. 
While some PACs have clear membership definitions that facilitate progress, in other 
PACs at other times, ambiguous membership has the opposite effect and constrains 
progress. In most cases, the PACs are directorship groups and membership is 
unambiguous because all members serve as Directors. In other cases, the PAC is a 
membership organization and the membership at-large elects Directors to the Board. In 
cases where the PAC is a membership-type group, the membership definition was or is 
ambiguous. In one case, the PAC has an online application form for membership, but 
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PAC members noted the way the Board handles membership is far less formal: “I think 
we’re at a point now where basically you can just say I want to be a member.” 
In this case, it was unclear how the PAC would discern interested parties from 
voting members who elect the Board. Vague membership definitions spark disagreements 
about the commitment of the voting members: “They want to make sure that people are 
vested in decision-making. That you can’t just show up for a meeting once and then 
drastically change the path that the [PAC] has been working on for decades.” 
In the past, the PAC generated income from membership dues, but membership 
through required contributions became “a pinch point for some board members.” Many 
PAC members believe that membership dues are a barrier to public participation in the 
PAC. The value of paying dues to participate in the PAC is unclear: “What do we get out 
[of participating]? What is this money here doing?” One PAC was considering 
transforming from a directorship to a membership organization, but “we always worried 
that we would not be able to sustain interest in people paying dues.” Ambiguity in the 
value of participation and actual costs to participate are both considered a barrier to 
public involvement in the PAC. 
Inaccessible	PAC	meetings	
Not all PACs hold their meetings after bank hours when most members of the 
public are free to attend. PAC members acknowledged their group meetings are relatively 
inaccessible: “Just this whole business of meeting in our little room over there… ok, sure, 
it’s open to the public—if they can find it.” When PACs hold meetings during the 
weekdays, the PAC participants tend toward retirees and individuals with professional 
interests. Some participants get paid through their job for their time attending PAC 
meetings. For example, participation is “easier for [the government and industry] 
because they have the people. That’s their job; that’s what they do.” Conducting business 
during typical working hours constrains broader public participation in the PAC. 
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Unclear	organizational	structure	
Other members expressed some concern that their PAC’s organizational structure 
was nebulous, unclear, and did not lend itself to clear accountability to the public: “it was 
never properly constituted… I just felt that it would have been much more transparent 
and accountable.” 
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PAC	Process	and	Management	
Across the AOC program, several factors shape how and why PACs handle their 
part of the RAP implementation process in different ways. Progress is influenced by how 
leaders manage, how they make decisions, (if and) how the group defines when their 
waters are clean enough, and the continuity of members’ engagement in the process. 
Table 3.7 summarizes the influential factors of the PAC’s process and management that 
members identified in their interviews; detailed descriptions of each follow. 
Table 3.7: Summary of PAC Process and Management Factors 
 Enabling Factors Constraining Factors 
PAC process 
and 
management 
• Strong leadership 
• Membership continuity 
• Detailed, attainable Remedial 
Action Plan 
• Consensus-building strategy 
• Common goal 
• Future planning 
• Facilitation 
• Clear endpoint 
 
• Poorly managed meetings 
• Participant attrition 
• Demanding workload 
• Unclear Remedial Action 
Planning process 
• Lack of clear endpoint 
• Majority rules 
 
 
Enabling	Factors	
Strong	leadership	
Many PAC members said a strong group leader helps to focus on objectives and 
fosters mutual respect among PAC members, which helped settle differences and enabled 
the process to move forward. PAC members described the leader(s) of their group as their 
“keystone,” because “they have a very good sort of guiding presence.” PAC members 
describe their leadership as action-oriented individuals: “a champion that has a passion 
to see things get done.” Keystone leaders are highly committed and engaged in the PAC; 
one member noted that their PAC leadership is “more than just chairing a meeting... 
They’re involved.” 
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Leaders run PAC meetings and conduct PAC business as “true professionals,” 
which helps focus the group on their objectives: 
I think we had really effective leadership… they definitely provided the leadership 
to ensure that the group stayed focused and stayed on task… [the] leadership of a 
group like [the PAC] is certainly very important. 
Strong leaders enable PAC members to accept decisions out of respect for the 
leader and the process: “[Our leader] was fantastic… even though I didn’t always agree 
with [them]… they were great. They did a good job. They kept us chugging along.” 
Another member noted their leader was diplomatic: 
And I know that they’re very responsible about keeping our meetings on track, or 
on task. So if you ask a question that’s distracting, they’ll say, good question. But 
it’s not part of the agenda at this time. So we’ll get back to that at the end. 
Membership	continuity	
The “long-term consistency” of PAC members endows the group with 
“institutional memory.” The institutional memory of a group’s participants enables their 
decision-making to be informed by the group’s history: “to have that historical 
perspective and to know… what we’ve already done and what we’ve already tried… 
that’s very valuable.” Continuity of membership enables the current group to focus on 
their objectives: “Just the experience factor… we know that this isn’t going to work 
because we talked about that before... [It] provides a more of a focus as to what’s do-
able.” 
Detailed,	attainable	Remedial	Action	Plan	
PAC members noted that a clearly articulated RAP enabled progress because the 
plans clearly defined the problem and focus of remedial actions. When RAP documents 
are sufficiently self-explanatory, PAC members benefit from enhanced understanding: 
“you had a very clear idea [from the RAP] of what exactly we needed to do.” Detailed 
RAP documents enable progress because members have “an incredible base to work 
with;” when “you write a good Remedial Action and everything else just kind of falls into 
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place.” Detailed plans facilitated RAP implementation because “if you have a plan, your 
chances of getting money are a lot better.” Thus, remedial plans most likely to get 
support and resources were the attainable, “reasonable RAPs” that were detailed and 
implementation-ready. As one member emphasized: 
I credit the fact that we were there at the table still working, still developing these 
plans, with the fact that now we’ve made all this progress. Because then when the 
money finally did become available, we had… [a] plan ready to go. 
Consensus-building	strategy	
In some cases, PAC groups benefit from a consensus-seeking approach to the 
RAP process. PAC members described meetings where “we discuss until we all agree,” 
and “arrive at the best path, jointly.” Reaching consensus took many long, sometimes 
testy, meetings to understand each others’ perspectives: 
We put together that committee and had many, many, many, very long meetings. 
And we stayed at the table—and I’m very proud of this—until we reached 
consensus. And we didn’t vote on everything. We stayed and we discussed and we 
brought all the different points of view into one spot. 
PACs benefitted from focusing on solutions and disengaging from positional 
negotiation or blame-seeking: “we weren’t there to shut people down or run [polluting 
industries] out.” The solution-focused management of the RAP process “helped keep 
[the] industry at the table.” The PAC was “not trying to have a forum where [the] 
industry has to come in and be yelled at,” because “we did not feel that was our role. So 
I think we were more of a let’s fix the problem than anything else.” 
Common	goal	
Many PAC members stressed that their group’s focus on a common goal enabled 
their perseverance and progress:  
The reasons why I think that we’ve been successful is that I have seen what can 
happen when different stakeholders, private industry, public agencies, concerned 
citizens… when they all define common goals and work towards them. 
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PAC members described their groups as “very goal-oriented” and that these goals united 
them. “I think there truly was a lot of glue to reach those goals” and keep the 
participants at the table pursuing solutions: “A big reason for that… [is] the people who 
come to join this group are doing it because we want to actually do things… this group… 
is oriented around… what can we do.” 
Future	planning	
In several cases, PAC members discussed their strategies and lessons for the 
future “to get ahead of some of the issues” they face as a group. Planning for the future 
may concern queuing up “implementation-ready plans for addressing the remaining 
BUIs” with future federal funding. Other planning also includes looking ahead to life 
after delisting: “and so a lot of our PAC grant activities now are transition activities.” 
Facilitation	
In one case, professional facilitation was hired to aid the launch of the PAC, “and 
these people were excellent. They taught this large, diverse, and mostly inexperienced 
group how to focus, how to make decisions, and how to set goals.” In a couple of the 
other cases, PAC members expressed the potential benefits of facilitation, noting that 
their group could have benefitted from such a conflict-management intervention during 
challenging times. 
Clear	endpoint	
PAC members identified that the clear Stage 1, 2, 3 approach to the RAP process 
was easier to follow than the OGL’s current piece-meal RAP update approach: “it was 
like, write the plans, come up with the solutions, and begin to remove the impairments… 
there was no mystery about the process. It was just how you accomplished it.” 
For some members, the top-down process that PACs had to follow helped with 
coordinating the RAP implementation: “having a prescribed process, having everybody 
singing from the same songbook about what needed to be done.” 
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Constraining	Factors	
Poorly	managed	meetings	
Some PAC members reflected on their PAC meetings and noted that distractions, 
sidebars, or other issues could get the agenda “off the rails relatively quickly.” 
Procedural rules may exist in bylaws but are scarcely or capriciously enforced in 
meetings. Poorly managed meetings distract the PAC from focusing on its objectives. 
Leadership would “ideally minimize any kind of digressions” in meetings, but PAC 
members noted that not all distractions are intended to disrupt, some people are just 
talkers by nature. “Because they start talking about a subject and all of the sudden we get 
into all of the minutiae that’s around it, they don’t look at the key points… But… people 
like to chat!” 
Some digressions can include hours of discussion about the particular business of 
a single BUI topic. In-depth conversation at PAC meetings is “not going to be very 
relevant to people” and members with other interests, who may tune out or drop out of 
the PAC process. 
Another challenge of “loosey-goosey” meetings is that a lack of procedural order 
can perpetuate misunderstandings between participants. One PAC member explained 
their PAC’s indecorous conduct at a meeting: 
[Members] kept butting in and talking over the top of other people who were 
trying to express themselves. I think that’s very unproductive when that happens… 
We have a lot of knowledge, and a lot of talent, and a lot of experience in that 
room… [but] we could be taking a lot better advantage… if [members] would just 
take the time [to] talk and listen to each other. 
The PAC meetings also use the “clunky lexicon” of AOC jargon in 
communications. One PAC member, a university professor, admitted that during the early 
years of their participation, the PAC meetings “might as well have been in Mandarin… 
because I had no idea what they were talking about. And I had a pretty good background 
in some of this stuff.” 
3. Findings – Internal Factors: PAC Process and Management 
 81 
Participant	attrition	
Significant membership declines constrain PACs because RAP implementation 
cannot occur through unilateral action by a lone participant; PACs need their members to 
be effective at reaching out to their organizational networks for resources, expertise, and 
support. Participation by members and leaders of a PAC’s “core group” are essential 
“because this type of work is much, much too big for a couple [of] people.” The PAC 
“need[s] that core group. If they start to falter, you’re on your own now, and it’s really 
bad. So you can’t do it alone.” 
However, that’s precisely the predicament many PAC members find their group 
in today, due to their loss of members over time. One member expressed concern 
“because so many of us have been doing this for so long, and we’re getting old.” PAC 
members noted that the group’s participant attrition rate over the long-term disrupts the 
PAC’s institutional memory. One challenge associated with participant attrition is the 
loss of institutional memory: “you lose the continuity of what’s happened in the past.” 
Participant attrition also disrupts the continuity of the PAC’s organizational 
capacity. For example, PAC members identified the challenge of recruiting their 
replacements: 
I think that going forward, those of us who… have been doing [this] for so long, 
you know, we’re going to be hard to replace… I worry about the next generation 
of advocates, are they going to be there? 
One PAC member noted that they were ready to step away, but they are worried their 
departure will leave a leadership vacuum: “I wish there was somebody else that would be 
or could be [involved in the PAC]. But I’m afraid that’s not going to be the case, I don’t 
know.” 
However, some leaders just had to walk away from the PAC, without securing a 
replacement or preparing junior leadership: “there [was] a vacancy there.” The PAC’s 
organizational capacity suffers when participants leave the group without a replacement: 
“we’re very low on membership… [it is difficult] keeping up that stamina on the 
membership, it’s been a long haul.” 
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Demanding	workload	
The demanding workload of the RAP process constrains PAC members value 
participating in the process. Particularly for volunteer members, the workload of 
conducting PAC business sometimes makes the cost of working greater than its benefits. 
For example, fulfilling the terms of grants can be a time-intensive endeavor: 
These grants that we get have pretty specific mandates. It’s pretty hard for an all-
volunteer Board of Directors with people that have jobs or other 
responsibilities… to actually put a lot of time into these things. 
PAC participants also lose focus because of the tedium of the workload: “it’s a 
pretty tedious group. I mean it’s... tedious work.” For example, in one case, “we 
probably spent the last six months editing and re-editing a two-page document.” Even 
the most dedicated, long-term PAC members noted the constraints of such a workload: 
“for me, it was awful because… I’m involved in so many things… To sit and read these 
[reports]… I dread them.” 
Additionally, the PAC workload “is not spread throughout” the membership 
evenly, “so some people definitely carry more.” For those PAC members, including 
leaders, carrying heavier workloads for RAP implementation, it can be a lot to juggle:  
I wouldn’t say the workload is huge, but [there are] a lot of different aspects to it. 
Keeping all those straight… keeping all the parts together. And not forgetting 
something you committed to do… is really, really tough. 
One PAC leader observed: “[There are] so many… ups and downs involved in keeping 
the organization alive from the time that this happened to the time that something gets 
completed. [It]… involves a lot of stomach lining.” 
In the course of 30 plus years, the history, accomplishments, and track record of a 
PAC group is long and complicated, “unless you’re intimately and continually involved 
in it, it’s really easy to get lost.” Keeping track of PAC business over time is not easy, 
even for ‘core group’ members in PACs: “to be honest over a while it gets sort of 
overwhelming.” For one PAC member in White Lake, the demanding workload of 
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delisting eliminated any interest in continuing the work after delisting: “I’m not busting 
my ass to do it like I did before. It’s just too much.” 
Unclear	Remedial	Action	Planning	process	
When prompted to diagram or sketch out the RAP process, most PAC members 
replied along the lines of: “I’m not sure I can give you a clear description of that 
process;” and: “I’m sure there’s a very well-defined process… [but] I don’t’ know what 
it is.” Members who joined their PAC more recently, and were not involved in Stage 1 or 
2 RAP problem identification and planning phases, seemed to have a less clear 
understanding about the RAP implementation process than their long-term member 
counterparts. PAC members noted the challenge of understanding the thread of the AOC 
process as it progresses over time: “I think sometimes that if you miss a meeting, or if you 
aren’t engaged, or if you may not know the whole process… you can be constrained in 
how much you understand, how much information’s provided to you.” 
PAC members observed that the government agencies’ share of RAP 
implementation tasks is a slow-going and opaque part of the process. For example, PAC 
members do not all understand the need for waiting on additional studies: “I mean, we’ve 
got to study it some more. And some more. And some more. And it’s like, when is this 
going to end? Perhaps I don’t understand.” PAC members noted that they were not clear 
on the details of the many phases of the RAP implementation process: “to be honest with 
you, this group here, from what I’m seeing… we’re just here to be informed. And what’s 
going on is behind the scenes… we’re not involved at all.” In this case, PAC members 
noted delays are inexplicable: “I’m not even sure why it’s a slow process, because we’re 
just on the waiting end. You know, I don’t know what’s happening back here.” Agencies 
are not communicating information to the PAC that provides members clarity about the 
process, and this lack of transparency in the process constrains PAC members’ 
understanding about the process and status of the underlying environmental problems. 
Lack	of	clear	endpoint	
Another constraint of RAP implementation is the repeated postponement of 
delisting, the endpoint of the process. One PAC member remarked: “I think most people 
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when they work on a project see a beginning and an end. And it began to look like there 
was never going to be an end.” This PAC member attested that the GLRI funds 
incentivized the state agency to “chase” opportunities for projects that were outside the 
AOC scope, but they “couched” projects in BUI terms to get superfluous projects 
funded. “I think it just it changed from being something that had… a real concern, a 
beginning, and an end, to something that was just gonna go on forever as long as there 
was funding available.” Without a definitive endpoint, the PAC’s focus expanded past its 
original objectives, reducing the value of the process for many participants. 
Majority	rules	
Some PACs relied on majority rule to guide decision-making when consensus 
was unattainable: 
Ultimately the majority rules… whatever the majority of the group felt made the 
most sense is the way that the PAC proceeded. That doesn’t mean that there 
weren’t some ruffled feathers and some hurt feelings… some real disagreements 
about things… ultimately it was there was a vote, and whoever prevailed, that 
was the way we proceeded. 
Making decisions through majority rule helped move progress when the group faced 
impasse, but this left participants of the minority unhappy with the outcomes: “everybody 
told the dissenters that this is the best you’re going to get.” The majority rule made the 
participants in the minority dissatisfied with the process, but members recognized that, 
despite its drawbacks, majority rules was better than minority rules:  
If you allow the minority to prevail consistently, it’s going to ultimately result in 
the disbanding of the group because people are going to say why am I here? So I 
think people recognize that... we’ve got to deal with whatever the majority feels is 
the most appropriate way to proceed, but certainly there were some tough debates 
from time to time. 
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PAC	Participant	Perceptions	and	Attitudes	
Every PAC member shared perceptions, attitudes, and other ‘subjective’ factors 
that influence their group’s ability to make progress. Factors include the personal 
dedication and motivation of members, the degree of perceived independence of the 
PAC, the relationships between PAC members, and members’ sense of accomplishment. 
Table 3.8 summarizes the influential factors of the PAC participants’ perceptions and 
attitudes that members identified in their interviews; detailed descriptions of each follow. 
Table 3.8: Summary of PAC Participant Perception and Attitude Factors 
 Enabling Factors Constraining Factors 
PAC 
participant 
perceptions 
and 
attitudes 
• Empowered by autonomy 
• Dedicated individuals 
• Motivated by holistic vision 
• Camaraderie within the PAC 
• Effective public education 
• Recognition of 
accomplishments 
 
• Limited by state control 
• Public apathy 
• Tiresome, lifelong process 
• Philosophical division within 
the PAC 
• Strained interpersonal 
relationships 
• Diminishing interest 
 
 
Enabling	Factors	
Empowered	by	autonomy	
PAC members expressed different perceptions about their autonomy and authority 
in the RAP implementation process. In many cases, the PAC members’ conviction is that 
their group “has control over the RAP and over the PAC process.” Several PAC 
members identified their groups’ high level of autonomy and authority as enabling their 
ability to drive the RAP implementation agenda: the “PAC is important because they’re 
the overarching umbrella, setting the goals and kind of dictating the direction.” PAC 
members appreciate that they are “given some autonomy to decide exactly what [our 
priorities are].” PAC members explained that they were empowered to set the agenda 
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and keep implementation progress consistent with their priorities. PACs are enabled to 
“set the tone for whether an impairment is going to be removed or not.” Where the PAC 
disagreed with the agencies, “they would gently lead [the agencies] in the direction they 
wanted them to go.” 
The PACs’ perceived autonomy is also important to their ability to maintain 
credibility in their communities because agencies primarily underwrite the PACs: 
It’s a bit of a contract in that way. They’re not just going to give us money to exist 
and do whatever we want... And, to that extent, we get pushed by the needs of 
[the] granting agencies a little bit… But we don’t feel like we can’t speak our 
mind because we get funding from the DEQ or EPA. We’ve always been unafraid 
to take a position on something. 
In two cases, PAC members recognize that their perceived autonomy depends on their 
relationship with the state agencies: “give credit to the agencies… I appreciate their 
guidance and everything. But they do respect our point of view.” The respect and 
equanimity in relationships between the PAC and government agencies are particularly 
important to the PAC’s ability to influence the RAP implementation process. One 
member noted that the state agency is responsible for the RAP, but they will also 
“consult with us, we may be able to have some input or push to look at certain topics… 
the state is writing it; we’re influencing it.”  
Dedicated	individuals	
Dedicated individuals volunteering on the PAC enabled the groups to persistently 
focus on solutions. PAC members’ attitudes across the board reflected the “driving force 
behind” the PAC is the “very dedicated local citizens.” Participants described their 
dedication as attributable to their “tenacity,” even “stubbornness.” Other members noted 
that a sense of duty moved them: “you really feel like you’re doing something important 
and if you don’t do this nobody else will.” PAC members noted that dedicated individuals 
were action-oriented and focused on solutions: “we really wanted to get something 
done.” 
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Motivated	by	holistic	vision	
One PAC member described their holistic motivation to participate on the PAC: 
“I’m looking at the entire thing, the entire ecosystem… how it affects… our communities, 
in tourism, in beauty… in outdoor recreation, all those things.” PAC members noted the 
importance of participants who are motivated by a holistic connection to the resource: 
“that’s the glue that’s held this group together, it’s an interest in something around the 
AOC.” A common refrain from PAC members about their motivation is the desire to “do 
the right thing.” Some members considered these motivations genuine: “a real divine 
interest in what’s happening,” without ulterior motives or personal agenda. Some PAC 
members perceived that private sector participants chose to make their resources 
available to the AOC program because “they were trying to do the right thing.” PAC 
members observed that participants with motivations to do the right things for the right 
reasons stay involved with the PAC over the long-term “because the folks that have 
really hung on have more than just [a] very specific issue.” 
Camaraderie	within	the	PAC	
Camaraderie among PAC members enables communication and promotes 
participants’ understanding of one another’s perspectives through dialogue. PAC 
members noted that camaraderie between PAC members is important: “we work very 
well with our counterparts.” One PAC member explained: “We all work well together, 
and [we have] known each other for a long time, and we just have a good relationship… 
That’s important that you like the people that you have to work with. And we all do.” 
PAC members noted that it’s always helpful when “the camaraderie has been 
good,” because “we’re all pulling for the same common cause.” Friendly relationships 
are key because they enable regular communications between PAC meetings and enhance 
the groups’ teamwork capacity: “we just meet regularly and communicate regularly, and 
work together, you know. We’re not working in silos.” 
Communication is essential for “reflection” and it creates an opportunity for 
“dialogue about talking about the lake and getting different perspectives and addressing 
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concerns.” Good relationships foster mutual understanding: “we realize well, we’re all 
trying to get the same answer here.” 
Effective	public	education	
The foundation of PACs' public education efforts starts with public engagement: 
“it’s that public awareness… and therefore broader participation.” PAC members noted 
that early on when PACs were still defining the problems, increasing public knowledge 
of the AOC program and understanding of the environmental problem became a key PAC 
activity: 
I think early on it was [building] the knowledge base… [Getting] people to know 
what was happening in the community, or what happened in the community. Why 
we were listed as this Area of Concern. And so even a lot of the early meetings 
and activities were to get the information out there, the community meetings, 
flyers… outreach components. 
After the PAC’s public education activities targeted public awareness, then PAC 
education activities “really did shift to say, it’s nice that everybody knows what’s going 
on, but let’s start doing something about it.” Effective public engagement activities 
enabled the PACs to focus on solutions. As one PAC member remarked: 
I think it was important for the local community people… to heighten the 
awareness. To say we do have these issues and we do need to care for this river. 
And we do need to you know, do the things that we need to do to protect it. 
Recognition	of	accomplishments	
Many PAC members reflected positively on the value of their time spent with the 
PAC. One of the ways participation felt valuable was when success is recognized and 
celebrated, because “it’s fun to be in an organization that is moving forward, that is 
accomplishing something and is being recognized for the accomplishment.” Participation 
was worthwhile “because it was dynamic… we were actually doing something, and we 
thought we were accomplishing something.” 
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Recognizing and communicating about the accomplishments of the PAC can be a 
source of pride and motivation for PAC participants: “I think that’s kind of one of the 
reasons why we’ve held together, is because the group is proud of the fact that we’ve 
communicated the successes we’ve had.” As they say, nothing succeeds like success: “so 
you get stronger, and each one you do reinforces your confidence in being able to do 
more of [the tasks].” Several PAC members emphasized that the value of engaging in the 
process and recognition of accomplishing progress was well worth the wait: 
When it works, it’s very rewarding... once we had the wheels greased by funding 
and everything, and things to start moving, it was just a marvelous… feeling. And 
I think those type of rewards take a while to really realize. 
 
Constraining	Factors	
Limited	by	state	control	
Many PAC members explained that federal and state governments control the 
AOC program, and implementation is the agencies’ ultimate responsibility. PACs 
perceive the limitations of the state’s control over the process to slow the momentum of 
progress. For example, one PAC member noted that the process is “heavily dependent 
upon the activities of the agencies. And I really felt like… it’s completely taken out of our 
hands, and we’re just waiting to hear back from them.” Some PAC members described 
“the wait on the agencies to get through their part” as a “bureaucratic nightmare,” 
while others were understanding, though frustrated: 
I get the workings of the government, and the agencies, and how things tend to 
not move as fast as people want them to move. I get it… it hasn’t been awful. But, 
there’s been times where I think things could have moved along quicker, from the 
agency end of things. 
The perception of the state's control of the RAP process is that it constrains the 
momentum of progress. Working through government bureaucracy “created some 
bottlenecks as far as just getting the process pushed along.” For example, progress itself 
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is a motivator, and it is difficult to demonstrate value to participants in the process when 
progress is slow. When the state has control of the process, and it slows down, at times 
“there’s nothing else [for the PAC] to do except wait and wait.”  
A lot of it is just sitting around and doing a lot of paperwork. And sorry, you 
know, but that’s the way it works. And a lot of it is actually… pushing things 
slowly through this process. That can seem painfully, painfully slow. 
PAC members also mentioned the limitations of agencies’ control over funding 
decisions. One effect of the state’s funding control is that it constrains the PAC’s power 
to set the agenda: “whatever we want to do here, we still have got to get their 
permission.” In this case, the PAC’s agenda is driven by agency priorities for funding, 
which is “a constraint in that it requires that our activities... coincide with the goals of 
the granting organizations... we really are driven by our interest in the availability of 
grant money.” 
Public	apathy	
Some PACs employed public engagement strategies, but the outcome was not 
sufficient for capturing public attention and spreading awareness and understanding about 
the AOC problems and solutions. The most common explanation was public apathy: 
“we’ve tried about everything... for some reason, people aren’t interested.” PAC 
members described attempts to solicit public input into the RAP process: “We gave them 
all the information we could give. And once in a great while, somebody would show up. 
And most of the time they didn’t.” Many PAC members described a “benign community 
involvement” in the RAP implementation process, writ large. PAC members’ attitude was 
that public apathy constrains public participation in PAC business. 
In most cases, PAC members desired greater levels of public interest and 
engagement than what their group has been able to achieve: “certainly would have been 
helpful to have more people involved who had a role, or who were impacted by decisions 
of the PAC… and more community involvement.” One member noted that public apathy 
constrained the PAC’s ability to facilitate public input into the RAP process: “I guess 
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that the [PAC] could be stronger if they had… more input from the public. And had a 
public there to educate a little bit, disseminate some of the details of the issues to.” 
In one case, even other regional organizations were apathetic to the AOC 
program. When the state reached out on behalf of the PAC to establish a fiduciary partner 
with a local organization, they “didn’t get any kind of response… apparently they just 
didn’t have any luck trying to find somebody willing to do it.” 
Tiresome,	lifelong	process	
Many PAC members, particularly long-serving members, noted that participation 
has become tiresome as the timeline appears indefinite in several cases: “A lot of folks… 
didn’t think that when they showed up for the first meeting, they were signing for a 
lifetime appointment.” PAC members noted their expectations early on were not to carry 
forth a multi-decade project; they committed because they were told: “the whole thing 
would be over in two to three years, no problem!” 
PAC members across every case discussed whether or not they would even be 
alive when their AOC was delisted: “I’ve always said it’s never going to occur in my 
lifetime, basically. Because it’s so big and complex;” “I don’t know that any of us believe 
it will happen in our lifetime.” There is a resigned optimism to this attitude because many 
PAC members feel good about the incremental progress achieved to date: “we can all go 
home and feel good about what we did… but don’t get too impatient about going to see 
[the waters] cleaned up in our lifetime.” After several decades of participating without 
an end to the AOC problem, many PAC members are “tired” of staying at the table. 
Some PAC members admitted to questioning, at some point, “why am I wasting 
my time” with the PAC? PAC members across cases noted a tricky paradox: participation 
declines as progress increases “because it seems like there is not as much to do anymore, 
so there is not that big motivating factor to get people to come.” PAC members 
speculated that members from business or interest groups no longer had an issue on the 
table, so they stopped participating: “I think that there were people or groups that simply 
said… there isn’t anything… that’s going to benefit us directly, and this process has gone 
on way too long.” 
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Philosophical	division	within	the	PAC	
Divisions within the PAC over philosophical differences constrain the group’s 
ability to resolve these underlying conflicts. Divisions within the PAC are not a matter of 
personal intention because PAC members affirmed that “there was no lack of goodwill 
on anyone’s part.” However, several PAC members explained that divisions exist 
between PAC members on matters of principle because there are “different philosophies” 
represented around the PAC table. Some PAC members were of the opinion that other 
parties “didn’t necessarily have water quality as an agenda.” Others are of the mind that 
private sector involvement in the AOC program was because “they wanted to make sure 
that their interests were being protected during this whole process.” PAC members did 
not always see eye to eye, with some PAC members characterizing others as: “not 
narrow-minded, just narrow-focused on one particular issue.” Some PAC members 
viewed other parties’ expectations for solutions as “extremely unrealistic.” Other PAC 
members acknowledged that there were constraints when “the public perception [is] 
perhaps of [the PAC] being an activist group.” Others felt slighted because some water 
quality issues “get kind of swept under the rug.” 
The division within the PAC about the principle or philosophy of an issue fosters 
disagreement and may lead to conflict. For example, after the White Lake AOC delisted, 
the PAC wrestled with the division between members over the principle of whether the 
group should compensate its leader. The PAC divided, and several members stopped 
engaging in organizing efforts after delisting, because they disagreed, on principle, that 
leaders should not be “doing well by doing good.” When PAC members noted they or 
other individuals were divided, these disagreements on fundamental principles 
constrained the group's ability to navigate and resolve such conflicts. 
Strained	interpersonal	relationships	
Some PAC members noted that they did not trust other members because of 
friction from “personality issues.” This was particularly true early on in the RAP 
process: “there was a lot of angry words, and intemperate things said in public meetings 
and threats made.” Some members find others “frankly, difficult to partner with,” while 
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others felt the strain of conflicts had inflicted “damaging impacts” on their reputation in 
the community. There were also instances where dysfunctional interpersonal 
relationships made some members feel “left out or not engaged.” In these cases, PAC 
members explained that impaired relationships constrain the groups’ mutual 
understanding: “you don’t understand where somebody’s coming from.” 
In several cases, past and present, positional bargaining and blame-seeking 
priorities of members constrain the PAC’s focus on solutions: 
If you close the door by blaming [other participants] for everything, without 
qualifying it… They may have an interest in protecting the water quality and [if 
you] just say well [they] don’t care… then you’ve closed the door to any kind of 
solutions. 
Diminishing	interest	
Some members noted they lost the interest that inspired their dedication to the 
PAC in the first place: “you have to be enthusiastic about what you’re doing or you 
better walk away. Because people read that everywhere you go.” In several cases, 
participants’ “interest wanes and rises” depending on the issues on the PAC’s agenda. 
Some PAC members’ interest diminishes as the process drags on: “My personal thing, 
I’m ready for it to be done, let’s put it that way… but I also don’t want to be really 
involved in it either.” Diminishing interest constrains PAC members’ dedication to action 
and their focus on solutions: “what was left is not people I would call movers and 
shakers. People who cared but who didn’t have [the] chutzpah to make things happen.” 
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Chapter	4	
Synthesis:	Why	Areas	of	Concern	Differ	in	their	Progress	
The previous chapter identified the factors that shape a PAC’s ability to influence 
progress and why. The overarching question of interest in this chapter is to understand 
what factors explain why RAP implementation progress differs among Areas of 
Concern? In this context, progress is a multifaceted concept that varies depending on who 
assesses progress and the metrics they apply. For example, comparing AOCs on a single 
dimension—how quickly they delist—misses important aspects of progress. Factors that, 
in the eyes of PAC members, enable quality progress may be seen as factors that slow 
down progress from the perspective of state or federal agencies. The removal of a BUI is 
not always celebrated as a success by PAC members when some perceive that more could 
have been done, yet state and federal agencies regard BUI removals as significant 
progress. Therefore, ‘good’ progress may take longer than ‘acceptable’ progress. This 
study constructs progress as ‘time well spent,’ which is both a quantitative and qualitative 
heuristic. 
This chapter proposes nine overarching factors that help explain why progress 
differs among the AOCs. As summarized in Table 4.1, these factors include elements of 
governance infrastructure like roles and objective criteria, and also more intangible 
factors like effective leadership and commitment.  
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Table 4.1: Factors that Explain Why Progress Differs Among AOCs 
1. PAC’s perceived independence and influence 
2. Clearly delineated state agency roles 
3. Clear criteria for delisting 
4. Balanced and sustained PAC member networks 
5. State and federal agency resource commitment 
6. State and federal actor engagement 
7. PAC’s robust translational capacity 
8. Public understanding and support 
9. Effective PAC leadership 
 
 
1.	PAC’s	perceived	independence	and	influence	
The first factor that helps explain differences among AOC’s progress is the PAC's 
independence and influence. A PAC’s independence is a requisite for earning the trust of 
the community as a legitimate voice for, and guardian of, the public interest. A PAC's 
perceived independence enables the community to trust the PAC to hold the process 
accountable to the public interest. Participants in PACs that have a higher degree of 
independence are often motivated by their sense of responsibility to ensure the RAP 
process holds government and polluters accountable to the public interest; to make sure, 
as one interviewee put it, they “do the right thing.” 
A PAC’s perceived independence is a function of the PAC’s origins. For example, 
when PACs originate independently from the grassroots, the communities are accepting 
of the PAC as representative of the public interest. PACs that started as community 
groups (Kalamazoo, St. Clair, and White Lake) noted that community members trusted 
the PAC to hold governments’ and polluters’ “feet to the fire.” PAC members from 
bottom-up groups noted that being “unafraid to take a position on something” enabled 
the group’s legitimacy in the region as the watchdog. The public trusts that the 
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representatives in these PACs will maintain independence and hold the agencies and 
polluters accountable for the cleanup throughout the RAP process. 
A PAC’s perceived influence over the RAP agenda enables participants’ 
ownership of the RAP process. When the state agency empowers the PAC with shared 
control of the agenda, it enables members’ ownership of the process because they are 
“heard” by the agency. In the case of the St. Clair Binational PAC, the OGL AOC 
Coordinator is empowering the Binational PAC with greater influence in the process of 
criteria definition for their hot-button drinking water BUI. In the case of Saginaw, PAC 
members do not feel their OGL AOC Coordinator is “taking them seriously” as an equal 
partner. In Menominee, some participants felt their PAC is too dependent on the state’s 
control of the RAP agenda, which constrains progress because greater PAC dependence 
on state agency control undermines PAC members’ ownership of the process. Further, 
when the state controls the RAP agenda, often the hurry-up-and-wait delays endemic to 
government bureaucracy are perceived by PAC members to constrain progress. Overall, 
PAC members described their ideal balance of shared control as having an “equal 
partnership” with the state agency. While control is not exactly a 50/50 split between 
PACs and the state agency, the state agency can empower a PAC by listening to members 
and enabling their influence on the agenda. 
A PAC’s perceived influence over the agenda is a function of the inherent 
interdependence of the PAC and the state agency; neither side can unilaterally control the 
RAP process. No PAC can independently undertake the entire RAP process for their 
AOC. The state and federal governments depend on the cooperation of the PAC to help 
plan and implement remedial actions in partnership with local stakeholders and 
institutions. However, while interdependent, the federal and state agencies are ultimately 
responsible for RAP implementation and can exercise significant control of the RAP 
agenda. A PAC group’s perception of their influence over the RAP agenda is contingent 
on the discretion of the agencies to empower the PACs with shared control in the process.  
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2.	Clearly	delineated	state	agency	roles	
Among these case study sites, progress occurs where there is a clear delineation 
between the agency’s dual roles as RAP convener and stakeholder. The first role of the 
state agency is to convene the RAP process. In every case, the state agency serves as the 
convener of the RAP process because the agency is ultimately responsible for soliciting 
public input in each AOC. The second role of the agency is to participate as a stakeholder 
implicated in the outcomes of the RAP process. The state agency has an interest in the 
agenda and substantive outcomes of the RAP process and is a stakeholder in every case. 
The level of trust in the PAC-agency relationship is shaped by how the agency 
distinguishes between its dual roles in the RAP process. Trust can erode when there is an 
unclear distinction between when the AOC Coordinator represents the interest of the 
state-as-stakeholder and when they represent the interests of the state-as-convener and try 
to influence the agenda to help focus and maintain progress momentum. With one state 
agency representative in both roles of RAP process convener and stakeholder, there can 
be misperceptions of governmental bias steering the RAP agenda toward certain interests, 
and thus distrust of the agency. For example, CAC members in Menominee explained 
that the group initially formed out of distrust of the agency handling the RAP without any 
public input. The CAC members in Menominee developed a trusting relationship with the 
state agency once their motives were clearly understood and their roles and 
responsibilities clearly articulated.  
PAC members’ misunderstanding of the state agency’s motives can foster distrust 
in the PAC-agency relationship. Without a mechanism to let the PAC members know 
which ‘hat’ the AOC Coordinator is wearing and motivating their statements or decisions 
throughout the process, misunderstanding of the state’s motivations can foment distrust. 
For example, in Saginaw, distrust of the OGL AOC Coordinator stems from the 
misunderstanding of the state’s motivations for denying some of the PAC’s requests. 
Similarly, Congress and the EPA have intensified pressure on the states to remove BUIs 
and delist AOCs and PAC members perceive the state’s motivations are a function of this 
external pressure, which in some cases has exacerbated misunderstandings of the state 
agency’s motives. 
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3.	Clear	criteria	for	delisting	
AOCs are making progress where the group and the agencies are “singing from 
the same songbook,” and there are clear criteria for BUI removal and delisting. At the 
beginning of Remedial Action Planning, the PACs had no reference point for how the 
state defined beneficial use impairments or thresholds for their removal. The PACs were 
on their own, “struggling with figuring out a target.” The state agency issued the first of 
its delisting guidance documents in 2006 (Michigan Department of Environmental 
Quality 2005; Final guidance for delisting Michigan’s Great Lakes Areas of Concern 
2006) which defines the target levels the state will accept to consider a BUI ‘removed.’ 
Overwhelmingly, PAC members commented that the state’s delisting guidance enabled 
their group to make progress because participants bought into the clearly defined BUI 
removal goals, and allowed the groups to focus their objectives on solutions. 
Clear criteria enable progress because they allow all the participants to commit to, 
and focus with certainty on, a specific, definitive endpoint for the process of removing 
BUIs and delisting. Participants, particularly those representing the private sector, value 
the AOC program when there is more certainty about the remedial outcomes than there 
would be if they participated in an alternative process. Some PAC members observed that 
an open-ended RAP process introduces uncertainty, which creates a disincentive to 
engage, particularly for private stakeholders and local governments. The RAP process is, 
therefore, less valuable to PAC members when the criteria are unclear or undefined 
because PAC members may perceive that the standards for removing BUIs or delisting 
the AOC are arbitrary or unfair. Clear criteria help to instill a sense of fairness in the 
process when the participants agree that the criteria are an objective standard for 
removing BUIs and delisting their AOC. 
However, where there is clarity, there is not always agreement. Clear criteria are a 
function of the degree to which the PAC agrees with the state’s definition of ‘attainable.’ 
A PAC may opt to set unique, local criteria for a BUI instead of accepting the state 
criteria, usually because PACs perceive a cleaner standard is needed and ‘attainable.’ In 
these cases, PACs are negotiating with the agency about the definition of how clean is 
clean enough? PACs can propose their definition of attainable criteria and then engage in 
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a back-and-forth negotiation with the state agency until both are satisfied with the 
attainability of the local criteria standards. Similarly, the state acknowledges that the 
‘attainability’ of some criteria is inherently contextual; for example, the OGL has not 
issued specific criteria for the “Loss of fish and wildlife habitat” BUI, recognizing that 
the conditions and feasibility of remedial actions are highly site-specific.  
The PAC’s and the state’s definitions of ‘attainable’ change over time with new 
members, new agency priorities, or changes in the context of the AOC. For example, due 
to the hot-button nature of spills and drinking water safety in St. Clair, the Binational 
PAC has been in a years-long back-and-forth negotiation with the state to define their 
local criteria for the drinking water BUI. A chemical spill crisis demonstrated to the 
Binational PAC members that the spill response plans portion of their BUI criteria was 
inadequate, and they subsequently pursued higher standards for their local criteria 
because of what they learned from the response to the spill crisis. 
PAC members value investing additional time in the RAP process to negotiate 
with the state over local criteria. Where PACs disagree with the state’s criteria, 
establishing and defending their local criteria adds more work and time to the RAP 
process. This does not necessarily equate to a constraint on progress, per se, because 
during these steps for defining local criteria, the PAC is working diligently toward 
empirically supporting their proposal, and thus are making progress. From the PAC 
perspective, disagreements over the attainability standards for criteria may lengthen the 
AOC delisting timeline, but contributes to the quality of the progress outcomes. Spending 
the time negotiating a higher standard for criteria is valuable to PAC members because 
they benefit if they can negotiate setting cleaner standards for removing BUIs. Spending 
time negotiating local criteria that end up to be similar to the original state criteria may 
appear to be a less valuable use of time, but in these cases, it is important to the PACs 
that the PAC define the criteria. For example, in Saginaw, the negotiation for the beach 
closing BUI criteria took over a year. While the resulting local criteria do not 
substantially differ from the state’s criteria, the PAC members emphasized it was a 
valuable use of time because it enabled the PAC’s ownership of the criteria. 
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However, in other cases, if the PAC disagrees with the state criteria, the state can 
still remove the BUI according to the state criteria, even over the objections of the PAC. 
For example, in White Lake, the PAC issued a “stipulation”1 with their acceptance of the 
removal of their drinking water BUI because of disagreements over the state’s criteria. 
While this scenario meant BUI removal was sooner than it might have been had the PAC 
engaged in negotiations for amending the criteria, PAC members discounted the quality 
of this progress; members perceived the criteria had set the bar too low.  
 
4.	Balanced	and	sustained	PAC	member	networks	
PACs can leverage resources and support to enable progress when they have and 
maintain a balance of members with social and interorganizational networks. PACs have 
more influence to advance progress when the group has connections to, and support from, 
other organizations, agencies, and institutions with a shared interest in improving water 
quality. The balance of a PAC’s member network is a function of the membership 
composition of the group. Where progress occurs, PACs have a membership composed of 
a balanced mix of both individual and organizational members that connect the PAC to 
their social and interorganizational networks in the AOC region. The balance of a PAC’s 
member network matters because it shapes the PAC’s capacity by defining the group’s 
access to funding, intergovernmental cooperation, and partnerships. PACs influence 
progress when their group does not exclusively rely on the social networks of individual 
members but also has access to the interorganizational networks of professionally 
affiliated organizational members.  
The preponderance of membership in several PAC cases is individual 
stakeholders who represent themselves or a sector of community members (i.e., 
‘recreational fishers’). Most PAC members described making connections through 
members’ social networks. PACs that connect to members’ social networks do so 
                                                
1 The main issue was that AOC BUI criteria exclude aspects of groundwater. Therefore their Drinking Water BUI was 
removed over stakeholders’ objections that their drinking water sourced from groundwater remained contaminated 
from the same source of pollution that contaminated the surface waters of White Lake. (Michigan Department of 
Environmental Quality 2014, 62) 
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primarily to implement public input and education/outreach tasks. However, PAC 
members explained that relying on their personal social networks is a limiting factor that 
constrains the efficacy of the PAC’s public input and education/outreach activities. 
Relying on personal social media networks or email updates to personal contacts limits 
the ‘reach’ of the PAC to connect with and educate individuals and organizations 
throughout the AOC region. 
PACs vary in the degree to which their membership also includes organizational 
representatives, such as those representing a Conservation District, local government, or 
private sector corporation. Several members noted that regional institutions were not 
sending representatives to their PAC. Without an interested employee, many 
organizations do not volunteer to represent their organization on the PAC: “if there’s no 
interest… from anybody in that group, they ain’t coming.” PACs with fewer 
professionally affiliated members are less connected to regional institutions and therefore 
have less capacity to influence progress. The greater access a PAC has to both social and 
interorganizational network connections, the greater the PAC’s organizational capacity. 
Most PACs have individual members, but the PACs that are distinguishable by their 
progress also have organizational members that serve the PAC in a professional capacity. 
Therefore, PAC membership composition determines the connections the group can 
make to other organizations that will support the PAC’s capacity through (1) funding, (2) 
intergovernmental cooperation, and (3) partnerships. 
First, professional members are essential to a PAC’s organizational capacity 
because they provide the group with connections to potential funding sources. The 
organizational members’ professional connections expand the potential sources the PAC 
can tap to solicit funding for RAP implementation. Similarly, access to 
interorganizational networks expands the possible sources of funding a PAC can access 
to underwrite its organizational capacity needs, such as to compensate members or staff 
for spending their time on PAC administration, fundraising, and membership recruitment 
and training. Organizational members can thus help the PAC to attract diverse funding 
sources to support RAP implementation capacity and PAC organizational capacity.  
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Second, a PAC is better equipped to influence progress when the group has 
organizational members professionally connected to other state and federal agency 
programs within and beyond the AOC program jurisdiction. RAP implementation 
requires the attention of other government agencies that work on the AOC program. 
Some PACs’ professional members can help to broker intergovernmental cooperation and 
accelerate progress. These PACs have members with contacts at other government 
agencies. PAC members reasoned that brokering intergovernmental cooperation through 
their members’ professional connections enabled progress more effectively (and quickly) 
than relying on the bureaucratic channels when the AOC Coordinators serve as the 
intermediary. 
Third, PACs benefit from professional members utilizing their interorganizational 
network connections to build partnerships that facilitate RAP implementation. Members 
described engaging the contacts in their interorganizational networks to develop 
partnerships with institutions in the region to accomplish tasks including hosting PAC 
meetings, public education and outreach activities, soliciting public input, conducting 
investigations, and planning remedial actions. PAC members affirmed that funding is 
awarded most readily to projects where the PAC members have leveraged partnerships to 
prepare implementation-ready watershed management or habitat restoration plans. 
Because the balance of a PAC’s member network is a function of the membership 
composition of the group, progress is constrained when a PAC depends on a single 
member’s network connections for its capacity, and then the PAC loses that individual. 
Membership turnover can cut the group off from members’ network connections to 
funding and support from partners. In the past, many PACs had robust representation 
from professional representatives of a diversity of institutions. In most cases, many of 
these members are retired, so PAC members are less professionally connected to 
potential partner organizations than they were previously. In these cases, only one or a 
few remaining organizational members can provide the PAC with contacts for building 
capacity through funding, intergovernmental cooperation, and partnerships. 
Relying on a single member’s professional connections to support the PAC’s 
organizational capacity can create a bottleneck, impacting the PAC’s influence on 
4. Synthesis: Why AOCs Differ in their Progress 
 104 
progress. Some PACs benefit from the part- or full-time dedication of a staff person, 
contractor, or strong leader. In several instances, these critical individuals maintain the 
majority of the PAC’s interorganizational network connections. A challenge arises when 
these individuals leave the PAC. Because the PAC’s connections were concentrated in 
the key person, losing that individual means the group is cut off from the individual’s 
interorganizational network connections. The loss of a leader or key individual deals a 
less severe blow to the PAC’s capacity where the PAC membership has a greater balance 
of organizational representatives as members because the group's professional 
connections are spread out across multiple organizational members. 
 
5.	State	and	federal	agency	resource	commitment	
State and federal agency resource commitment contributes to PAC capacity and 
progress. Nearly every PAC member noted that consistent, flexible agency funding 
enables the PAC to influence RAP progress. In contrast, when there is a lack of resource 
commitment, the PAC capacity to function is constrained. For example, immediately 
following the creation of the St. Clair Binational PAC, the Michigan agency committed 
neither financial nor human resources to support the Binational PAC, leaving Michigan 
members to pirate resources from their home organizations to keep the RAP process 
moving along. The commitment from their Canadian counterparts’ agency to fund a 
secretariat for the Binational PAC was the key reason the group could function at the 
outset. Additionally, when the state and federal agencies commit resources to the PAC, 
the commitment is a demonstration to the PAC that the agency values the PAC’s role in 
the process. Similarly, a lack of resource commitment signals to the PAC that the 
agencies do not value the PAC’s contributions enough to invest in them. 
The commitment from state and federal agencies is a function of the budgets and 
priorities of the departments and administrations that control the AOC program. Funds 
for PAC support grants come from the federal GLRI funds funneled through the EPA. 
However, the GLRI is contingent upon Congressional support for sustained funding to 
the AOC program, and while it appears that this support will continue, there is no 
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guarantee. PACs must submit grant applications to the OGL that explains the designated 
use of the funds they request. The OGL exercises discretion over what PAC support 
grants can fund, but the state must also comport with federal restrictions imposed on PAC 
support grant funded activities. For example, PAC support grant spending excludes food 
and beverages. PAC support grants are not for ‘unrestricted’ expenses, but they do serve 
to underwrite many technical, communication, and administrative capacity needs of the 
PAC. 
 
6.	State	and	federal	actor	engagement	
Another factor that differentiates progress among AOCs is the engagement of 
state and federal actors—the individuals representing their agency. State and federal actor 
engagement matters because it embodies the agency’s attentiveness and commitment to 
PAC needs and priorities. Agency representatives’ engagement through their physical 
presence at PAC meetings helps demonstrate that the agencies are putting skin in the 
game; taking the time and expense to be in the room with the PAC is an investment of 
sweat equity. When representatives show up in person for a PAC meeting, this signals to 
the PAC that members’ participation is an important and valuable part of the RAP 
process. Members noted that AOC Coordinators’ and OGL and GLNPO program 
managers’ absence from PAC functions signals to the PAC the agencies’ lack of 
commitment to the PAC. In many cases, PAC members noted that OGL and GLNPO 
program managers usually only show up at the end of the process, such as at BUI 
removal or delisting celebrations. On the other hand, when the OGL program managers 
began giving PACs attention, members explained that they felt their interests were an 
agency priority: “we’re not the voice in the wilderness anymore.” 
In some cases, the AOC Coordinator’s engagement goes beyond the call of duty, 
and they broker intergovernmental cooperation within and beyond the AOC program 
purview. Brokering collaboration with other government agencies matters because it 
enables communication among the AOC program and between these agencies to help 
coordinate RAP research, documentation, and implementation. For example, in 
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Menominee and St. Clair, PAC members described their AOC Coordinator2 as the 
primary, and legitimate, broker of communication, information sharing, and coordination 
with other AOC program agencies. When an AOC Coordinator brokers cooperation 
within the AOC program, they help keep track of the status of the planning, assessment, 
management, and monitoring actions that other agencies conduct. By coordinating, the 
state agency representatives can share information and communicate with their 
counterparts in other agencies to avoid delays and hasten progress. 
Progress also occurs under the auspices of other government programs beyond the 
jurisdiction of the AOC program. There is a vast constellation of federal and state 
bureaucrats overseeing water quality improvement programs that overlap with AOC 
program objectives. However, the other agencies and departments administering these 
programs have no formal connection to, or communication with, the OGL AOC program 
office. Because of their legitimacy as a government employee, AOC Coordinators can be 
active in generating intergovernmental cooperation and bring the RAP implementation 
agenda to the attention of other government agencies. Because of their professional 
network connections to, and rapport with, the representatives of other government agency 
programs, the AOC Coordinators may, therefore, be credible brokers of 
intergovernmental coordination. 
State and federal actor engagement is a function of the formal mechanisms for 
intergovernmental communication. The St. Clair AOC has a Canadian RAP 
Implementation Committee (CRIC) and Four Agency Managers Work Group, and the 
Menominee AOC has a Technical Advisory Committee (TAC). However, in the cases 
studied here where the AOC is exclusively under Michigan’s jurisdiction, there are no 
formal mechanisms for intergovernmental communication between and among state and 
federal agencies. In these cases, state and federal actor engagement is a function of the 
individual agent’s discretion. As some PAC members recognized, there is “turf” among 
government agencies and programs, and there is not a natural tendency for 
intergovernmental cooperation to occur without effort above and beyond the expectations 
of the AOC Coordinator’s role. Similarly, try as they may, an AOC Coordinator cannot 
                                                
2 Including the AOC Coordinator equivalent representatives from Wisconsin and Ontario for Menominee and St. Clair 
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coerce the cooperation of other agencies, and brokering intergovernmental coordination 
is beyond the OGL’s control. 
 
7.	PAC’s	robust	translational	capacity	
Progress occurs where PACs have robust translational capacity because 
participants with technical and communication skills enable the PAC to effectively advise 
agencies about the criteria for, and progress of, the RAP process. The RAP process 
revolves around documenting the need for, and outcomes of, remediation, and thus PAC 
participants must understand the documents at each step of the process. RAP documents 
can include Stage 1 and 2 RAPs, BUI removal criteria and reports, RAP updates, studies 
and assessments, fact sheets, research reports, and letters. The “clunky lexicon” of the 
AOC program’s specialized terminology can impede members’ engagement in the 
process, and people can lose interest when RAP documents are inaccessible or filled with 
meaningless jargon. Dense or complex RAP documents take more time for PAC 
members to understand and deliberate; PAC members described the workload of 
reviewing RAP documents as tedious and slow, even “dreadful.” Other obstacles include 
losing valuable time in meetings to sidebars or arguments stemming from members’ lack 
of understanding of documents under discussion. 
On the other hand, communicating complex technical documents in accessible 
terms makes it possible for members to understand and discuss the problem objectively. 
PACs can keep membership more engaged in deliberations when they translate their 
documents into plain, meaningful language. Everyone in the group understands the 
substance of what they are deliberating and advising when their group’s collective skill 
set encompasses the technical know-how needed to translate the complexities of the 
issues and their solutions. 
The PAC’s ability to advise the state agency is a function of the PAC’s 
membership composition and the technical and communication capacity of its members. 
PAC members with the technical and communication skills to interpret RAP documents 
are more commonly organizational representatives with professional training and 
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background. Participants with technical and communications knowledge enhance the 
PAC’s effective performance as an advisor to the state agency because they can 
contribute informed advice themselves. More importantly, skilled members can translate 
their understanding to enhance other members understanding. While one professional 
member may be able to explain technical details of one BUI, for example about the 
ecology of wetlands, they may not necessarily have the technical background to translate 
details for other BUIs, for instance about the chemistry of drinking water quality. Thus 
both the technical and communication skills of members shape the PAC’s translational 
capacity and thus efficacy to function as an advisor on RAP development and 
implementation. 
The group’s translational capacity is also a function of the financial assets 
available to a PAC to compensate contributors for their time spent conducting technical 
evaluations or translating complex documents into accessible communications. A PAC’s 
efficacy as an advisory body is enhanced when it has the funds to invest in activities 
beyond RAP implementation per se and can invest in hiring members or third parties as 
contractors to translate technical documents. Most commonly, PACs underwrite their 
translational capacity through OGL PAC Support Grants. These grants mostly fund: 
contractors compiling technical reports, compensation for member or staff time spent 
administrating PAC meeting business, public education activities, and certain aspects of 
delisting celebrations. For example, in Saginaw, grant funds were used to hire Public 
Sector Consultants to write the “Measures of Success” (2000) report that initially set 
targets for their BUI delisting criteria. PAC members in some cases noted that lulls in 
AOC program funding precluded hiring contractors and staff to perform these necessary 
translational functions. 
A PAC’s translational capacity is a function of the state agency’s technical 
assistance to the PAC, where it occurs. In St. Clair and Menominee, there are separate 
government committees that focus on technical aspects of RAP development and 
implementation. However, the AOC Coordinator is typically the only overlapping 
member between the PAC and the interagency technical body. At PAC meetings, the 
4. Synthesis: Why AOCs Differ in their Progress 
 109 
AOC Coordinator3 answers members’ questions, gives presentations, and generally helps 
to clarify RAP documents produced by the technical committee. Sometimes the AOC 
Coordinator interprets technical RAP document details for the PAC as the main point of 
contact between the PAC and government agencies. State AOC Coordinators possess the 
knowledge to understand the scientific complexity of the environmental problems in 
AOCs. The AOC Coordinators face the challenging task of ensuring RAP documents 
conform to the highest standards of scientific quality and accuracy, while also 
communicating plain-language interpretations of complex technical information so that 
PAC members can make educated decisions and provide the state with informed advice. 
Finally, the state’s translation for PACs is a function of the PAC’s trust in the 
agency. Where the PACs can trust the state agency, PAC members may accept or review 
only the ‘translated’ documents provided by their AOC Coordinator. However, where the 
PAC members distrust the government, the group may not accept abridged or summary 
documents and need the AOC Coordinator to provide the PAC with the raw data, 
research findings, or official report drafts for their independent review. 
 
8.	Public	understanding	and	support	
Public understanding enables community support for AOC remediation and 
stewardship projects. PAC public education and outreach initiatives help to foster this 
public understanding and community support. In most AOCs, there are striking 
differences in public understanding and awareness of the environmental problems, which 
undermines local support for remedial solutions. Presently, PACs vary in prioritizing 
such outreach initiatives. PAC members from Kalamazoo, St. Clair, and White Lake 
evaluated the effectiveness of their public education positively and observed that 
focusing on “building the knowledge base” in the community enabled public support for 
the process. For example, White Lake PAC members emphasized that their public 
education efforts were integral to attaining community buy-in that enabled their swift 
                                                
3 And, where applicable, ex-officio state agency members 
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RAP progress. On the other hand, some PACs do not have any public outreach initiatives 
of their own. 
Public understanding is a function of the interaction the public has with the water 
resource. PAC members explained that a local population of active water users enables 
local support because of the visibility of the problems and their improvements. The 
community support for remedial solutions is greater where active water users directly 
benefit from visible restoration. Firsthand water users are the most aware of the visible 
water quality improvements and get “excited” about stewarding the resource into the 
future. However, due to differences in understanding about the environmental problems 
in the AOC, public support favors “showy” remedial actions over “invisible” ones. It is 
insufficient to rely on water users’ firsthand experiences with visible impairments and 
improvements to enable understanding of the problem and ownership of the solutions. 
For example, in St. Clair, even with a supportive user community and local sense of place 
tied to the waters, there are public complaints about restored habitat sites because they 
are perceived to impede human use of the riverside. One St. Clair Binational PAC 
member noted the importance of PAC’s role to focus public awareness about these 
‘invisible’ problems because they are complex to understand, the effects are out of sight, 
and the solutions occur mostly underwater. PACs that work to shed light onto the 
invisible issues through their education campaigns help to build public support for and 
make progress on important BUIs that may otherwise be out of sight and out of mind. 
A PAC’s public outreach efforts are also critical for building local support for 
long-term remediation into the future beyond AOC delisting. For example, the St. Clair 
Binational PAC has delegated many public education tasks to its non-profit organization 
‘arm,’ Friends of the St. Clair River (FOSCR US). Binational PAC members explained 
that building public awareness is important to gain community buy-in that will sustain the 
FOSCR group’s efforts into the future, after the St. Clair AOC delists and the Binational 
PAC (presumably) dissolves. 
The PAC’s capacity to undertake public education initiatives that build public 
understanding and support for remediation is a function of PAC membership 
composition. For example, several PACs created community-friendly versions of their 
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Stage 2 RAP: like the White Lake Community Action Plan (White Lake Public Advisory 
Council 2002), or the Kalamazoo Beauty and the Beast report (Kalamazoo River 
Watershed Public Advisory Council 1998). These PAC-authored documents were made 
possible because of the technical and communication capacity of PAC members at the 
time. A PAC’s ability to translate technical information into accessible and clear 
communications that are disseminated through the group’s public education initiatives 
enables the public to understand the problems and support the solutions under 
consideration.  
 
9.	Effective	PAC	leadership	
Progress occurs in AOCs where PACs have effective leadership because they 
effectively manage the process. PAC members across all cases commented that a key 
reason for their progress was their group’s leadership, most often the Chair of the Board 
or paid staff. They noted their leadership is the “keystone” holding the PAC together, 
making it strong by fostering respect of the process and respect among the participants. 
PAC members respect the RAP process when the PAC leadership fairly enforces the 
rules of procedure. Effective leadership creates an incentive for stakeholders to 
participate because members know the leader will protect and respect every interest 
around the table by ensuring the ground rules of the process are respected. Effective 
leaders can provide focus in PAC meetings and reel in members that may take the agenda 
off track. Conversely, PAC members noted that leaders that are not effective process 
managers have loose reins on meeting decorum that undermines the group’s capacity to 
stay focused on objectives and listen to one another. 
Effective PAC leadership is a function of “separating the people from the 
problem” (Fisher and Ury 1981) by focusing on a common goal instead of on assigning 
blame for the problems. PAC members credited their progress to leaders who keep the 
group’s focus on articulating, and then achieving, the PAC’s common goal. As several 
members also noted, PAC participants do not all have to agree with the leader on the 
substance of the issues for the leader’s guiding presence to focus the group on its 
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common goal. By effectively facilitating and managing the process, leaders enable 
participants’ faith that their interests will be represented in the group’s common goal. For 
example, Menominee PAC members attested that their leadership facilitated an effective 
consensus process for jointly writing up their common goals.4  
 
Discussion	
What these nine factors have in common is that they are all dynamic and 
impermanent. Over the course of three decades, each PAC may have had many of these 
factors at some point, but over time these factors have come and gone in response to 
changes in the internal or external context in which they operate. Factors PACs possess 
today may not be sustained into the future. Therefore, the key to progress is not the mere 
presence or absence of these factors. Instead, progress occurs where PACs and agencies 
have mechanisms in place that are attentive to the changes in these dynamic factors, 
where their focus is not only on the goal of RAP implementation and water quality 
improvements but also on these key process factors that shape the PACs’ ability to 
influence progress. Progress occurs where PACs and agencies cultivate these nine 
dynamic factors as they change over time, and are deliberate about, and attentive to, the 
process of community-based collaboration, not only the technical mechanisms and 
outcomes of RAP implementation. 
                                                
4 This became the “Lower Menominee Desired Future State” and “Ecosystem Goals and Objectives for Restoration of 
Impaired Uses” sections of their 1990 Stage 1 RAP (Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources and Michigan 
Department of Natural Resources 1990, 181) 
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Chapter	5	
Conclusions	and	Recommendations	
In 1987, the vision of including public input to guide the remediation of Great 
Lakes Areas of Concern was one of “ecological democracy” (Hartig and Zarull 1992). 
Early literature focused on principles for convening PACs and emphasizes the “essential” 
(17) role of maximizing “broad-based” (Hartig and Law 1994, 858) stakeholder 
involvement as the venue for “substantive local participation” (Mackenzie 1997, 177). 
These early studies examined the AOC program just as PACs were forming and provide a 
theoretical framing of factors believed to influence public participation in the RAP 
process. In contrast, this study draws on empirical results from 30-plus years of Michigan 
PACs’ experience in the implementation of this community-based collaborative 
ecosystem management. While the early literature focused on the initial phase of 
convening PACs, these theoretical studies accurately anticipated several of the factors 
identified by PAC members in this study as shaping their ability to influence 
implementation progress. Many of the themes identified in the early literature focused on 
what would bring stakeholders to the table, but some also described factors that would 
keep stakeholders at the table during the implementation phase. 
This chapter discusses the consonant themes from the early AOC literature that 
PAC members identified as factors, as well as the novel insights from this study not 
previously recognized in past studies. It reflects more broadly on lessons learned from the 
AOC program and implications that apply to a range of community-based collaborative 
ecosystem management initiatives. Finally, it provides recommendations to the State of 
Michigan's Area of Concern program, organized according to the nine findings from the 
previous chapter. Several recommendations echo the advice posited in the early literature 
more than two decades ago, while other recommendations focus on implications derived 
from the novel insights provided by PAC members participating in this study. 
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Themes	and	implications	
Early studies anticipated the vital role of, and challenge to, coordination across a 
large geographic area with complex government jurisdictions and multiple community 
networks. In theory, PACs could provide a mechanism to link networks of community 
organizations working on different facets of water quality in an AOC. While the early 
vision was for the PAC to serve as a locus for building coalitions among regional 
organizations, participants in this study acknowledged that these linkages are a function 
of individuals within these organizations that have a personal interest in participation. 
Similarly, early literature noted this coordination would take a concerted effort that 
“needs to be complemented with governmental commitments to intra- and inter-agency 
coordination” (Hartig and Law 1994, 861). Hartig and Zarull (1992) recognized the 
importance of coordinating other local, state, and federal remedial actions: “the greatest 
short-term progress is achieved when the effectiveness and coordination of existing state, 
provincial, and federal pollution control programs is improved” (28). More than twenty 
years later, PAC members noted water quality benefits accrued to their AOC from 
government actions beyond the AOC programs, but that silos and turf between 
government departments are constraints to coordination among these programs. Absent a 
clear mechanism, remedial actions across these multiple agencies over the course of 30 
years has lacked institutionalized coordination and as a result, have been challenging to 
track. Where this coordination occurred, it has been a function of the individuals in the 
PAC and their interorganizational network connections, or their AOC Coordinator’s 
discretion serving in a brokering role. 
Early studies emphasized the critical role of government commitment and 
engagement from the local, state, and federal agencies and noted that support primarily 
exists “at the individual level rather than the institutional level” (Mackenzie 1997, 178). 
PAC members in this study noted that this lack of institutional commitment persisted for 
two more decades and that the Great Lakes Restoration Initiative (GLRI) in the mid-
2000s institutionalized and invigorated state and federal commitments, while local 
government engagement continues to lag. Landre and Knuth (1993) noted the role of the 
“local economy... as a factor influencing the success of public involvement in remedial 
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action planning” (160), and PAC members in this study similarly identified issues of 
austerity that have influenced local governments’ ability to commit resources to the 
implementation of remedial actions. 
Interestingly, past literature overlooked the role of private sector commitment and 
engagement in the PACs, which members in this study identified as a constraint to 
influencing RAP implementation progress where it is lacking, and a boon where it is 
present. Much like the involvement and coordination across multiple government 
departments and community networks is a function of interested individuals rather than 
institutional commitment, this pattern is also present in the participation of the private 
sector. Engagement of industry and commercial stakeholders in the non-regulatory AOC 
program is a function of the interest of individuals more so than the commitment of the 
corporation. More often, other regulatory programs catalyze private sector investment in 
the implementation of remedial solutions. 
Much of the early literature overlooked the internal factors influencing the PAC 
groups’ origins, structure, function, process, and management. Part of this gap is a 
function of collecting data from agency representatives rather than PAC members 
themselves; this is reflected in the literature's focus on issues like facilitation by state 
agencies, government accountability to the public, and generalizations about public 
stakeholders’ inertia and lack of hope for cleanup. Similarly, the vision of the PACs as 
operationalizing an ecosystem approach to management posited a paradigm wherein all 
participants were equal members of a team. The PAC model would, in theory, empower 
all stakeholders with “sufficient authority” as a mechanism to increase “individual and 
collective responsibility” for the RAP process (Hartig and Law 1994, 859). 
PAC member perceptions from this study provide novel insights into the reality of 
the challenges to shared control among PACs and state and federal agencies, as well as 
factors like the PAC’s internal leadership, the commitment of PAC members, their 
motivations and incentives for getting and staying involved. One phenomenon not 
foreseen in early literature is the membership attrition that occurs over the course of a 
long process. While a stake in the problems may have drawn participants to the table, 
many leave the PAC following the resolution of ‘their’ single issue; thus PACs have 
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dwindled to small core groups of interested individuals motived by a holistic, ecosystem-
level vision for the AOC.  
The thirty-plus year natural experiment of the Great Lakes Areas of Concern 
program reinforces lessons from the broader literature on community-based collaborative 
ecosystem management, as well as provides some novel implications for the field. It 
affirms the imperative for balancing government control and authority, recognizing that 
both process and people matter, and ensuring that those involved in the collaborative 
process have network connections that help inform and enable the process. 
Community-based collaboration is a mechanism for enabling government 
accountability to the public, provided “two process prerequisites [are] met: affected 
groups need to be able and willing to participate, and norms of good process management 
need to be followed” (Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000, 238). This implicates not only the 
convening agencies as the ultimate decision-makers, but all the participants: “the burden 
for achieving a representative, inclusive, productive, and credible process is shared by the 
parties to the process” (239). The challenge then lies in balancing government 
accountability to the public interest with the inherent government responsibility and 
control derived from their statutory authority over the decision points of the process. PAC 
members in this study articulated in their own words many of these norms that appear in 
the literature, including “facilitation” (108), “well-managed meetings” (110), and “an 
efficient organizational structure” (112). The experience of PAC members over 30 years 
of community-based collaboration reinforces the literature’s stated importance of crafting 
and attending to a well-designed process that respects the governments’ obligations as 
decision-makers while at the same time empowers participants’ “direction-setting” (Gray 
1985, 927) of the implementation agenda. The difference between typical top-down 
government decision-making with limited, one-way public input and community-based 
collaborative efforts, such as PACs, empowers participants with the “trinity of voice:” 
access to the potential for being heard, standing to be a “heard” and respected voice in the 
process, and influence to change the outcomes of the process (Walker, Senecah, and 
Daniels 2006, 194). The key to balancing government control with mechanisms for 
accountability to the public interest lies in the empowerment of participants to participate 
in a well-managed, and therefore valuable, process. 
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The emphasis of the literature on collaborative processes notes that the norms of 
good process management manifest in both tangible procedural structures and intangible 
elements associated with the people involved. An effective community-based 
collaborative process that promotes government accountability to the public is comprised 
of the tangible “bricks” (Wondolleck and Yaffee 2017, 9): the foundational structure of 
the process like organizational structures, resources, roles, and responsibilities. Effective 
process is also comprised of intangible “mortar” (9) that holds the process together, such 
as the relationships among participants, their individual and collective motivations for 
participating, and their commitment to the process (9). The collaborative process itself is 
conceived as “dependent on a virtuous cycle between communication, trust, commitment, 
understanding, and outcomes” (Ansell and Gash 2008, 558). PAC participants in this 
study noted all of these elements as critical to their group’s ability to influence 
implementation progress, noting that communication, trust, commitment, understanding, 
and successes along the way are a function of both institutional and individual impetus. 
Matters of process and of people are mutually reinforcing: promoting interaction, 
learning, and recognition of success codified through structural mechanisms like 
formalized intergovernmental coordination and systematic program evaluation adds to 
the value individuals see in the process, enabling greater trust, commitment, and respect 
for each other and inspiring hope for progress into the future. 
 One somewhat novel insight gleaned from PAC members’ experience in the AOC 
program is the importance of the membership composition of the group. Specifically, 
members that serve the group as representatives of regional organizations play a key role 
in linking the PAC to their interorganizational networks. The literature on community-
based collaboration posits that a groups’ access to community networks contributes to 
progress: “by developing new networks or tapping into existing ones, collaboratives can 
significantly improve their ability to translate consensus [among the group] into results 
[on the ground]” (Margerum 2011, 35). The associations of individuals matter, and 
participants that bridge PACs with other community networks are considered “boundary-
spanning” (Edelenbos et al. 2013, 8). The findings from PAC participants in this study 
suggest that who PAC members are is a factor that contributes to implementation 
progress in a community-based collaborative ecosystem management process. A PAC’s 
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membership composition influences the group’s ability to forge partnerships, broker 
intergovernmental cooperation, and solicit strategic funding. Certain PAC members that 
connect the PAC to interorganizational networks in their community can bring the 
resources of these other regional institutions to the PAC through their connections. 
Boundary-spanning PAC members who supply the group with connections to both their 
social and interorganizational network contacts can help immensely with building the 
PAC’s capacity to sustain its efforts, and enabling an enduring process. The literature on 
collaboration notes the role of “the network of relationships” in helping to “maintain the 
collaboration” (Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000, 115), and the findings of this study also 
suggest these network connections play a central role to the efficacy of a collaboration to 
succeed and endure.  
One new insight from this study is the notion that there is power in numbers when 
it comes to boundary-spanning participants. PAC participants noted that relying on just 
one member to provide the group with linkages to interorganizational networks in the 
region creates a bottleneck. Groups with a balanced membership are less vulnerable than 
groups with only one member as their connection to regional organizational networks and 
their resources and support. Like the AOC program, many community-based 
collaborative ecosystem management initiatives are not self-contained and rely on 
leveraging partnerships for implementation. Therefore a critical element of making 
progress is to attract and retain a variety of members that can broker linkages and span 
boundaries to help orchestrate the efforts of a broader coalition of interests for the goals 
of the ecosystem management initiative.  
Just as an ecosystem relies on the structure, function, and composition of the 
biotic and abiotic elements in the system, so, too, do community-based collaboratives 
require structural elements of a well-planned process, functional elements of the 
relationships among participants, and a balance of the diversity and abundance of 
participants, contributing individually and collectively toward a productive and 
sustainable outcome. 
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Recommendations	for	the	AOC	Program	
The following nine recommendations directly relate to the nine findings from the 
previous chapter, as summarized in Table 5.1. The emphasis of each recommendation is 
on strategies and management options that the State of Michigan’s Area of Concern 
program might consider for addressing these nine factors, and not a prescription of details 
for how the state’s AOC program should go about operationalizing change. 
Table 5.1: Recommendations for the AOC Program 
 Recommendations for the AOC Program Factor addressed 
1. Assess and address shared control PAC’s perceived independence and 
influence 
2. Separate roles to build trust Clearly delineated state agency roles 
3. Strive to collaboratively negotiate local 
criteria 
Clear criteria for delisting 
4. Support the PAC’s membership balance 
and strategic recruitment 
Balanced and sustained PAC 
member networks 
5. Navigate expectations of, and fluctuations 
in, funding 
State and federal agency resource 
commitment 
6. Support AOC Coordinator and program 
manager engagement 
State and federal actor engagement 
7. Assess and invest in translation PAC’s robust translational capacity 
8. Engage in strategic planning for outreach Public understanding and support 
9. Lead the process by example Effective PAC leadership 
  
 
1.	Assess	and	address	shared	control	
PACs need to have an independence of voice and feel that the OGL is taking them 
seriously as an equal partner. The PAC’s perceived influence and shared control are 
imperative for their community to view their group as a legitimate guardian of the 
public’s interest in the RAP process.  
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The OGL could strategically address the balance of control between the PAC and 
agency to match the needs of the PAC according to the context of the community and 
BUIs under consideration. Steps that could help address a PAC’s perceived independence 
and influence may include: 
• Working collaboratively with PACs to co-develop agendas; 
• Discussing expectations for shared control and articulating roles and 
responsibilities accordingly; 
• Discussing issues of public perception to enhance a shared understanding 
of the issues that may benefit from empowering the PAC with greater 
influence on the agenda; 
• Providing a deliberate mechanism for PAC feedback to continue assessing 
and addressing the dynamic need for shared control on an ongoing basis; 
and, 
• Maintaining communication with PACs throughout the process, even 
during times when the state agency may be constrained by lulls in funding. 
Some AOC coordinators already do these things on an informal, ad-hoc basis, and 
the state’s AOC program can benefit from expanding this to become a systematic 
practice. 
 
2.	Separate	roles	to	build	trust	
The state agency is both convener and stakeholder in the RAP process, and clear 
delineation of these dual roles enables PAC trust of their AOC Coordinator and supports 
implementation progress.  
In Michigan’s AOCs, a single OGL AOC Coordinator comes to the PAC table 
and serves the capacity of both the state’s convener and stakeholder roles. There are 
differences among AOCs in the clarity of PACs’ understanding about the motivations of 
their AOC Coordinators because of the two ‘hats’ they wear. There are a variety of 
strategies the OGL may consider, including:  
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• Clarifying within the state’s AOC program the expectations of the dual 
roles and responsibilities of AOC Coordinators; 
• Working jointly with each PAC to develop a “PAC Charter” that clearly 
articulates both the state and the PAC’s distinct roles and responsibilities 
(one example from Wondolleck and Yaffee (2017, 176) is the Advisory 
Council Charters used by the National Marine Sanctuary Program);1 
• Enabling the OGL AOC Coordinators to focus on one role by designating 
separate staff to represent the state’s other role; 
• Ensuring convener role staff can regularly attend PAC functions, 
potentially working out of a regional office nearby the AOC; and, 
• Exploring the opportunity for stakeholder role staff to serve multiple 
AOCs and occupy a high-level policy coordination position. 
A jointly-developed PAC Charter and the separation of roles can help to build 
PAC trust in the agency. For example, in Menominee, there is a Wisconsin state agency 
secretariat for the PAC and a separate ex-officio state agency representative to the PAC. 
Separate staff for the state’s dual roles may not be needed for every PAC but can be a 
strategy to build PACs’ trust of the agency in cases where it is lacking. 
 
3.	Strive	to	collaboratively	negotiate	local	criteria	
Clear criteria for BUI removal and delisting enable PAC participants to commit 
to, and focus on, specific endpoints to the RAP process, and are valuable because they 
enable certainty in the outcome of the process. Where PACs define local criteria instead 
of accepting state criteria, deliberations over the ‘attainability’ of local criteria can 
become adversarial negotiations between the state and the PAC. 
The PAC members’ view is that negotiating local criteria adds value to the RAP 
process, but adversarial negotiations over local criteria can become counter-productive to 
                                                
1 See: http://channelislands.noaa.gov/sac/pdfs/sac_charter_072114.pdf as an example. 
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progress. Some steps the OGL might consider for handling the negotiation process for 
defining local criteria include: 
• Striving to collaboratively negotiate local criteria, approaching the 
negotiations from a win-win (not win-lose) perspective; 
• Acknowledging that negotiating local criteria adds value to participating 
in the RAP process; 
• Supporting the PACs’ technical or other resource needs for proposing and 
negotiating evidence-based, research-backed criteria; and, 
• Enhancing the transparency of the state’s evaluation process for 
determining and negotiating the attainability of proposed local criteria.  
Negotiating local criteria is not the ‘scenic route’ to delisting; rather, it is an 
important component of the RAP process because it enables PAC members’ incentive to 
remain engaged in the process. While it may take more time to take extra steps in the 
RAP process for determining attainable local criteria, the state can find opportunities to 
make negotiations more efficient by taking a collaborative, win-win approach. 
 
4.	Support	the	PAC’s	membership	balance	and	strategic	recruitment	
PACs derive much of their RAP implementation and organizational capacity from 
the funding, cooperation, and partnerships sourced from the network connections of their 
organizationally affiliated members. Progress among AOCs occurs where PACs have a 
balanced composition of individual and organizational members, and where that balance 
sustains over time. 
The OGL has an opportunity to attend to the balance of the PAC’s membership 
composition, including strategies such as: 
• Assessing present PAC membership, including detailed attributes of 
participants such as: 
o Affiliation (i.e., individual vs. organizational representative), 
o Role in PAC, 
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o Skills and technical background, 
o Demographic attributes (i.e., age, race, gender), and 
o Represented location in the watershed/AOC; 
• Requiring PACs to systematically track membership and submit official 
member records to the OGL; 
• Encouraging PACs to clarify organizational capacity needs, including 
defining membership criteria and identifying gaps in membership balance; 
• Supporting PAC activities that build and implement strategic membership 
recruitment; 
• Providing resources to PACs for member training and team building to 
facilitate sustained membership into the future; 
• Constructing historical records of PAC membership to identify 
organizations that could resume PAC membership in the future; 
• Prioritizing resources and support for PACs where membership 
composition lacks balance or shows a pattern of shrinking down and 
possibly not sustaining into the future; and, 
• Managing membership transitions to help the PAC maintain its 
organizational network connections and balanced membership 
composition. 
Systematically tracking membership changes over time is a norm of good process 
management and a responsibility that PACs and the state shares. One of the early 
obstacles to this study was that there is a dearth of public information about PAC 
membership. Presently, the OGL Coordinators and PAC leaders have different means for 
keeping membership records. Sharing best practices from the experiences of those 
already doing so can help to establish a practical, systematic mechanism for tracking the 
balance of PAC membership composition. The OGL might also consider taking a more 
proactive role to attend to the PAC’s membership composition and help PACs anticipate 
membership changes and manage transitions to ensure that institutional memory is not 
lost. 
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5.	Navigate	expectations	of,	and	fluctuations	in,	funding	
GLRI funding to PACs through OGL support grants enables PAC capacity 
through AOC Coordinator commitment and resources for some administrative, technical, 
and public outreach needs. However, there is no guarantee of federal funding in 
perpetuity, strings attached to funding create gaps for funding other PAC capacity needs 
such as PAC members’ time spent fundraising or recruiting and training members, and 
issues with funding cycles and timing can leave PACs without funding for weeks or 
months at a time. While some PACs have had success with “cobbling” together other 
sources of funding to support their capacity, the deliverables and projects for other 
funding sources can sometimes distract PACs from RAP implementation priorities. 
Strategies the OGL might consider to ensure state commitment to the PACs, 
could include: 
• Maintaining communication and transparency with the PACs throughout 
the process to help them navigate their expectations of, and fluctuations in, 
funding that supports the state’s commitment to PACs; 
• Ensuring continuity for state AOC Coordinators, even through times of 
lean federal funding; 
• Supporting PACs to strategically pursue other, diverse funding sources 
that maintain their focus on AOC program priorities; 
• Insulating PACs from the uncertainty and timing of GLRI funding; 
• Funding essential PAC activities such as administration and technical 
contractors; 
• Compensating PAC members’ time spent on fundraising efforts focused 
explicitly on securing income to support the PAC as a self-sustaining 
organization beyond AOC delisting; 
• Underwriting PAC capacity needs that the GLRI does not (or cannot) 
fund, such as membership recruitment, member onboarding and training, 
team-building and site visits; 
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• Expanding state funding to local governments specifically to support their 
participation on the PAC and their partnership in RAP implementation 
activities; 
• Keeping the PACs appraised of the state agency’s resource constraints in a 
forthcoming and timely manner; and, 
• Pursuing opportunities at SPAC legislative meetings to build political 
support among legislators to appropriate state funds to the AOC program. 
Funding is critical for sustaining the state agency’s financial and human resource 
commitments to the PACs, but helping to manage PAC’s expectations of funding 
commitment may be even more critical to progress. 
 
6.	Support	AOC	Coordinator	and	program	manager	engagement	
In a sense, Michigan AOC Coordinators have two jobs in one: first, to attend PAC 
functions (serving the dual convener and stakeholder role). PAC members explained that 
in-person agency participation is part of what makes the RAP process valuable for PAC 
participants. AOC Coordinators’ second job is to be the AOC’s point of contact for 
communications with related agency programs across multiple government departments. 
PAC members explained that formal mechanisms for intergovernmental coordination 
helps progress; in the absence of these mechanisms, progress occurs where AOC 
Coordinators take the initiative to go above and beyond the call of duty to actively broker 
intergovernmental coordination. 
Fulfilling these two jobs in one is a significant undertaking. The focus is to find 
opportunities for synergy and provide support to AOC Coordinators and program 
managers to optimize their engagement with their counterparts at other government 
agencies and with the PACs. For example, the OGL could take steps such as: 
• Expanding the strategy currently in place for Southeast Michigan where 
AOC Coordinators work out of the field offices located close to the AOC 
site so that consistent attendance at PAC functions is practical; 
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• Exploring options for partnerships with other agency departments that 
have field offices near AOCs as a liaison to the OGL AOC program 
where it is impractical to station a dedicated AOC Coordinator locally; 
• Dedicating resources for OGL and GLNPO program managers to 
demonstrate skin-in-the-game with more frequent attendance at PAC 
functions (far in advance of when agencies “need” to be there for project 
implementation or delisting); 
• Promoting and supporting AOC Coordinators to spend their time 
communicating and coordinating with other government programs 
beyond the AOC program; 
• Convening a forum for regular, transparent intergovernmental 
coordination within and among local, state, and federal agency programs 
(such as the TAC model used in Menominee); and, 
• Considering creative solutions that transcend traditional departmental 
boundaries in other agency water quality programs to promote awareness 
and understanding of AOC program priorities. 
The intention of these recommendations is not to add to the already-full workload 
of AOC Coordinators or complicate the existing system of bureaucratic decision-making, 
but to make efficient use of existing resources through coordination and communication.  
 
7.	Assess	and	invest	in	translation	
PAC participants’ understanding of their AOC’s issues and solutions is the 
foundation of their effective advice and input, and participants depend on each others’ 
ability to translate complex science across a wide range of ecosystem management topics. 
AOC Coordinators can also provide translation and enhance understanding, but some 
groups require more transparency from the government due to lack of trust. Sometimes 
PACs hire contractors to help translate technical information to fulfill their advisory role 
effectively. 
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The OGL AOC program may consider taking steps to build a PAC’s translational 
capacity, such as: 
• Working together with the PAC to assess the group members’ current 
technical and communication skills to identify what areas of technical 
expertise each group possess and needs; 
• Assessing the extent to which PACs trust or distrust AOC Coordinators’ 
assistance with translation; 
• Building the PAC’s understanding of the agency’s positions by enhancing 
transparency in the state’s translations of technical information; 
• Promoting cross-PAC learning by supporting technical experts from 
different AOCs to provide assistance and guidance to other PACs; and, 
• Investing in technical contractors to provide translations and promote 
understanding to ensure effective PAC advice and input. 
A PAC’s translational needs are context-specific and may change over time with 
changes to membership or depending on the issues. The focus of these strategies is on 
maximizing PAC members’ informed deliberation of the issues and understanding of the 
problems and solutions. 
 
8.	Engage	in	strategic	planning	for	outreach	
Public understanding of the environmental problems and their solutions enables 
community buy-in for supporting remedial actions in AOCs, but invisible problems and 
solutions are more challenging to build public understanding and support. Public outreach 
was an early priority articulated in many AOC’s Stage 1 RAP document. However, for 
many PACs, their subsequent efforts have prioritized developing the Stage 2 RAP and 
drawn their focus toward implementation and away from public education and outreach 
initiatives. Similarly, the introduction of GLRI funds for remediation creates an incentive 
to focus on implementing remedial actions to remove BUIs. As interviewees in this study 
noted, progress occurs where PACs engage directly, or with partners, to promote public 
understanding and build support through education and outreach initiatives. 
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The OGL AOC program may consider strategies that address the PACs’ need for 
public understanding and support, including: 
• Supporting PACs with engagement and investment in strategic planning 
for public outreach and education initiatives; 
• Encouraging PACs to identify and engage in partnerships with local and 
regional organizations to include AOC program priorities into existing 
public education and outreach initiatives addressing water quality; 
• Investing in the implementation of a PAC’s strategic public outreach plan; 
and, 
• Prioritizing education and outreach activities that can evolve into self-
sustaining or fundraising opportunities so that PACs can continue these 
efforts beyond delisting when AOC program investment is no longer 
available to the PAC. 
Some of these strategies are already in place in some PACs, but the AOC program 
could benefit from making these a priority for every AOC. For example, the FOSCR 
Canada and FOSCR US organizations are a product of the St. Clair River Binational 
PAC’s strategic approach to accomplishing public outreach. As the St. Clair Binational 
PAC discovered with the FOSCR US group’s annual Sturgeon Festival, some public 
outreach activities that begin as expenses can evolve into self-sustaining or even 
fundraising opportunities. 
 
9.	Lead	the	process	by	example	
Effective PAC leadership is an important factor because it enables effective 
process management. Where leaders manage the process effectively, participants with 
divergent interests and goals can focus together on a common goal because the process is 
perceived to be fair and all participants have a chance to be heard. While the state agency 
is not, and should not be, the leader of the PAC, the state agency plays a leadership role 
insofar as they serve as the convener of the RAP process. Furthermore, each PAC has 
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differing levels of expectations of the degree to which the state agency should have 
leadership in the RAP process.  
The OGL AOC Coordinators have the opportunity to lead the RAP process by 
example and provide a robust baseline of leadership to help sustain the RAP process 
during times of PAC leadership transitions or challenges. Another opportunity for 
enhancing progress in AOCs is to support PAC leaders to ensure effective process 
management. Steps the OGL AOC program might consider include: 
• Supporting PAC leaders and members with opportunities for training and 
assistance for effective process management;  
• Creating opportunities for PAC dialogue and feedback to provide trouble-
shooting that supports effective process management by PAC leadership; 
• Assessing PAC members’ expectations for the state’s leadership role in 
the process and calibrating the level of state leadership accordingly, 
• Assisting PACs with clarifying and articulating ground rules for meetings, 
and adhering to these ground rules; 
• Encouraging the PACs to undertake consensus (rather than majority-rules) 
decision-making; 
• Providing PACs with training or support for developing and abiding by 
consensus rules; 
• Articulating details about the steps in, or requirements of, the RAP 
process; and 
• Providing PACs with advance notice and opportunity for feedback when 
federal or state agencies modify RAP process steps or requirements. 
The state agency does not have authority over the PAC’s leadership, therefore 
leading the process by example and supporting PAC leadership’s effective process 
management are strategies that can enable the state to help the PACs address their 
leadership needs without interfering with the PAC’s autonomy. 
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Looking	back,	looking	forward		
 This study provides insights from PAC participants’ experiences over the past 
three decades and provides a current analysis of the AOC program from the PAC 
participants’ vantage point. As discussed earlier, several consonant themes emerge from 
both the perspectives of government officials from the early AOC literature and the PAC 
participants’ perspectives in this study. However, the literature provides the perspectives 
of government officials from 20 years ago. Further, the unit of analysis in this study is at 
the individual PAC participant level, and not officials at the government level. Given the 
emergence of consonant themes across units of analysis and eras in time, this is a 
compelling reason for future research to explore common and divergent perspectives on 
AOC progress including both the individual PAC participant level and government 
official level units of analysis. It would be informative to understand how government 
officials’ perspectives have or have not changed over time and to understand the 
contemporary themes and factors shared among PAC participants and government 
officials. 
While this study provides many insights into the factors that influence the efficacy 
of public engagement in the progress of environmental decision-making exclusive to the 
AOC program, several broader questions remain for future research, such as: 
• What lessons can be drawn from understanding the similarities and 
differences between AOC PACs and other models of public advisory 
entities for community-based collaborative ecosystem management 
processes? 
• Are there differences in implementation progress where local government 
representatives are or are not included in a community-based collaborative 
process? 
• Are there differences in environmental outcomes of remediation where 
private sector representatives are or are not included in a community-
based collaborative process? 
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By looking back at the past three decades of Michigan’s Area of Concern 
program, this study provides an opportunity for the State of Michigan’s AOC program to 
learn from the experiences and perspectives of PAC participants and carry these lessons 
into the future of the AOC program’s management and priorities. Looking forward there 
are opportunities not only for the AOC program to make changes that better enable PACs 
to influence progress, but also for other government programs to undertake community-
based collaborative ecosystem management initiatives. As governments continue to react 
to emergent water quality issues, and as the public increasingly demands accountability, 
transparency, and democracy in the processes to improve water quality, the AOC 
program is both an exemplary and cautionary tale of how to manage the process of 
community-based collaborative ecosystem management initiatives.
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